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Introduction 
 
The US presidential elections of 2016 proved for some the limited possibilities of a two-
party oligarchic system and the imperative need to represent more diverse political voices 
in the electorate. However, the crisis of the party system in America is not to be confused 
as the cause of the decay of the Republic but rather it is the increasing inequality that has 
been creeping into our political economy since the Reagan Administration that made 
possible the fatal choice in 2016 between the neoliberal globalism of the Clintons and the 
fascist populism of the Trumps. 
Political theory understands parties as professional machines isolated from 
society. In many senses, party politics takes place independently of social and economic 
phenomena. This work aims to show how partisanship is a phenomenon already 
embedded in the dynamic forces and struggles in society, even before the existence of 
formal parties, and shows the need for another philosophical understanding of 
partisanship than the dominant framework used thus far. 
In doing so, I retrace contemporary and ancient philosophical prejudices against 
parties and partisanship, and demonstrate through a new reading of Hegel and Marx, how 
a reframing of the philosophical can be compatible with partisan views, surpassing the 
moralism and idealism that characterize the dominant philosophical view of parties and 
politics. I call this re-framing speculative while the dominant paradigm I name it 
antinomian. In the speculative outlook, opposites are framed in a single political unity 
and at the same time they maintain their excluding differences. In the antinomian view, 
political opposition is a problem that must be resolved outside politics, in the realm of 
ethics or theology. 
I show that the speculative perspective allows us to comprehend politics in its 
own terms without abandoning the conceptual rigor and metaphysical pitch of 
philosophy. The antinomian perspective on the other hand attempts to discipline politics 
with the jurisprudence of the concept and in this manner leaves politics unknown. One 
vision belongs to the realist tradition defending something like an autonomy of politics; 
the other perspective violates such independence and it reduces itself paradoxically to 
condemnations or praise of the political without adding or subtracting substance. 
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The work of Marx and the revolutionary tradition that originates with Lenin 
reframed the notion of the partisan and demonstrated that first, partisanship operates still 
in the depths of the private sphere, in the imperative transactions that capitalism demands 
from us, and also, that this phenomena is one of the highest philosophical order, to be 
understood from the most advanced philosophical system produced by modernity -
German idealism- and to be practiced not in the halls of universities but in the councils 
and meetings of political parties. In other words, speculative consciousness is fulfilled in 
practice, a timeless philosophical ideal if there ever was one that disappeared with the 
professionalization of philosophy and the privatization of public life. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
CHAPTER 1 
PARTISANSHIP AND POLITICAL REASON 
 
“Whoever has reflected little on the nature of an Assembly cannot fail to see that 
without an opposition, such Assembly is without inner and outer life. It is precisely 
this antagonism within it that forms its essence and justification. Without it, it has 
the appearance of only one party or just a clump.”  –Hegel 
 
“One of the most widespread and unhealthy symptoms of public life is the contempt 
(if not open hostility) that is displayed towards adherence to a party. It is 
characteristic of political free lances, and political adventurers to repudiate party 
affiliations and to talk pompously about party ‘bigotry’, ‘dogmatism’, intolerance, 
and so on, and so forth. Serious politics can only be promoted by the masses; non-
party masses that do not follow the lead of a strong party are, however, disunited, 
ignorant masses, without staying power, prone to become a plaything in the hands of 
adroit politicians, who always emerge ‘opportunely’ from the ranks of the ruling 
classes to take advantage of ‘favorable’ circumstances.” –Lenin 
 
“Parties live in a house of power.” –Weber 
 
Introduction: The Will to Party 
2012 was a momentous year. The people of the world took the streets to demand 
political freedoms and economic justice. From ousting dictators to checking the banks, 
democratic energy burst in ways unseen in 30 years.  
The Reaction was swift. One raïs replaced another in Cairo with customary 
American backing. Civil war exploded in Libya and Syria on French bidding and 
Washington “leading from behind.” From Athens to Budapest, even as far north as 
Helsinki, far-right populism is now experiencing a new golden age. Obama’s imperial 
humanitarianism funded suspicious pro-democracy movements in Venezuela and 
Ukraine. As William Robinson writes, “The purpose of [US] ‘democracy promotion’ is 
not to suppress but to penetrate and conquer civil society in intervened countries, that is, 
the complex of ‘private’ organization such as political parties, trade unions, the media, 
and so forth, and from therein, integrate subordinate classes and national groups into a 
hegemonic transnational social order.” 1 
There is one crucial difference between both popular movements. In Cairo and 
Madrid, protests targeted the political and economic elite; in Kiev and Caracas, pro-
                                                          
1
 William I. Robinson, 1996, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, Intervention, and US Hegemony. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.29 
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Western oligarchies organized demonstrations to topple democratically elected leaders. 
These are two forms of partisanship with two opposite concepts of democracy, one of 
participation, the other to cement class power. Turning the tide to 40 years of neoliberal 
depoliticization, these developments show that not only rich elites, but the ordinary 
citizenry attach great importance to parties and political agitation.  
Political change is practically impossible in the absence of durable parties. Parties 
provide leadership and organization to embryonic movements and an invaluable economy 
of energy to the people. The Left is not the only one that is aware of needing a party 
organization, even if such awareness is brought by its current defeat. Two recent 
examples in US politics suffice. Without broad popular support, the Tea Party’s 
consistent leadership and deep pockets have penetrated the Republican Party becoming a 
third force in US politics. Occupy Wall Street was finished in its first New York winter. 
Having no specific program, ideology, leadership and organization, Occupy was seen 
more as a public nuisance that the Wall Street-funded NYPD quickly scattered. In its lack 
of ideological articulation, Occupy wasted a precious opportunity to appeal to the 
working class. The only tangible result, however, was to install the idea of the “99%” in 
ordinary speech. The Tea Party in contrast commands three State executives (Indiana, 
Kansas, and Wisconsin) and controls over 20 elected officials in federal legislature
2
. 
Parties are the most important organizations of today’s ‘competitive’ regimes. 
They have been key agents of political development, of revolutions and 
counterrevolutions in the modern era. Parties mediate civil society and the State; their 
history draws an arc from being civil associations to the monopoly of the State, of 
forming party-States (Parteienstaat), as Gerhard Leibholz called it in the 1920s. Leibholz 
believed that parties activated the masses and bound them to the State. Thus, parties had a 
foundational role in modern politics. Without “the interposition of these organizations, 
                                                          
2
 “A political organization capable of handling such colossal tasks cannot arise spontaneously or 
haphazardly; it has to be continuously, consistently and consciously built. It is not only foolish but fatal to 
take a lackadaisical attitude toward party-building or its problems. The bitter experiences of so many 
revolutionary opportunities aborted, mismanaged, and ruined over the past half century by inadequate or 
treacherous leaderships has incontestably demonstrated that nonchalance in this vital area is a sure formula 
for disorientation and defeat.” James P. Cannon, “The Revolutionary Party and Its Role in the Struggle 
for Socialism”, International Socialist Review, Vol.28 No.5, September-October 1967. 
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the people would today be an amorphous mass, politically powerless and helplessly 
vegetating to and fro” 3.  
Yet the rapports of parties with the masses are always shifting, forming cycles of 
demobilization and mobilization, from elitism to populism and back. At the beginning of 
the democratic era, parties were elite organizations concerned with managing class power 
in a world of restricted participation. This type of elite party in Western Europe was not 
fully integrated into the nascent State bureaucracy of old aristocrats and clergy
4
. Later, by 
populating parliaments and with their newly acquired political functions, they 
progressively assimilated to the emerging liberal State.  
The opposite of the elite party, the mass party, was born with universal suffrage 
and the political enfranchisement of labor. With the workers’ entrance into party politics, 
political energies shifted to matters of equality and wealth redistribution
5
.  Parties at this 
stage were popular social movements rather than private clubs or bureaucratic structures 
and they often entered into conflict with existing semi-liberal and liberal States. Mass 
parties were ruled by the logic of opposition, not only to other parties, but to existing 
[autocratic or semi-democratic] States –the Bolsheviks being this type of party par 
excellence. At these early stages of competition and ideological struggle, parties 
functioned also as political schools for the classes and the groups they represented
6
. Thus 
socialist parties provided political literacy for the working class; conservative religious 
parties concentrated in rural regions to secure peasant loyalty through patronage with 
landed gentry; liberal parties mobilized the interests of urban middle classes and the petty 
                                                          
3
 See Anna-Bettina Kaiser (ed), 2013, Der Parteienstaat. Zum Staatsverständnis von Gerhard 
Leibholz. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 
4
 See Arno Mayer, 2010, The Persistence of the Old Regime, London: Verso, for bourgeois 
compliance and cooperation with the old aristocracy. 
5
 These events were decried by a conservative Carl Schmitt, insofar old relations of property were at 
risk with advances in democratization. For Schmitt, politicization and depoliticization 
corresponded to shifting the arenas of debate from politics to technology. Thus, religious 
controversies were neutralized in the Age of Enlightenment with a deistic God. The controversies 
shifted to politics and to the moral education of men. In the 19
th
 century, enlightened pedagogy was 
substituted by political economy where technical distribution of goods and resources became the 
central problem and site of controversy. In the modern era, parties mobilized the masses through 
economic empowerment, then economics became depoliticized in technical politics, and parties 
now seek to mobilize the masses according to new cleavages and lines of division, such as identity 
politics or nationalism. See Carl Schmitt, 2007, The Concept of the Political, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press 
6
 See Danilo Zolo, 1992, Democracy and Complexity, University Park: Penn State University Press, 
pp.118-121 
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bourgeoisie. In sum, mass parties oriented the people, which in the words of Schumpeter, 
“are incapable of action other than a stampede.” The evolution of parties from private 
associations to mass organizations corresponded to the increasing social differentiation 
brought by industrial and economic modernization
7
.  
After the 1960s, de-politicization in the West swept in to counter mass power.    
Party members lost their influence; partisans from specific groups and classes were 
ignored in order to attract voters with the so--called “catch-all parties”. This last phase is 
the party, especially the American party-type, as a striking electoral machine more 
concerned with securing funds rather than partisans, with seeking office rather than 
seeking policies. This transmutation explains why American parties since the 1970s 
declined in mass membership and soared in influence and power. According to 
Schlesinger,  
“Political parties do not control their nominations, yet win elections; whose support 
among the electorate has declined while their electoral record improves; parties whose 
organizations have supposedly decomposed, yet whose personnel and payrolls have 
blossomed; parties that have no control over their members, yet present clear partisan 
choices to the electorate”8. 
 
To wit, post-partisan parties prevented social change, turning people skeptical of 
the political process
9
. In the United States, while parties are at an all-time low in their 
legitimacy among voters, they are also at their peak as agents of enormous influence
10
. 
Parties with real possibility of winning office are divorced from their mass membership 
                                                          
7
 Writing against pluralists, E.E. Schattschneider and Joseph Schumpeter soon recognized the 
bureaucratization and professionalization of parties of every hue. Ironically, both American party 
theorists characterized Western democratic parties in much the same way liberals disparage 
Leninist organizations -undemocratic, top-down, elite structures composed of professional 
partisans. See Joseph Schumpeter, 2003, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, London: Routledge, 
p.283. See also E.E. Schattschneider, 1942. Party Government: American Government in Action. 
Transaction, p. 58. 
8
 Joseph Schlesinger, 1994. Political Parties and the Winning of Office. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, p.10 
9
 Many scholars contest the assumption of a generalized apathy in the American electorate, arguing 
that the increased polarization between Democrats and Republicans cause a rise in partisanship 
and party identity. See Morris P. Fiorina and Samuel J. Abrams, 2008, “Political Polarization in the 
American Public”, Annual Review of Political Science, pp.563-588; Marc J. Hetherington, 2001, 
“Resurgent Mass Partisanship: The Role of Elite Polarization”, The American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 95, No. 3, pp. 619-631; Mark Brewer, 2005, “The Rise of Partisanship and the Expansion 
of Partisan Conflict within the American Electorate”, Political Research Quarterly 2005 58: 219. 
10
 See Russell Dalton and Martin Wattenberg, 2000. Parties without Partisans. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p. v 
7 
 
and with the social movements they were once linked. Parties participate in elections but 
are not themselves democratic organizations. In Schattschneider’s famous sentence, 
“democracy takes place between parties, not within parties”. Giovanni Sartori, the dean of 
party scholars, also thinks that “democracy on a large scale is not the sum of many little 
[party] democracies”11. Such absence of internal democracy is crucial in the anti-
democratic character of contemporary parties’. Leaders within the party rise in power and 
in absence of democratic controls and procedures, they’re prominent if their nomination 
pays off in national elections
12
.  
Parties became post-partisan with time only appealing and organizing voters as 
consumers. This shift from partisan to voter marked the privatization of political action in 
late-capitalist party democracies. Partisans, main figures in earlier stages of party 
evolution, mobilized collectively to pressure for policies and to attain power in or outside 
elections; voters, the main targets of current parties, are private consumers simply 
registering a preference in the ballot
13
.  
The Anti-Partisanship of Political Theory 
In this discouraging atmosphere, political philosophers bitterly disdain parties. 
Party hacks destroy presumed time-honored rules of democratic negotiation, deliberation, 
and compromise. Parties divide the People; the General Will is manipulated into private 
interests. After all, philosophical truth must be one, not many. Not necessarily showing 
much political wisdom, political philosophers favor reasonable deliberation as an attitude 
more pertinent to ‘independent’ spirits. It is not hard to notice in regards to mass politics 
the unshakeable elitism of philosophy. 
                                                          
11
 Giovanni Sartori, 1965, Democratic Theory, New York: Praeger, p. 124 
12
 See William Cross and Richard Katz, 2013, The Challenges of Intra-Party Democracy, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, pp.11-28 
13
 As Wang Hui remarks in respect to China and the Western party system, “As the party, through 
the process of exercising power, became the subject of the state order, it increasingly changed into 
a depoliticized apparatus, a bureaucratic machine, and no longer functioned as a stimulant for 
ideas and practice. For this reason, I would characterize the dominant contemporary form as 
having undergone a transformation from a party-state to a state-party or ‘state-multiparty’ system. 
This implies that the party no longer conforms to its past political role, but becomes a component 
of the state apparatus. What I want to emphasize here is the change in the party’s identity: no 
longer possessing its own distinctive evaluative standpoint or social goals, it can only have a 
structural-functionalist relationship to the state apparatus.” Wang Hui, 2009, The End of 
Democracy: China and the Limits of Modernity, London: Verso, p.9 
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Empirical scholars of politics on the other hand are not too anxious over the 
downfalls of partisanship. “Party-phobia” is philosophical. There is always the more 
urgent and interesting matters of institutional design and representation, the mysteries of 
the partisan brain, or how a party system in a certain country produces like the states of 
matter “centripetal” or “centrifugal” dynamics, fragmentation, condensation, sublimation, 
and so on.
 
 Yet in this minimalist, value-free universe of positivism, there is no pondering 
of the consequences of partisanship for democracy and politics. Empiricists commend 
parties and dismiss participation. Parties represent the flesh and blood of democracies, yet 
it is much more important for many empirical scientists to preserve the State by checking 
the mob
14
. 
Political theory has a long anti-partisan tradition. Sigmund Neumann said that, 
“Political parties are the lifeline of modern politics and yet they have been the 
stepchildren of political theory.” Nancy Rosenblum restated the same metaphor in a 
recent book, “Parties are truly the orphans of political philosophy but they are the 
darlings of political science.”15   Anti-partisans echo the view of the Greeks, the Saints, 
and the Moderns. But this wasn’t always the way of philosophy; many classical theorists 
very much admired partisanship. Montesquieu and the German idealists appreciated the 
English for their party spirit. Hegel pictured partisanship even working beyond usual 
politics. Hegel thought that opposition rules human history, that to challenge other 
people’s views was to progress in politics, science, and culture. These thinkers however 
endorsed a disciplined and institutional partisanship. Advocates for revolutionary 
partisanship like Machiavelli, Marx, and Engels were prominent exceptions. Parties must 
                                                          
14
 I think current visions of parties separated by morality and science neglects the specific morality 
of politics, which Machiavelli pictured as Chiron the Centaur, half-man, half-beast, law and norm 
achieved through persuasion as well as force, “to know how to make use of both natures, and that 
one without the other is not durable.” Ideology and the physics of power and government inform 
all partisan perspectives. If these two aspects may be separate in theory, they are joined in practice. 
See also Antonio Gramsci, 2007, The Modern Prince and other writings, New York: International 
Publishers, p.140 “They are the levels of force and consent, authority and hegemony, violence and 
civilization, of the individual moment and the universal moment, of agitation and propaganda, of 
tactics and of strategy, etc.” For Gramsci, such perspective must be the approach of the 
revolutionary party since the other party already makes use of this political truth. See also, 
Friedrich Engels, 1978, Collected Works, vol. 10, p.284 See also Lenin, 1976, "State and Revolution 
(1918)", Selected Works, Progress Publishers, p.294. See August Nimtz Jr. 2014,, Lenin and the 
Revolutionary Use of Elections and Parliamentary Politics, London: Palgrave-MacMillan. 
15
 Nancy Rosenblum, 2010, On the Side of Angels: An Appreciation of Parties and Partisanship. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, p.41 
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not only debate but take arms. If the situation demands it, struggles must take the streets 
rather than the floor of parliaments. Breaking the law often expands democratic liberties. 
Ignoring what one enthusiast saw as the “inapprehensible and indestructible 
nature of the political party,”16 current condemnations or praise of parties should be 
qualified. Parties indeed disturb; they thrive in the negative, in struggle and strife, 
coalitions and betrayals. When parties are praised, the type of participation fostered by 
them is dismissed as the ever present danger of populism in democracy. But this partisan 
‘perversity’ existed in state bureaucracies, churches, armies, and associations even before 
formal parties existed. Modern democracies just provided institutions which 
accommodated for party competition
17
.  
Parties do not merit the homage accorded by some or the sourness granted by 
others. Parties sometimes require a cold approach as their self-interest, but they always 
require a conception as dialectical as their nature. One must account for the democratic 
mass element parties navigate and how parties operate according to the logic of 
opposition. Parties require internal and external opposition, revealing that antagonism, 
not authoritarian imposition or anarchic deposition, define partisan politics. As 
Rosenblum states “Parties are defined only in relation to one another and make sense 
only in regard with one another.”  
I consider that the anti-partisanship of current political theory is both a sign of 
compliance with State power and defeatism in regards to popular power. Moral 
philosophies dismiss partisanship in favor of idealized constitutional values that are 
constantly violated by contemporary power. Similarly, other political theories that 
renounce partisanship from a position of ethical escapism and subjectivism have nothing 
to say about actual politics other than parties are all part of State power. This second type 
is just content with denouncing the cruel march of the world
18
.  
                                                          
16
 “See Friedrich Rohmer, 1844, “Lehre von den politischen Parteien: Die vier Parteien” in Kurt Lenk, 
1974, Theorie und soziologie der politischen Parteien, Luchterland, p.80 
17
 “No democracy in the world can eliminate the class struggle and the omnipotence of money. It is 
not this that makes democracy important and useful. The importance of democracy is that it makes 
the class struggle broad, open and conscious [through parties].” Vladimir I. Lenin, 1975, “The 
Successes of the American Workers”, Collected Works, vol.18, pp.336  
18 Few authors express this ethicist view of Hegelian “beautiful souls” more forcefully than Simone 
Weil: “Political parties are organizations that are publicly and officially designed for the purpose of 
killing in all souls the sense of truth and of justice… The institution of political parties seems to be 
10 
 
 Present views of partisanship misrecognize partisan operations and formations 
resulting in post-political rhetoric and prescriptions. Such misrecognition is not only 
contingent upon political conjunctures, especially those after 1968 and 1989; they also 
depend on specific ontological presumption of identity and difference. Liberal politics 
advance an outlook of absolute identity by educating and molding the multiplicity and 
complexity of politics into a universal narrative of global norms and rules. Views on 
radical difference that are distinctive of post-structuralism largely prevent thinking such 
multiplicity in terms of political representation, parties, and party organization. In 
opposition to these two forms of political reason, I propose a third way called the 
speculative which envisions an "identity-in-difference" (Hegel), a "unity of the diverse" 
(Marx) in which the partisan opponent is the other, the adversary, and at the same time, 
someone that stands in a common symbolic and political universe.  
In what follows, I map this anti-party spirit in contemporary political theory 
through the leading spokesmen of constitutional democracy from the Right to the Left of 
political liberalism. On the one hand, Hayek, Rawls, and Habermas allow me to trace the 
anti-partisan slips of liberal politics. I then address the strong refusal of parties by post-
structuralists such as Levinas, Derrida, Lyotard, Foucault, and Deleuze. Although these 
two groups of theorists profess opposite philosophies and conceptions of reason, they 
equally reject partisanship. I contend that liberal and post-structural schools of political 
thought are anti-partisan for their disjunctive approach. They focus either on politics as 
an ideal identity and unity of State and society, or conceive the political as an equal ideal 
difference between state and society, and refuse real existing politics.  Both bodies of 
political theory exclude the possibility of a third option that constitute the moment of 
mediation between State and society, politics and ethics. Partisans and parties are 
precisely these figures of mediation. These are political beings that are defined in 
relation-to other parties, to society, and to the State.   
The view of an “identity-in-difference” represents a third type of political 
epistemology more fitting to partisanship and equally committed to political organization 
                                                                                                                                                                             
an almost evil in pure state. They are evil in their principle and evil are their practical effects. The 
suppression of political parties would be an almost pure good almost pure, obviously legitimate in 
principle and practically could not but produce positive effects.” Simone Weil, 2014, Senza Partito, 
Obbligo e diritto per una nuova pratica politica, Milano, Apogeo, pp.36-7 
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and ethical emancipatory practice. Hegel, Marx, and some critical theorists submit to this 
speculative vision of identity-in-difference, which frames recognition and co-dependence 
as key social actions, more adequate to understand the partisan mind and the logic of 
political opposition. 
1989 - The antinomies of liberalism 
Liberal pluralism conceives the State economically as a site of competition; social 
groups contest to influence institutions and the State accommodates them without regard 
to ideology, class, or sector interests. Since civil society is the source of moral legitimacy, 
liberal states represent civil society as a whole soaring over particular interests through 
legal and ethical neutrality. Liberal sociality thus is the sum of individuals, the simple 
sum of its parts, and all parts have an equal claim to see their interests as legitimate. 
Everybody is formally equal with the same rights and endowed with the same universal 
rationality, but emptied of content and determination such as class, race, or gender or any 
other subset of concrete and historical difference. This flight from particularity is a 
central characteristic of the liberal Rechtstaat and its citizens. But the liberal notion of 
society is individualistic and abstract. Liberal totalities are outcomes of individual 
conflicting interests. Hegel described the liberal society, the commercial society as a 
spiritual animal kingdom, “in which individuals, amid confusion and mutual violence, 
cheat and struggle over the essence of the actual world.”19 
Liberalism today needs serious philosophical justifications. Pragmatism and 
utilitarianism are not acceptable as in earlier times. These philosophies lack universal 
foundations which are required for a political theory with global designs. 
Consequentialism makes truth too vulnerable to the contingencies of politics or for a 
cynical Machtpolitik. Liberal practical philosophy is not concerned with phenomena but 
with foundations, so formal prescriptions are expedient to ignore political needs and 
contexts. Foundationalism is very adequate to current liberal hegemony after the fall of 
historical socialism.
20
  
                                                          
19
 Georg W.F. Hegel, 1998, Phenomenology of Spirit, London: Oxford, §537, p.327 
20
 Gerald Gaus writes, “As a political ideology [liberalism] has been immensely successful; it has 
found room for individualism and communitarianism, for planners and free marketeers, for value 
skeptics and perfectionists.” The heart is in classical liberalism, skeptical about sweeping values, 
individualistic, and rebellious to grand designs. Hitherto such theory is severe and unattractive. 
“The antinomies of liberalism”, Gaus explains, “makes sense of both the success and failure of 
12 
 
Liberal practical philosophy depends on the ideal separation between pure 
prescription and empirical fact, understanding the person in two as private desire and 
public reason, faculties that stand opposed to each other. This is a distinctly analytical 
approach, understood in a Kantian sense. Analysis dissects and separate, treating each 
unit of the system or faculty as the mind as separate. Hegel called it the view of the 
Intellect or Understanding (Vernunft). For the analytical approach, the mind is like a 
machine. The mind merges the manifold of experience, sense-data, and facts under a 
category. The analytical categories give legal validity to experience after our sensations 
have joined them. But these two faculties, the ability to perceive (Kant called it 
aesthetics) and the ability to reason (analysis), are separated.
21
 Intuitions to perceive time 
and space, and the concepts that synthesize experience have nothing in common. Radical 
newness is impossible because a finite set of categories are already given to order all 
possible experience.
22
  
 Unlike Kant’s moral theory, desire has a normative nature in liberalism as an 
inheritance of utilitarianism. Among the “first” human desires is the need for self-
preservation and security, and these desires are viewed as private and natural, free from 
social determinations.
23
  But this excesses of desire must be checked by an alien, rational 
political power. Thus political and moral reason and desire are in a mutual subjection, 
manifested in the polar opposite of liberal individualist ethics, deontology and 
utilitarianism, Kant and Bentham. Either reason attempts to ward off destructive desire, 
or sees desire as the lawgiver.  
In this ethical and political dualism, liberal practical philosophy sees the political 
subject as one ideal rational agent, whose sole end is the pursuit of infinite different 
                                                                                                                                                                             
liberalism in the last century… But this success as an ideology is the root of the failure of liberalism 
as a political theory to resolve its antinomies; the very scope of its appeal ensures that no fully 
consistent liberal theory will emerge vindicated over its rivals.” See Michael Freeden (ed.), 2004, 
Reassessing Political Ideologies: The Durability of Dissent, London: Routledge, p.30  
21
 This is contrary to the mind that unites things in their diversity and opposition. The first type of 
mind is what Hegel and the dialectical tradition conceives as the Understanding, or the Intellect. 
The second type of mind is Reason, which is dialectics and speculation having a critical and 
reconstructive aspect. These three modes of reason will be the subject of the next chapter. 
22
 As Habermas states in an orthodox Kantian turn of phrase, “The task of universal pragmatics is to 
identify and reconstruct universal conditions of possible mutual understanding.” Jürgen Habermas, 
2000, On the Pragmatics of Communication, Cambridge: MIT Press, p.21. 
23
 See the excellent analysis of the dichotomies of liberalism in Roberto M. Unger, 1977, Knowledge 
and Politics, New York: Simon & Schuster 
13 
 
desires in the “non-political” private sphere. The separation between 1) reason and 
desire, develops into another separation between 2) facts and values, as well as yet 
another moral distinction between 3) ought and being. The liberal principle of desire 
interacts well with analytical reason. For analysis, society is the sum, an aggregate of all 
individuals. The system is the total sum of simple parts, and the market is the total sum of 
individual, unconnected decisions based on desire. For analysis, simplicity is valued 
above complexity producing still a further antinomy between 4) values and rules. Liberal 
analytical totalities are agnostic on the driving values and intentions of individuals as 
long as these values are channeled through impersonal and neutral mechanisms such as 
procedural rules. The individual is driven by values and the aggregation of all individuals 
by rules, which are indifferent to each and everyone’s ideas of values. Since for most of 
contract theorists, men are isolated and hostile to each other, freedom is only possible by 
an impersonal order rising above interpersonal relations. Law thus is ethically neutral and 
individual values are subjective based on free arbitrary choices. Rules are objective 
because they balance private interests.  This distinction between objective rules and 
subjective values reflect yet another liberal opposition between 5) substantive and 
procedural justice. According to rules, justice is conceived as fair procedure, a due 
process independent of the outcome. According to values, justice is substantive and 
meaningful only to private individuals. Since the concept of a public, communal being is 
denied in liberal theory, social justice in terms of substantive values or public conceptions 
of the good is denied.
24
 
This cursory description of the different antinomies of liberalism shows that 
individuals are intrinsically private beings but also individualism is the main justification 
for liberalism to be a public philosophy. But the liberal privatized individual rejects from 
the beginning the possibility of an intrinsic public being. The public sphere is invalidated 
not on the grounds that a subject decides to become public and social a posteriori, or in 
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the sense of belonging to a particular community; the public sphere is rejected in that a 
public communal being is not necessary. The public being is a supplement, a nuisance to 
the individual, necessary only to safeguard his individual propertied freedom. But “public 
beings” –either as citizens, the State or any other political form- as such are necessary for 
political philosophy. After all, liberalism is a public philosophy. I think liberalism just 
cannot solve the basic tension to be a public philosophy and at the same time to keep 
private foundations.  
Liberalism as the ideology of individual freedom reveals from the standpoint of 
publicity to be a philosophy of alienated individuals. Liberalism presupposes an already 
freed society that does not recognize its own alienation (alienation is an alien concept to 
liberalism) in isolated, atomized individuals in competition. Liberalism stabilizes such 
non-recognition through de facto “neutral” and impersonal mechanisms, especially the 
technical imperatives of the market, and legal timeless justifications, partaking of an 
uncritical modernity. If the loss of community is a sign of modernity and modernization, 
the liberal denial of community and the affirmation of private agency is a re-statement of 
this a-critical ethos towards modernization.
25
 
Liberal dualism is evident in how it treats individuals according to their class 
position in the economic sphere. If political liberalism has an optimistic view of human 
nature, it is because the individual is sufficiently abstracted as to speak of the general 
rights of man. It is in the economic sphere, however, where liberalism deploys a dual and 
darker vision. In relations of commerce, liberalism sees the individual as a virtuous 
example of calculation, rationality, and sobriety. But in relations at the workplace or the 
factory, things turn off-putting. Every worker is a potential vagrant. Workers need to be 
surrounded by insecurity and instability in order to become more productive and 
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disciplined. They are driven by passion and vice.
26
 Here, productive man does not 
possess the attributes of rationality and industriousness. In circulation, man is rational; in 
production, irrational. In this sense, liberalism applies different principles depending on 
the human activity and the class position. Pessimism and unreason in the factory; 
optimism and virtue in the market where commodities need to be sold. Human nature is 
again split in two as workers and tradesmen with opposite human natures. Hence, 
tradesman (reason) must command the worker (desire); reason must command laziness. 
The same dual standard amounts to party politics. Political parties are essential for liberal 
democracies, but political parties become dangerous if they question and attempt to 
reorganize the ‘irrational’ sphere of capitalist production.  Lenin saw it clearly, “Liberals 
are prepared to recognize the class struggle in the sphere of politics [organized as 
political parties] but on one condition—that the organization of state power should not 
enter into that sphere.”27  
Obviously, liberal ideologists would distrust partisanship since partisans advocate 
for a particularistic vision of the polity. Partisans threaten the formal rationality of liberal 
logic by projecting their particularity as generality.  The liberal critique of partisanship 
assumes therefore universalistic and rationalist premises, useful to cast individuals 
beyond political fault lines.  Partisans should only be “partisans for democracy” or 
“partisans for reason”, advocates for general principles like the responsible use of reason 
and universal tolerance. These moral principles however limit the kind of political 
engagement acceptable for liberal democracies. There should only be one conception of 
good, which is private permissiveness (right), and only one conception of politics, which 
is the pluralism of private wills, equally legitimate. Thus, under the umbrella term of 
‘militant’, self-defending democracy, parties critical of the liberal order are actively 
cleansed of the political landscape for national security, tolerance, or multicultural 
reasons. For proponents of this idea of “militant democracy” –echoing Habermas’s 
principle of constitutional patriotism-, “a party ban does not target at a specific political 
idea, but at their possible impact on the democratic system; it is not an ‘interdiction of 
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thought’, but an ‘interdiction of organization’. Therefore, it would be starry-eyed to 
expect that dissolution could eliminate anti-democratic thought among the dissolved 
parties’ followers. But their political influence and their access to the voters are 
weakened.”28 Liberal universalism accepts political differences in theory, but the 
programmatic objective is to assimilate, integrate, and smooth these differences in a 
cosmopolitan order to educate dissenting subjects, parties, and nations on liberal norms. 
To carry out its particular brand of internationalism, liberal political morality marshals a 
philosophy of absolute identity in two ways: neoliberalism, the convergence of economic 
systems under one vision of the market, and multiculturalism, or the diffusion of 
difference through cultural politics. All political regimes must converge in a community 
of neoliberal democracies defined by universal principles of deregulated competition, 
passive citizenship, and most of all the transformation of market economies into market 
societies in which abstract exchangeability regulates even non-economic relations. 
Liberalism also deploys its philosophy of absolute identity paradoxically through 
multicultural infinite differences. Regimes enter liberalism if they commit to a 
fundamental deference for different opinions, races, groups, and lifestyles because the 
endless diversity of human life can only realize and fulfill itself in one liberal order. The 
“Lockean proviso” is that as long as these groups are loyal to the fundamental 
imperatives of liberalism (freedom through property and life as property), they may 
practice their identities with no harm. Multiculturalism provides the domestic version of 
neoliberal globalism. In multiculturalism, identity is projected as the multiplication of 
inherent differences possible only within one order; in neoliberalism, the diversity of 
economic and political arrangements are excluded under one market. In both classes 
‘disappear’ from the public vision through gender and race and police repression. 
Liberal anti-partisanship from Right to Left 
Partisanship undergoes a similar experience. Between parties that are loyal to the 
system (the ones that have taken office), parties that are reluctant to electoral democracies 
(minority fringe ‘parties of principle’), and other parties that are anti-system 
(“extremists”), and still others that oscillate between reluctance and rejection, liberal 
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regimes discipline such broad scope with the law of loyal opposition formulated 
sometimes around the economy, or around institutions. Thus, the paradox of political 
tolerance is restricted to those who share the same general worldview, cancelling it. 
Bernard Williams points out that thinking of tolerance as a political rather than a moral 
issue allows to see “a liberal state and its typical patterns of legitimation, in the cases that 
toleration is thought appropriate, toleration will be supported by a variety of attitudes, 
and none of them is very specifically directed towards the value of toleration as such.”29 
Liberal rejections of partisanship are perplexing since the core political identity and 
moral authority of liberal democracies depend on political opposition and political 
competition. Parties cut through democratic rationality by organizing passions and 
particular interests; they, unlike any other social organization, symbolize the Hegelian 
idea of liberalism as a ‘spiritual animal kingdom’. Yet Friedrich von Hayek, John Rawls, 
and Jurgen Habermas, the three foremost philosophers of liberalism of the last 50 years 
are solid cases from the Right to the Left of the political spectrum of the unmitigated 
liberal rejection of partisanship.  
Although moral apprehensions for the dirty game of politics and prescriptions for 
well-ordered societies are legitimate, Hayek, Rawls, and Habermas, along many other 
theorists of Right and Left liberalism tend to regard conflict (not necessarily competition) 
as harmful to politics. Engaging in what Hegel would call the attitude of “beautiful 
souls”, their prescriptions do not consider that rational, disinterested action outside 
organizations (Rawls and Habermas), or pure individual self-interest, also independent of 
organization and conducive to undistorted competition in the case of Hayek, seldom takes 
place in actual politics. Given the glaring ethical flavor of their theories, there is also no 
account for the harmful traits of deliberation (or individualism in Hayek’s universe) as if 
good procedures invariably produce good outcomes.
30
 Instead of comprehending 
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actuality, their market or Kantian moralism retreats from politics identifying one-sidedly 
philosophical ideals with political practices.   
In liberal theory, norms and intentions rule over facts and practices; ethics 
overrules politics leaving facticity inadvertently at the mercy of positivism and 
technology, that is, as a set of brute facts to be manipulated and managed. Despite 
frequent moral remonstrations against the cynical position of positive theories of 
democracy, an excessive emphasis on democratic norms complements political 
positivism and pragmatism in that the longing for an ideal demos has no real import for 
‘empirical’ politics. Conversely, the lack of applicability of deontology in the political 
realm (as opposed to a political ethics of a more consequential nature) makes the ethical 
turn irrelevant for the orthodoxy of self-interest and instrumental reason. In their critique 
to economic theories of democracy, normative theorists view party dynamics in inverse 
proportion to their notion of popular participation. “Ethical democrats” think indirect 
representative party democracy is insufficient. “Representative party democrats” think 
direct participatory democracy is impossible. The two competing economic and ethical 
theories of democracy oscillate from the pole of self-interest and aggregation to the other 
of obligation and deliberation.  
Common to both theories however is an identitarian and exclusive conception of 
subject. In economic theories of democracy, the citizen is Benthamite following private 
utility; in ethical theories, the citizen is Kantian, obeying duties. This diremption between 
ethics and economics, between pure self-interest and pure obligation is typical of a neo-
Kantian framework. Individuals are torn between the antithesis of impure empirical 
desire and pure transcendental reason. Moreover, liberal reductions of politics to 
philosophical ideals are as old as political philosophy. The Republic, which inaugurates 
Western political philosophy, longs for eternal ideas to discipline the chaos of politics. 
Kant seconded by quelling political possibilities with a priori concepts. Hayek, Rawls, 
and Habermas are neo-Kantians. For Rawls and Habermas, the Kantian separation 
between public reason and private interest inform their universal principles of reason 
Moral reason is an unconditioned cause that makes possible critique and evaluation of 
existing political practices. Hayek follows a very different, evolutionary route, using the 
Kantian dualism between desire and reason, but inverting the terms. In this sense, Hayek 
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is Kantian in method, but not in substance. Rawls and Habermas believe that moral 
consciousness determines right action, for Hayek, consciousness is the product of nature, 
spontaneously emerged from the natural order, but with no specific moral end in sight.  
Hayek’s evolutionary approach excludes teleology, other than complex self-
organizations. Such self-organization is, of course, the market as the ideal sphere of 
voluntary exchanges determined by universal laws. These laws and moral values for 
action are “part of a process of unconscious self-organization of a structure or pattern.” 
Thus, instead of moral ideas to act as critical arbiters of the existing order, moral ideas 
are functions for the preservation of existing market societies. Thus, public law does not 
represent nor is directed towards a regulative principle. Moral or economic regulation is 
the fatal error of what Hayek calls ‘constructivism’ or “the propensity of primitive 
thought to interpret all regularity to be found in phenomena anthropomorphically, as the 
result of the design of the thinking mind.”31 Public law represents just public order; it is a 
result, not a regulation, which must be interpreted by organs of the existing order, not by 
private individuals. Thus, public law is emptied of any moral regulation outside order. 
Hayek sees moral individuals as products of an evolutionary order that has constituted 
their social nature and this nature, which is really market relations, is there to promote 
efficient individual relations in terms of their economy. This efficiency is not of course 
the utilitarian redistribution of resources but the Pareto optimality: resources are 
efficiently allocated if one is able to pay (want and willingness to pay are the same here) 
while the worse off may potentially be compensated for such ‘efficient’ allocation. Such 
compensation needless to say never happens. Hayek collapses the Kantian distinction 
between a regulative ought and the existing order. The present is morally right: facts are 
values and market societies are ideal organization devoid of critical capability. 
 Advocacy for redistribution through parties or collective organizations does not 
have a place in Hayek’s universe. Political parties embody interest groups that distort 
prices, misallocate resources, and consequently provoke more state intervention in the 
economy. Political lobbyism and political parties impose unreasonable costs on the public 
sphere. Parties and organized political action destroy the spontaneous order, the catallaxy 
of the market. As Hayek writes, “Organizable groups further distort the distribution of 
                                                          
31
 Friedrich A. von Hayek, 2013, Law Legislation, and Liberty, London: Polity, p.10  
20 
 
benefits and make it increasingly unrelated to the requirements of efficiency or any 
conceivable principle of equity. The result is a distribution of incomes chiefly determined 
by political power…  [Parties] are all driven, even if it is not their agreed aim, to use their 
power to impose some particular structure upon society, i.e. some form of socialism, 
rather than create the conditions in which society can gradually evolve improved 
formations.”32 
Moving to the Center of the liberal spectrum, Rawls laments, for example, that 
“much political debate betrays the marks of warfare. It consists in rallying the troops and 
intimidating the other side, which must now increase its efforts or back down… To be is 
to confront.”33 In many instances, Rawls skips political analysis for a series of 
recommendations under the marker of ‘public use of reason’. In A Theory of Justice, 
parties should act and formulate policy according to the common good (which is fine 
except that the common good formulated in detail as policy can be many things for many 
people.) Parties, for example, are “to be made independent from private economic 
interests” and should not gerrymander. Voters, on the other hand, should decide on moral 
grounds instead of economic necessity; constitutional ideas instead of levels of 
unemployment or rates of inequality and distribution should take priority when casting 
votes. In neo-Kantian style, Rawls strictly separates pure constitutional principles of 
justice from empirical institutional dynamics and interested behaviors.
34
 In A Theory of 
Justice, parties serve a very limited role. Similar to Locke’s conception of parliamentary 
opposition, Rawls confines majority rule and opposition to means rather than ends, how 
to realize politically the already given transcendental principles of justice. Constitutional 
design, the realm of philosophy, restricts the partisan scope of action so the ‘base’ self-
interest of all classes does not distort the limits established by the original position.
35
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Rawls lessens the juridical restriction on partisanship in Political Liberalism. In these 
lectures, Rawls sees his conception of justice as fairness just as an alternative among 
many. Different principles of justice can be contested and deliberated, because the 
principles themselves may be not too clear or are too general. Since the political 
conception of justice has “little to say about many economic and social issues that 
legislative bodies must regularly consider”36, there is unquestionably the need for 
independent-minded citizens educated in public reason and moral virtue. Thus, civic 
education enables the citizenry to address the essentials of public rights and constitutional 
principles as well as all “highly divisive matters” freed from partisan squabbles. Like 
many political philosophers of the past like Plato and Rousseau, Rawls’s solution to the 
convolutions of party politics is more moral education. 
Coming from the Marxist tradition to finally reconcile with European social-
democracy, Habermas wishes for an ethical democracy alien to parties. Positive theories 
of democracy, which reel around parties, seek to “evaporate the idealistic content of 
normative theories under the sun of social science”; they provide “a cynical view of the 
political process.” These theorists consider the citizenry uneducated and impressionable, 
used by “illegitimate” forces seeking to subvert constitutionalism. Habermas responds by 
theorizing an ethical citizenship based on a set of norms and values that preexists politics. 
To this end, Habermas reformulates the phenomenological concept of life-world a social 
remnant of non-instrumental reason to show how norms exist here and now, and not in 
Utopia.
37
 Social life-worlds for Habermas are regions rich with expressive meaning; they 
are opposed to the rationalized and bureaucratic world of politics. “The public sphere” 
writes Habermas, “has a complementary relation to this private sphere, from which the 
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public, as the bearers of the public sphere, is recruited. The life-world forms, as a whole, 
a network composed of communicative actions.”38  Private life-worlds have the potential 
to correct the public sphere; they are charged with a utopian content made concrete in the 
pre-political world. Following also a neo-Kantian style, the life-world for Habermas is a 
pre-political or non-political realm of emancipation that acts as lawgiver as well as judge 
of politics.   Thus Habermas thinks parties should be responsive to that expressive sphere 
in civil society because their normative origins are found there. . “Political parties”, 
writes Habermas, “would have to participate in the opinion- and will-formation from the 
public's own perspective, rather than patronizing the public and extracting mass loyalty 
from the public sphere for the purposes of maintaining their own power.”39 Yet what 
party would survive with this strategy? How would parties know the ‘public’s own 
perspective’? And where does the public make its perspective known?40 The end result is 
pure and simple anti-partisanship. Habermas grieves the entry of political parties in 
democracies. Ideal speakers, who follow communicative norms, are informed private 
citizens devoid of party loyalty. Habermas provides no mechanisms on how an informed 
citizenry retaining the immaculate values of a privatized life-world can effectively 
exercise or check governmental power.
41
 The aim of his buoyant political sociology is to 
bring these communicative ideals into actual politics, of communicative norms actualized 
in the life-world, to re-connect them to politics, and to transform real politics into a 
politics of principle. But as Hegel observes, practical hommes des affaires (not les 
hommes des principes) develop partisan consciousness. Principles quickly die away with 
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the generalities of the rights of man and citizen.
42
 Habermas is all for a citizenry of 
Independents that do not participate in institutional politics, but deliberate in a public 
sphere devoid of political organizations.
43
  
1968 - Post-Structural Refusals 
Liberalism seeks timeless foundations and justifications; post-structuralism looks 
for groundlessness instead seeing time as a constitutive element of reality. Post-
structuralism distrusts hegemonies and systems, so absent are the liberal worries for a 
plural society in order to gain global legitimacy. Post-structuralism is not about 
accommodating different perspectives under a big-tent ideology, but to wage total 
critique to existing normative projects. These theories suspect grand narratives of 
emancipation, in the name of a rare, yet-to-come community, an antinomian mystique 
that can truly house differences.
44
   
Post-structural anti-foundational theories separate the political subject elsewhere 
in the aesthetic and phenomenological realm in order to ‘unsettle’ the political and detach 
it from moral and juridical arguments. Pre-rational sensibility, the pure forms of intuition 
of time and space, are cut off from analysis and dialectics, in order to legitimize a lived 
experience prior to the positive ethics and politics.  Thus, the antinomies of theory and 
fact, values and rules, legality and morality are justified pre-rationally in terms of will 
and one’s existential position in the world. Political beings are “justified” in their 
absolute difference with being and law; values and rules come from poetry and art, 
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morality beyond law and positive norms.
45
 Yet these anti-foundational theories are still 
Kantian. They are not speculative in negotiating the conflict between the ideas of pure 
reason and the categories of understanding. Rather, the destruction of metaphysics is 
enacted in pre-rational states. Antinomies are framed before the conflict between 
understanding and dialectics from the vantage point of Kant’s transcendental aesthetics, 
the doctrine of pure intuitions of space, and especially time. If in liberalism, the antinomy 
of law was produced in terms of reason and desire, in post-structuralism, the antinomy is 
re-produced in disposing of reason through aesthetics. 
Post-structuralists formulated various political theories favoring multiple modes 
of ethical and political engagement. From a morality centered on hospitality to an ethics 
of a freed desire as  values of a new and unedited democracy, there is present a common 
core of anarchism, focusing more on tactics and short-term interventions rather than 
lasting programs and principles. Consequent with an anti-foundational and post-
metaphysical philosophy, post-structuralists were at the same time open to other forms of 
acting politics and to collectives wary of parties. Such healthy skepticism to hierarchies 
however soon led to an overall suspicion of revolutionary political organizations due in 
no small measure to the Stalinist nature of Eastern European regimes and Western 
Communist parties. Many post-structuralists interpreted the Stalinist counterrevolution as 
the inevitable product of a Western metaphysics and teleology of history. Unlike 
liberalism, post-structural conceptions of partisanship were a direct result of the Marxist 
experience as the dominant form of radical politics for most of the 20
th
 century. 
Therefore, after the defeat of the revolts in the 60s and socialism, most post-structuralists 
conceived the political more and more in moral and ethical terms.   
According to Todd May, what separates post-structuralism from ‘traditional 
political philosophy’, torn between strategy (what is to be done in the long term) and 
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formalism (metaphysical principles of justice) is that political post-structuralism is 
thoroughly tactical. In the tradition of the Greek Sophists, performance, gestures, and acts 
matter more than prescriptions. Such supremacy of tactics is also present in anarchism, 
for which the political centralization of power is not only rejected, but also any concept 
of centralized power discarded. Practices of power are irreducible to each other and they 
happen in heterogeneous instances. In May’s Foucauldian formulation, “Power for the 
strategic political philosopher emanates (at least primarily) from a center. For tactical 
political philosophy, there is no center within which power can be located. There are 
many sites from which it arises, and there is interplay between these various sites in the 
creation of the social world.”46 May concludes that the tactical nature of post-
structuralism and anarchism rejects notion of vanguardism and political representation. 
Vanguardism is rejected since power cannot have a privileged point of entry, unless one 
claims metaphysical authority and wields it as a thing. The rejection of representation 
derives from the rejection of vanguardism; there is no party that can claim special 
authority or power from the people.  
The poststructuralist collapse of metaphysical representation and political 
representation glosses over two very different things. Philosophical representation deals 
with concepts of the understanding; political representation addresses acts of will. 
Political representation seeks to make a type of will, private or public, known and 
exercised. However, the collapse between the two notions is grounded on a perspectivist, 
Nietzschean attitude that will and knowledge are the same. All sorts of representation are 
based on some type of will, especially the will that makes concepts appear as forms of 
thought, a reactive will to Nietzsche. Therefore, Nietzschean post-structuralists, left-wing 
Nietzscheans wage an across-the-board critique of representation, even if the 
philosophical and political types of representation are different, ending in philosophical 
and political anarchism, an anti-partisan ideology if there ever was one
47
.  
Contrary to liberalism’s commitment to absolute identity, post-structuralists 
commits to absolute differences, to the margins and remains of social power structures. 
These are external, undetermined sites loaded with vital intensity and force, filled with an 
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impersonal will, a will of power that is a structure rather than an agent, in which subjects 
and knowledge are effects of will.  A lack of conscious subjectivity complements this 
intensity of the Will; it posits a greatness of an impersonal substance. If liberalism 
emphasizes an absolute Subject or agent, lacking context, history, an objective Substance; 
post-structuralism affirms a Substance without a Subject.
48
 Paradoxically, post-
structuralism favors postures resistant to assimilation and compromise, radical modes of 
being in the world, prescribing a notion of Subject whose imagery is evasion and escape, 
outside social bounds. The Substance is never identified with existing political 
institutions, as in Hegel’s notion of ethical life, but the Life [of the Subject as Substance] 
takes place elsewhere than actuality, leading into what Perry Anderson criticizes as 
Super-Subject. Examples of this conception of subject beyond or outside ethical life 
abound in post-structural theory: Butler’s performative subject as an instance of a special 
being of a future law to come, Agamben’s concept of potentiality as an indeterminate 
utopia, Lyotard’s return to the Kantian sublime as a way to disown political rationality 
and advance a radical aesthetic individualism, Derrida’s spectrality, and so on. However, 
these figures are dependent on the ethical and political realm they resist.
49
 The success of 
post-structuralism quickly evolved into a totalizing logic in spite of appearances.  
  Key political concepts in politics such as the people, representation, sovereignty, 
law, power, and authority became in their totalizing critique self-cancelling paradoxes, 
fixed in constant interplay, without resolution, obtaining a politics of deep skepticism 
toward actual politics complemented by a strangely utopian, almost fideist project of 
emancipation. Poststructuralists imagined a more ethical, a future law or a special being 
that cannot be thought with our current system of categories. Ethics displaces politics in 
the form of a non-representable subject outside, prior, or after history and society.
50
  Yet 
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 Walter Benjamin’s antinomian text Critique of Violence inspires this postmodern conception of 
law. Derrida and De Man repeat Benjamin’s position but they dispense of Benjamin’s utopian 
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post-structuralism’s rebellious spirit is steadfast against prescribing or analyzing actual 
politics.. Taking sides for this or that party participates in the overwhelming repression of 
metaphysical politics, a politics of truth. For all their endless deconstruction of 
categories, there is in post-structuralism wrong and right ways of thinking.  
Anti-partyism from Levinas to Lyotard 
All major post-structuralists who are in large part authors of the ongoing ethical 
turn in political theory, exhibit an anti-partisan element. This prejudice makes hard to 
conciliate their philosophies with questions of political organization. Levinas is the 
philosophical father of this post-structuralist aversion, the grandfather of the topic of 
otherness in post-structuralist ethics. For Levinas, a commitment to the other defines 
ethics. The other is not conceived in the political terms of competition, confrontation, and 
cooperation, but in the moral terms of opening, generosity, and hospitality. Heidegger as 
many philosophers before him considered ontology as the highest type of philosophy, a 
knowledge of immediacy which revolves around, the question of Being. For Levinas, 
ethics is even higher, even more fundamental and primordial coming before ontology; 
our first experience is the experience of others and with others. We are already living 
with others, instead of the lonely Dasein (the being-there) of Heidegger thrown into this 
world and abandoned. Levinas offers a communitarian Mitsein, a being-with the other in 
life and suffering. But between the Buberian relation of I and Thou, there must be for 
Levinas a third party witnessing this relation, so friendship and mutuality do not become 
all-consuming, exclusive and selfish. This figure of the third figure is the rest of 
humanity; the “Big Other”, so to speak, witnessing but also limiting this relation in order 
for the realm responsibility to be extended to those outside, to become universal.
51
 
Levinas applies this phenomenology to politics. Unlike ethics, politics is the 
struggle between two camps and knows no ‘neutral’ thirds. For Levinas, politics is 
dialectical. . In dialectics, actors see and recognize each other as mirrors of the other. 
They are only concerned with self-recognition and for acting on equality (of forces), but 
                                                                                                                                                                             
imagination; the promise of (Messianic) emancipation is eliminated, practically reducing law to its 
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they do not engage each other as others, with all the dignity and charity that generous 
recognition entails. Politics thus ignores individuality making everything abstract, turning 
differences into equalities, exchangeabilities, and indifference. By destroying true 
diversity Hegel is the ideologist of abstraction; his phenomenology –unlike Levinas’s- is 
only possible when the two parties mirror each other and do exactly as the other, in the 
absence of a general third. One subject is the same as the other, “each being” writes 
Levinas, “is posited apart from all the others, but the will of each from the start consists 
in willing the universal or the rational, that is, in negating its very particularity.”52 This 
idealization of individuality results in a realist conception of politics. The end is the 
denial of alterity, the imposition of one individuality over the other, totalization, and war. 
Like Hegel’s philosophy, politics leaves nothing out, everything is consumed by a 
voracious World Spirit,
53
 “War establishes an order from which no one can keep his 
distance; nothing henceforth is exterior. War does not manifest exteriority and the other 
as other.” Furthermore, “The art of foreseeing war” Levinas maintains, “and winning it 
by every means –politics- is henceforth enjoined as the very exercise of reason. Politics is 
opposed to morality, as philosophy to naïveté.”54  
Levinas’s “third party” is post-political embodying ethical justice, beyond the 
‘idealist’ dialectics of ‘two-party’ politics. The third party “desires” the other, and since 
the Other cannot be known or represented, t what is required to match such 
indecipherable nature is unconditional sacrifice and generosity. In an antinomian way, 
Levinas sees no possible contact between ethics and politics. Ethics is positive, salvific, 
and human, and its injunctions of embracing the Other are axiomatic, not justified by 
reason, or subject to proof or debate. On the other hand, politics is reason; politics is hell. 
Derrida also disavows partisanship for a melancholic Messianism. Already Walter 
Benjamin, like Levinas, found expression for a similar anti-political spirit in the wake of 
totalitarianism. In Benjamin’s Critique of Violence, politics is mythical violence, an 
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instrument of violence used by the law-imposing moment (the Party of Revolution) or the 
law-preserving Party of Order. Divine violence is beyond this politico-mythical antinomy 
it is bloodless and transcendental, not imposing but deposing.
55
 But the conflict of 
politics in Benjamin is ‘solved’ in a higher ethical antinomy. Existing political systems 
cannot ground justice; this mystical justice founds secular authority making mythical law 
possible and at the same time destroys it. In Benjamin, this Messianism appears in a 
fairly orthodox way. , God gives and takes and everything is a disaster. Derrida 
secularizes the Messianic by extracting from Benjamin’s eschatology its transcendent, 
destructive elements but by preserving the idea of a Messianic wipe-out as infinite 
differance, a “Messianicity without Messiah” that shakes the grounds of our legal-
political ideology in the name of a justice and democracy yet to come. Justice makes 
possible laws, but it is irreducible, even contrary to the laws themselves.
56
  This negative 
promise of justice is betrayed when fulfilled by the law.   
Partisanship, on the contrary, sides with actuality by taking sides, but its “narrow-
mindedness” does not make justice to Derrida’s conception of justice. Justice like its 
more empirical manifestations of hospitality and friendship are inimical to membership, 
belonging or loyalty to a group. Justice is radical and unconditional openness. Parties, 
either give up their partisanship and practice unqualified hospitality, or become 
intolerant, inhospitable, and particularistic. It follows from Derrida’s vision that 
democratic parties should be like democracy, “autoimmune”, to be able to include 
political enemies, antibodies and become infected.
57
 Parties would do justice to this 
                                                          
55
 “Just as in all spheres God opposes myth; mythic violence is confronted by the divine. And the 
latter constitutes its antithesis in all respects. If mythic violence is lawmaking, divine violence is 
law-destroying; if the former sets boundaries, the latter boundlessly destroys them; if mythic 
violence brings at once guilt and retribution, divine power only expiates; if the former threatens, 
the latter strikes; if the former is bloody, the latter is lethal without spilling blood… by the expiating 
moment that strikes without bloodshed, and, finally, by the absence of all lawmaking.” Walter 
Benjamin, 1996, “Critique of Violence”, Selected Writings I, Harvard University Press, pp.249-250 
56
 “To address oneself to the other in the language of the other is both the condition of all possible 
justice, it seems, but in all rigor, it appears not only impossible (since I cannot speak the language 
of the other except to the extent that I appropriate it and assimilate it according to the law of an 
implicit third) but even excluded by justice as law, inasmuch as justice as law seems to imply an 
element of universality, the appeal to a third party who suspends the unilaterality or singularity of 
the idioms.” Jacques Derrida, Acts of Religion, New York: Routledge, p.125 
57
 Jacques Derrida, 1977, Limited Inc. TriQuarterly, p.116. 
30 
 
notion of justice if they destroy themselves in an unconditional ethic of love and 
inclusiveness.  
Curiously, Derrida’s anti-partisan declarations come from his late engagement 
with Marx. For Derrida, the fall of socialism left the world with Marxism’s “ghosts”, the 
unresolved questions of exploitation and imperialism. But Derrida is not worried with 
Marxist diagnoses of modernity, analysis of colonialism, uneven development, late 
capitalism, and not even Marxist parties. Derrida invokes instead a ‘certain spirit of 
Marxism’, not determined by class struggle, but by more universal ideals such as human 
rights. This ghostly spirit requires a New International “without status, without title, and 
without name, without party, without country, without national community.”58 But the 
ideal of human rights in this New International, this party of Justice is un-decidable. The 
meaning of human rights is  contended from all sides, and at the same time,  human rights 
must deal with the idea of the other’s ‘rights’, on how to make [impossible] justice to the 
other.   
 Like Levinas and Benjamin, Derrida cloaks his political reflections with 
mysticism. Justice is full of “spectral beings” that are inaccessible to reason. To speak 
affirmatively of just institutions and justice in a substantial sense is self-defeating. This 
vaporous, infinite other, embodying infinite and future justice as promise must never be 
actual. The other robs all meaning to affirmative language. The outcome is mourning and 
quietism in the name of an “interminable self-critique.” 
Foucault detests confrontations. As Levinas and Derrida, Foucault’s idea of 
debate is to trace and compare the unsaid assumptions of a discourse, rather than taking 
sides, a genealogical, rather than a critical project. Foucault prefers cool analysis and 
recommends not engaging in polemics. Taking sides subscribes to potential negative 
practices avowed by this theory or that party.
59
 Partisans are polemicists. They do not 
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seek interlocutors, but rather treat adversaries like “processing a suspect.” Partisans 
follow truth and power according to the “repressive hypothesis” as things, hard 
currencies to manipulate and exchange. Political parties embody that modern form of 
power Foucault calls the pastorate, as forms of revolt specific to secret societies with “a 
different governmentality with its chefs, its rules, and its principles of obedience.”60  
Moreover, for Foucault, to take sides is not only questionable but also simplistic. 
Partisanship belongs to a world of representation and prescriptions. . Intellectuals and 
parties should stop representing or taking part for the oppressed, although they can side 
on something like justice. Foucualt’s conception of the political person is elitist. Partisans 
and intellectuals cannot just live the same life or feel the same as the masses. Moreover, 
to emancipate the masses may be illusory since masses may well desire repression. 
Foucault (along Deleuze) collapses political representation (Vertrettung) with general 
representation (Darstellung). The critique of representation as a philosophical idea in 
general becomes also a critique of partisanship and political representation. Since 
representation itself is oppressive, political representation is also oppressive even if it 
works in the interests, or takes sides with the dominated.
61
 
Lyotard takes the critique of representation and partisanship further. A true 
revolutionary politics takes place outside representation through channels of ‘libidinal 
energy’ and sublimity.62 Representation constitutes the State’s ideology; it seeks to make 
things present again, known, but now under the State’s purported categorical and 
totalitarian coordinates. Through a reading of the Kantian theory of the sublime, Lyotard 
builds a spontaneist, ultra-left view of politics.. The sublime is unrestricted energy and 
enthusiasm, enacted in revolutions, the New, and the Event. The sublime in Kant 
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amounts to an overwhelming feeling due to the contemplation of all-powerful objects, 
Kant deduced such feeling of overwhelming power as alien to reason, but still within the 
subject. But the sublime for Lyotard stands for a pure subject, beyond reason but full of 
power, “there is no sublime sensus communis because the sublime [would] need the 
mediation of moral feeling and the latter is a concept of reason.”63 The sublime is pure 
expenditure devoid of morality.
64
  
The result is radical-bourgeois individualism, a kind of artistic sensibility, 
distrustful of political commitments and alliances. Lyotard justifies such distrust for 
organization through his theory of language and discourse, which for all post-
structuralists is the special locus of struggle. An anti-referentialist philosophy of language 
makes the sublime anti-partisan view possible, seeing language as an archipelago of 
disparate practices unable to clarify the meaning of general concepts;
65
 concepts and 
language rather inhabit as strange entities within the subject, as the medium of endless 
dissent. In opposing reason to aesthetics and the figural, Lyotard opposes deliberation for 
a politics of performativity. “It is clear’, writes Lyotard ‘that language games are 
heteromorphous, subject to heterogeneous sets of pragmatic rules’. He takes a view of 
politics as differend, infinite dispersal of games, meanings, and discourses without a 
unifying social universe. Yet his model shares with deliberative democrats distrust for 
political parties and organized opposition. On the one hand, deliberative democrats 
dislike parties for their divisive, non-rational nature; on the other, Lyotard dislike parties 
for being prescriptive, to attempt a moral-political organization of a collectivity. Politics 
should be spontaneous (disorganized) radical dissent.  
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Like Foucault’s rejection of partisan politics of truth, Lyotard spurns the 
‘gladiatorial paradigm’ proper to political parties and collective organizations.  Parties 
competing among themselves over truth claims belong to a realist metaphysical world 
that treats thought and ideas as instruments. This extreme contextualism of isolated 
language games in the manner of the second Wittgenstein –the anti-philosopher of 
Philosophical Investigations- has no room for partisan practice. Parties presuppose a 
political society where others must be engaged in a common language and struggle. But 
since the ethical responsibility in the differend is to respect the other’s play or language, 
Lyotard uses such epistemology to deride organization, strategy, and the social… and 
political philosophy tout court. 
Conclusions 
 Liberals often reduce politics to procedure, establishing legitimacy in established 
legality. Politics and partisanship corrupt the institutional process that makes possible 
legitimate, unhindered deliberations. Post-structuralists think of true politics happening in 
exceptional situations, with grand events and mystical evocations. Laws can never be 
legitimate. Institutions and parties are already corrupt for belonging to the State. True 
politics is always to come as a promise of emancipation turning away from actuality to 
make room for a more open, more ethical kind of being. 
 Poststructuralist theories stress a politics of difference relinquishing the ‘liberal’ 
moment of universalism and rationalism. Post-structuralism sanctions a political actor 
who occupies a special place outside reason and political representation. And parties 
negate and reduce the endless complexity of political life, a complexity conceived in 
terms of vitalism and affects. Yet, in resisting universalism and hegemony in profit of 
particularity and diffusion, post-structural narratives fail to differentiate between different 
universalisms and run the danger of reifying difference at the risk of overlooking 
underlying and totalizing social relations. To wit, critical post-structural accounts offer a 
powerful critique of liberal moral rationalism, but the trade-off is to privilege the 
particular instead of the universal, fragment over totality, and so on.
66
 Just as liberals, 
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post-structural theory censures partisanship. Post-structuralists are skeptical of parties and 
manifestoes, framing politics as micro-politics and singularities, at the ‘molecular’ level 
of civil society. Just like liberal theorists praise non-partisanship with ideas of consensus 
and deliberation, postmodernists discredit partisanship on the opposite grounds of infinite 
dissent, particularism, and the metaphysical impossibility of [political] representation. 
Liberalism and postmodernism evenly stifle partisanship as a result of their 
understanding politics from either ontological commitment to absolute identity or 
absolute difference. 
 Both accounts proceed from grand but closed theories of the political. Post-
structural and liberal conceptions have strenuous requirements for ‘true’ politics. Liberals 
imagine a world of rational deliberation between excellent citizens outside institutions 
like parties or Congress. Poststructuralists use similar exceptionalist arguments. Real 
politics are rare and extraordinary, miraculous, brought by unforeseen events. And 
politics disappoint if independent, selfless citizens do not deliberate or if radical 
individuals do not demand the impossible, nothing less than immediate, spontaneous 
revolution.
67
 For these reasons, postmodernism and liberalism engage repeatedly in a 
moral perfectionism. Both theories stress on the extraordinary and do not consider the 
repeated failure and equivocation of politics, due to necessity, constrain, and 
negotiations. Politics for both ethical theories bear demanding standards, consequence of 
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conceiving politics from outside, from jurisprudence and metaphysics.
68
  
 Both political theories, persistently fail to deal with the double-sided actuality of 
parties and institutions. Parties make normative claims for the whole community and at 
the same time they divide the community. Parties are political unities that divide the 
polity, and their existence shows that every polity is a divided unity. Yet post-
structuralism and liberal/deliberative theories seek a holistic unity, either through moral 
consensus or a future community of special beings. Post-structural exceptionalism is the 
exact obverse of liberal proceduralism. Exceptional events depend on business as usual; 
the site of the Event does not make sense without the ordinary.
69
 These are all 
consequences of a politico-philosophical dualism and antinomianism that I will explore 
in the next chapters. Eventually, post-structuralism and liberalism depend on similar 
logics of exclusion. Liberalism operates under a excluding reason, the other must be 
disciplined through moral coercion and learning.  Post-structuralism employs an 
exclusive otherness. To be truly ‘political’ is to place oneself outside institutions and the 
law through different routes of escape, through ethics, aesthetics, or religion.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
CRUSHING THE PARTY  
ANTI-PARTISANSHIP IN THE HISTORY OF THOUGHT 
 
 “Another infirmity of the Commonwealth [are] the great number of corporations; 
which are as it were many lesser commonwealths in the bowels of a greater, like 
worms in the entrails of a natural man.” -Hobbes 
 
“More respect to the man of knowledge; down with all parties!” –Nietzsche 
 
“When one imagines two powers in mutual opposition but unable to come to grips 
with each other because the one constantly evades the other, a set-up like that would 
certainly not lack a comical effect.” –Kierkegaard 
____________________ 
 
The Canon: No Parties 
Parties and partisan minds did not fit with perennial ideals of harmony and 
concord, ever since the Platonic contempt for democracy.
70
  Democracy gives every part 
equal power. Aristotle accepted the contentious nature of politics, but prescribed formal 
equality with elections to protect material inequality. By sharing political power, 
Aristotle inoculated property power.
71
 Monotheism followed with a more extreme verve. 
Augustine saw factions as an attribute of the pagan mind -many gods, many parties.
72
  
Heretics had to reconcile with orthodoxy or be expelled from the Church. Religious 
parties destroyed the highest values of charity and peace for Aquinas.
73
 In the Islamic 
world from Spain to Egypt, Maimonides urged minorities to recognize no other authority 
than the Rabbinic majority or risk losing their rights. More than 300 sects flourished after 
the rise Shia Islam continuing pre-Islamic feuds in religious guise. Sunni philosophers 
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such as Alfarabi, Avicenna, Averroes, and Ibn-Khaldun considered these splits more 
dangerous to the Ummah than infidels. Later, many parties burst with the Lutheran 
Reformation. Sects claiming divine inspiration competed throughout Central Europe. 
Peasant movements frequently advocated an antinomian politics and religiosity in 
disregard for civil and religious laws.  Luther sided with the Counterrevolution despite 
his rebellion against Rome; absolute submission to secular authorities required no parties; 
the true and free life of the faithful recognizes no factions or “outward distinctions”.   
Modern contract theorists inherited the ancient antipathy for parties, but modified 
the means to crush them. Modern theory sundered the corporatist view of necessity and 
continuity between nature and polis, and political divisions as well as political freedoms 
and mobilization became systematic with the rise of centralized States, national 
parliaments, and legal parties. Imperatives became technical managing security, self-
preservation, and power; gravity shifted to the individual and politics became directorial 
radically realigning the poles of power and legitimacy. If the corporatist bond of the 
ancients never posed as harsh a diremption between individual and community despite 
their general lack of freedoms, formal modern egalitarianism brought into the open a 
vision of politics as struggle. The image of the polity lost the old organic and harmonic 
‘balance’ between similitudes and analogies, since the scientific revolution in politics 
polarized individual and community through free consent, form and content through State 
sovereignty, and actuality and ideality through dividing politics and ethics.
74
  Individuals 
now were opposed to each other and to the State. If principles of identity and continuity 
ruled ancient thought, modern theorists used the principle of difference and estrangement. 
The scientific revolution produced a set of political antinomies that would govern 
Western political imagination to our days.  
The scientific-technical outlook, again, never ceased hostilities toward parties 
despite the rise of constitutional party governments. Almost all contractualists and non-
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contractualists such as Smith, Hume, and Nietzsche snubbed parties. If something is 
common for philosophies of every political sign is their antipathy to parties, perhaps for 
the philosophical belief that overrides every politics that Truth is one. Parties had to be 
eliminated, or their capability restricted and neutralized. Parties also had to become 
provisional, or to have them as many as possible to turn them useless.   With modern 
contract theory, the pair of civil society and the state, state of nature and political nature, 
articulated a kind of duality soon to be transformed into a dualism, not far from medieval 
theology, in which the lower order of politics ought to mirror a superior and depoliticized 
natural law. Natural law and contract as the normative origin of politics emptied politics 
of history. Thus, contractualists executed an opposite move than the utopians and 
historicists of the Renaissance. Unlike utopians, which also used natural law to criticize 
existing societies, contractualists idealized existing societies. Existing regimes became 
the Utopia, especially around the individual’s assertion of property power.75 Unlike 
Machiavelli who like Hegel placed great importance to how institutions shaped political 
life, contractualists preferred the moment of foundation or constitution, in order to fix 
politics with first reasons in a political metaphysic. 
Ancients never viewed politics as a positive science. Modern theorists instead 
wanted to secure an exact knowledge of politics to, as Habermas writes, “disregard the 
categories of ethical social intercourse and confine themselves to the construction of 
conditions under which human beings, just like objects within nature, will necessarily 
behave in a calculable manner.”76 Hegel described this modern moment as trying to grasp 
the opposites of ideal and content “in the most abstract extremes”. “The judge is the 
thinking Understanding”, the scientific faculty that dissects, separates, inspects, and 
fragments objects in order to know them and master them. Contractualism produced a 
politics marked by this extreme ‘inorganic’ diremption between ideal and content, this 
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tearing apart between subject and political power.
77
 Between both extremes, nothing must 
take place. The excluded third meant the disappearance or to regards as secondary 
intermediary bodies between State and individual, Substance and Subject.  
The Modern Politics of Understanding 
Medieval nominalism provided the antinomian framework for Hobbes, the first 
modern contractualist. The nominalist conception of language rested on a strong 
separation between form and content. Language was seen as an arbitrary institution; 
words were void of substance and universal meaning. Without universal and rational 
essences, ideas of good and morality depended on divine and sovereign will as holders of 
absolute power. Hobbes’s view was one of an absolute conventionalism, where both 
terms absolute and convention carry equal weight. Orders are conventional because they 
are products of human deliberation and agreement. Orders are also absolute because there 
is nothing outside convention. Form (convention) over-determines social and political life 
(content). The absolute nature of convention is settled by not reflection or philosophy, but 
through sovereign will.
78
 Hobbes’s contract is built on this dual nature of absolute and 
relative (convention). On the one hand, the relative convention lies in the subject entering 
freely into a deliberate and contingent contract with others to designate a power outside 
the contract. On the other, absolute convention is total obedience to this third power. 
Power is reified in the sovereign, as well as language is reified in conventions and 
customs.  
Nominalism provided Hobbes with key concepts to build his artificial notion of 
the State. Hobbes produced an absolutist state without the aid of tradition, deduced from 
the powers of understanding and observation of ‘human nature’. Like most moderns, 
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Hobbes separated the realms of nature and politics, severing the evolutionary link from 
nature to polis proper to corporatism. Yet the outcome is theological even to Hobbes’s 
own mechanicism. Hobbes conceived nature as mere repetition, an endless state of war, 
and human nature as a blind mechanism of passions. Politics and order are almost 
miracles. The sovereign is the Creator of politics, intruding into natural existence. In 
Hobbes, the absolute mechanicism of a secularized nature coexists with a supernatural 
decisionism. Although Hobbes, the “Galileo of politics”, did not believe in miracles for 
being threats to the political order, the myth of the Leviathan, half-men and half-God has 
a miraculous flavor.  Hobbes’s theological exegeses at the end of Leviathan ground the 
modern State on Biblical revelation, the paradigmatic ‘miracle’ of all.79 
In order to keep sovereign power complete, Hobbes cast out parties from the 
Leviathan drawing on psychological and sociological reasons.
80
  Party leaders appeal to 
the vanity of its members, and partisans quickly become fanatical and dangerous for the 
Commonwealth. Parties are in advantage over the State in securing loyalties from the 
people. Cohesion is easier to achieve among the people, instead of the allegiance to a 
remote central power. The fervor of group identity overcomes the fear of isolated 
individuals. Political parties are among the “Diseases of the Commonwealth”. They are 
“many lesser Commonwealths in the bowels of a greater; like worms in the body of the 
natural man” 81, corporations, those insidious entities from the middle Ages that denied 
members independence. But authority requires no intermediary bodies between subject 
and State, atomization and individualism enhance political stability and order. 
Locke showed greater acceptance to parties, but restricted partisanship to a 
legalistic conception of politics. First, Locke treated divisive issues such as beliefs and 
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religion as non-political issues, private matters. Second, Locke only allowed public 
opposition in his model when civil functionaries, ministers and magistrates neglect right 
and procedure, endangering the correct functioning of the State. Locke’s juridical-
procedural concept of opposition comes from his understanding of the state of nature. 
Unlike Hobbes, Locke seems more medieval in his notion of nature; nature is goodness 
and should model political society.
82
 The legislature and the executive reflect two 
fundamental laws of nature, the right to life and property and the right of punishment.  
The challenge of living in a state of nature lies primarily in hardship and scarcity, not 
violence. If Hobbes harshly separated nature and politics in order to assert political 
authority, Locke weakened such partition, but created a depoliticized conception of 
politics that secured ‘natural’ social relations instead of asserting political authority. The 
Lockean State allowed individuals to behave within a political order as if they were in the 
state of nature, especially in their quest for wealth.  Parties are given a place in the 
political order, but they are greatly constricted to enforce and legislate according to the 
laws of nature. Locke reduces a bit the philosophical hostility to parties, but parties are 
only guarantors of pre-existing laws, not creators of new orders. Partisan opposition is 
juridical or procedural, not political, appearing only in an approving or judgmental role. 
 More than any other contract theorist, Rousseau asserts a radically creative 
politics due to his concept of will. Yet more than any other contractualist, Rousseau 
considered parties as the main hindrance for the General will. Parties embody private 
interests, desire and selfishness; they are not conducive to that work of art which is 
political society. More than Hobbes and Locke, the antinomies characteristic of this 
period appear throughout Rousseau’s political theory in order to bind (but not resolve) 
the extreme differences between ancients and moderns concerning good government. 
Rousseau for example wished for a republic with modern direct institutions based on the 
ancient idea of virtue. Rousseau also believed that perfect freedom is only possible in the 
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State of nature, but political freedoms are creations of the radical will, completely outside 
nature. There is no trace of natural law once popular sovereignty is constituted. Rousseau 
understands politics as a radical convention, thus his stark antinomy between natural man 
and civilization is not solved easily in going back to nature.  Rousseau’s political 
philosophy is anything but a regression to nature. By eliminating natural law, Rousseau 
saw no need to preserve ethical and political individualism, the political personalism of 
the Sovereign, or to retain the inequality of Locke’s contract. Individuals fulfill 
themselves in virtue through education (as in Plato) in a political form in which all public 
differences collapse (against Plato). This transition from nature to artifice is epochal and 
marks the passage from European romanticism to modernism.  Rousseau’s vision of 
politics, on the contrary, far surpasses Hobbes’s in alienation.83   But Rousseau’s General 
Will is built as an absolute identity without differences.
84
 There should be no private 
wills in the public sphere, no parties in the republic of virtue, and if these were inevitable, 
then there should be as many as possible for them to become ineffective.
85
  If Locke 
allowed for parties in parliaments and opposition, it is because Locke has a restricted, 
juridical conception of politics. Rousseau does not allow parties for the opposite reason. 
The danger of politics lies in its own nature, in unrestricted will, for which parties do not 
have a natural law to obey, follow, or consult.  
For a thinker that is often seen as crucial to liberal constitutionalism, the one who 
thought contractualism in systematic terms, the question of political parties in Kant’s 
philosophy is absent. However, one can easily deduce from his practical philosophy 
Kant’s position on the question of partisanship. Kant never theorized concerted political 
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action or political opposition, yet Kant’s conception of public reason constitutes the 
cornerstone for our deliberative, non-partisan conception of political reason. To this end, 
Kant reversed the relation between public and private. A citizen uses her reason in a 
private, heteronomous way when she speaks as partisan for an organization. The private 
use of reason means to advance the interests of a political organization or group. The 
public use of reason appears only when a citizen speaks as an Independent, using only the 
convictions of her moral conscience. Kant’s reversal of this question of public and private 
was revolutionary, akin to Luther’s emphasis on conscience. Kant defined the public 
sphere as the realm to apply moral judgment in excess of political constrains from 
specific states or organization, a transnational freedom of conscience, so to speak. Yet 
Kant starkly separated the moral from the political and, therefore, practical reason 
quickly became anti-political. Kant invested reason with supreme legislative powers 
above partisan interests, but such reason speaks for an abstract concept of humanity and 
from no specific place, without time and without space.  
Anti-contractualists had also deep anti-partisan prejudices. Hume thought no 
government was founded on contract.
86
  The original contract is a speculative fiction 
produced precisely by parties. Partisan politics is metaphysical politics; parties believe in 
these invisible principles as if they were real. Modern parties for Hume are speculative 
parties of principle, founded on abstract notions. This is the source of their evil. 
Speculation demands no contradiction between principle and action [Hume thought that 
contradiction allowed each person to do as she wishes privately supporting a plural 
political life.].  Fanaticism follows when action and principle, theory and practice are not 
in contradiction. Parties of principle possess irreconcilable views. But since man is a 
stubborn creature of habits and since it is impossible to provide an ultimate reason for a 
right knowledge or right politics, the only solution is to moderate party strife, not to end 
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it.   Hume as well as Burke regarded speculation as the trait of the revolutionary mind. 
For both men, revolutions are products of false philosophies, which elevate metaphysical 
concepts as ultimate authorities. Parties, for Hume, cannot “well support [themselves], 
without a philosophical or speculative system of principles annexed to its political or 
practical one. People are commonly very rude builders, especially in this speculative 
way, and more especially when actuated by party-zeal”.87   
Criticizing the state of nature, contract, and partisanship was a logical outcome of 
Hume’s skepticism.88  Hume’s skepticism towards speculation and parties was coherent 
with his philosophy of knowledge, organized around the opposites of reason and 
sensations. The antinomian nature of Hume’s thought regards senses destroying claims of 
reason, such as the mental idea of cause when causes are nowhere seen. At the same time, 
ideas from perceptions associated with the senses are only ideas of the mind. Mental 
representations of sensations are not the same as sensations themselves. An unbridgeable 
gulf exists between reason and perception and consequently the mind falls into 
unavoidable contradictions. Senses struggle with reason, and reasons provide 
inconsistent, fictional arguments to explain experience and sensuousness. Smith and 
Hume radicalized British empiricism to conclude that causation is not real, just a mental 
operation. Likewise, in politics, the notion of contract is metaphysical when it is regarded 
as an actual first cause to justify political responsibility, and parties are to blame for 
introducing these fanatical first causes into politics. 
Nietzsche’s critique of contract disposed of the abstract equality of contract 
theorists, but he preserved and sharpened their anti-partisan antinomianism.
89
 The type of 
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justice for contractualists is only possible among equals; modern violence originates in 
the illusion that this type of justice, that this contract can be universal. One archetype for 
Nietzsche is the Rousseauian man, creator of commotions- responding “to the most naïve 
of moral canons, like objectivity, good will of Christianity.”  Hegel understood also 
modern Christian morality as this diremption of absolute inwardness and external 
legislation, which took the fullest and most consummate form in Protestantism. But for 
Nietzsche, Christianity is instead this equalization of external relations that does not do 
justice to the unequal inner vitalities of different spirits.  Contract is a democratic fiction 
born out of a Christian and dialectical bad conscience. Nietzsche’s antinomian anti-
contractualism extends logically to political parties and political representation. There is 
no mutual recognition between nobles and slaves.
90
 The mob clouded by hatred and 
resentment would not recognize their ‘natural’ superiors.91 Political parties belong to the 
vulgar democratic era; parties are “all compelled to transform their principles into great al 
fresco stupidities.”92 Modern democracies must “prevent the organization of parties”, 
because the rich and the miserable depend on wealth and parties organize and manipulate 
this dependency for political power. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
decisive turning point in European history, but he sees them not as a tremendous problem but as a 
great opportunity –the long tyranny of reason is coming to an end and a radically new creation may 
soon be possible… to raise humanity to new and glorious heights in the wings of his musical 
philosophy.” 
90
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Anti-partisanship and the antinomy of law 
From contractualists to Nietzsche, politics was framed through the opposites of 
civil society and the State, and with the mild exception of Locke, there is no 
philosophical conceptualization of political opposition as practice. In all the revisited 
theories, political opposition is unethical. When parties and partisans are considered, 
there is only proscription and the separation between ethics and politics made blunter. 
Gillian Rose calls this partition of ethics and politics the antinomy of law. For Rose this 
antinomy has a specific beginning in a historical institution. Rose writes,  
“Unaddressable oppositions between morality and legality, autonomy and heteronomy, 
the good will and natural desire, force and generality, can be traced to an historically 
specific legal structure which establishes and protects absolute property by means of the 
juridical fictions of persons, things, and obligations. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit 
shows how the confrontation between master and slave becomes internalized in the 
‘person’ as the struggle between the good will and inclination. Opening up a historical 
perspective on the development of the idea of ‘persons’ as the bearers of equal rights and 
the hypertrophy of their inner life, Hegel expounds the antinomy of law as the 
characteristic compound of modern states of individual freedom with individual 
depoliticization.”93  
 
According to Rose, in modern philosophy, Kant and Kantianism extrapolated Roman 
property law into universal law by separating the laws of things from laws of persons, 
means and ends, subjects and objects. The famous Kantian maxim of not treating persons 
as things is an intelligible ideal, a regulative principle, yet this distinction is inherently 
private, and while the distinctions between things and people are idealized, they still stem 
from a juridical opposition at the heart of Roman property law.  The antinomy of law 
asserts individual freedoms against power, but also, and less evidently, it naturalizes 
property relations (such as the system produced by Rome) as ethics. The antinomy also 
purifies politics of political opposition, and subordinates conflicts to moral philosophy, 
reproducing the dualism of imperium et dominium of Western tradition. Kantianism 
presupposes an idealization of Roman relative ethical life, but dirempting the opposites 
of persons and things, but by still preserving such distinction in the realm of the 
unconditioned.   
In his critical theory of knowledge, Kant viewed antinomies as tools to show the 
limits of cognition. At the same time, his model justified the empirical world through 
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extemporal norms of reason, and as result, politics as practice was transformed into a 
metaphysics of law. The normative nature of Kant’s conception of politics summarized 
the attitude of most classical contractualists, especially Locke, as well as modern liberals 
and post-structuralists. Politics must be understood transcendentally in light of 
foundational principles beyond partisan propensities, and also by criticizing actual 
politics in metaphysical language, independently of institutions and political struggles. 
This approach, whether critical or not, imposes a strict separation of ideal and actuality. 
Contractualism justifies politics in terms of abstract right, as a system of property 
relations. “Our ancient society”, as Rose would say, relies on the antinomies of persons 
and things; it treats persons as things and things as persons. The core of the modern state 
and modern political philosophy is recognition and selfhood, even if it is under a system 
of property. As property becomes the foundation for personal freedoms, it becomes also 
misrecognition of personhood, in a double sense: the possession of personality, and 
personae, bearers and masks of the property system. For example, when a person’s 
[labor] is rented or hired, the person takes on the legal role of a thing. But this 
personhood or legal selfhood is already a product of the legal system. It does not bring 
into existence a natural self-hood prior to law as contract theorists imagined. This illusion 
of natural law is proper to natural consciousness, according to Hegel, effective as long as 
we recognize the substance, objective spirit, and institutions as natural and in opposition 
to spirit. The apparent naturalness of second nature is a product of human freedom 
itself.
94
 For Hegel, the dichotomies between civil society and the State come from taking 
something a posteriori, the existence of an atomized society with the advent of modernity 
and capitalism as the condition for all political societies independent of social reason. Yet 
dichotomies are outcomes and not causes of social orders. The fragmentation of 
bourgeois social relations which is an effect is misrecognized as isolated individuals as 
cause.  
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The tradition of political Kantianism deploys the antinomy of law to produce 
transcendental political subjects, purified from concrete desires and social relations, and 
to produce a jurisprudence of duty, in which rights and obligations are universal and 
transcendental, independent of regimes and political forms. The problem is to reconcile 
the theoretical determinism of transcendental philosophy with practical-political freedom. 
In other words, how to make philosophy politically possible, and how to make politics 
philosophical, to unite both extremes of thought and action. Yet in this diremption 
philosophy always kept the upper hand. 
Kant used antinomian analysis as a powerful critical tool, but Kantian criticism 
resulted in skepticism and Kant’s theories had to be reworked to avoid nihilism in his 
practical philosophy. The result was a dogmatic morality formulated through axioms and 
maxims. The history of post-Kantianism shows how the skeptical implications of Kant’s 
system risked degenerating into faith or religion. Since first reasons are not rationally 
justifiable, commandments come to fill the non-observable universe of political morality, 
ethics, aesthetics, and religion.
95
 Hegel argued that antinomies results in incoherence, but 
they are also necessary.
96
 Yet, Hegel’s treatment of antinomies has been ignored by 
liberal and post-structural traditions of thought. These two traditions, for the most part, 
have been stuck in an endless dilemma between freedom and necessity, legality and 
legitimacy resulting in many consolations about the ‘paradox’ of politics. The result of 
these two neo-Kantian ways of thinking is a political anthropology inimical to 
partisanship.
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Two Traditions of Partisanship 
The history of political parties thus produced two philosophical approaches to 
partisanship. One is neo-Kantian stemming from Weber that understands the party as a 
machine competing for State power, separate from society, and using ideology only for 
material interests and self-advancement. It is neo-Kantian in the sense that it separates 
starkly political reality from political ideal, more of which will be said later in regards to 
Weber’s view of the party. This isolated view of the party from society belongs to the 
liberal tradition that informs the vast majority of party theory in the 20
th
 century.  
The other tradition began with Hegel and German idealism on the Left and Right 
in the 19th century. Party theorists in this tradition included Rosenkranz, Bauer, Gans, 
Ruge, and Marx and Engels on the Left, and also F.J. Stahl, F. Rohmer, and von 
Treitschke on the Right. This second tradition of political parties and partisans accounts 
for both the objective integration of partisanship into the electoral system, and for 
partisanship's oppositional dimensions in the broader political, economic, and social 
arenas. This tradition has a dialectical conception between theory and practice, 
organization and tactics, party and society that rejected perspectives that see parties as 
autonomous entities. They saw the political party as essential to the universal life of a 
modern nation. As Gramsci explains,  
“The history of a party must be the history of a particular social group. But this group is 
not isolated; it has friends, allies, opponents and enemies. Only from the complex picture 
of social and State life (often even with international ramifications) will emerge the 
history of a certain party. It can therefore be said that to write the history of a party means 
to write the general history of a country from a monographic point of view.”97 
 
Heinrich von Treitschke, another Hegelian and Bismarckian nationalist, at the 
opposite side of revolution, writes that, 
“An unprejudiced study of history shows that the Party is a political necessity for a free 
people. It draws the countless opinions of individuals together into one average, and 
crystallizes the confused judgment of each into definite form. Although it is a wholesome 
incentive to certain natures to be compelled to range themselves under some banner, there 
is no doubt that the terrorism of Party may also do harm. For it is clear that every party 
must be one-sided… Every party is of necessity prejudiced and short-lived when 
compared with the breadth of vision and allotted span of the State. It is a chimera to try to 
construct parties to endure forever. Their best fate is to disappear with the attainment of 
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their object, their most shameful end to perish because the facts of history have proved 
the vanity of the ends for which they strove.”98 
 
The entrance of the working class into national politics gave parties a vast 
significance. Parties were now mass parties. All popular politics considered now parties 
or party-like organizations essential for working class interests and political theory.
99
 But 
the extension of the suffrage celebrated by the newcomers posed a challenge to 
traditional political theorists. To different degrees, theorists like Burckhardt, Hegel, Mill, 
or Tocqueville supported universal suffrage only in theory and as an ideal, but they 
suspected its immediate realization. Around 1830s, as Kahan states, “no liberal can 
support the immediate establishment of universal suffrage, but all foresee sometime in 
the distant future when it would be a good thing.”100 Voting for them was not a right, but 
a privilege. Mill and Tocqueville considered at different times in restricting suffrage or 
suspending it outright. Mill’s famous distinction between parties of order and parties of 
reform as requirements for healthy democracies is one of the best statements of the 
dialectical principle of partisanship. Mill however restricted partisanship to Whigs and 
Tories, and gave a very qualified defense of partisanship. Moreover, parties of progress 
and parties of reform were abstractions, not real political parties. Mill believed that 
antagonism was only useful if it corrected the deficiencies of the political system, yet 
actual political parties failed precisely to do so.
101
 Mill therefore advocated for anti-
partisan antagonism in the form of independent discussion, deliberation, and 
experimentation. Although being the first politician to call for women’s right to vote in 
the British Parliament, Mill’s advocacy was strictly limited to consideration of class and 
education, not to mention despotism for the British colonies.   
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Parties embodied for Hegel the selfishness of civil society. Unlike mere civil 
associations, parties were not just content with civil particularism; they struggled for 
universality by being involved with the State. However, for Hegel, a multiparty system 
posed the danger that the government may itself become a party. “The government –
writes Hegel- is not a party opposed to another party in such a way that both have to fight 
for major concessions from each other, and if a State does get into a predicament of this 
kind, this cannot described as health, but only as misfortune.” Hegel therefore had in 
mind an intra-institutional party system. He did not advocate for parties to the whole of 
the Prussian electorate for two reasons. Mass electorates did not exist in any of the 
German states and princedoms in the 1820s, and Hegel worried that irresponsible and 
selfish voters would hinder the communal (sittlich) ends of the ethical state. In this sense, 
Hegel was a theorist of a selectorate, not an electorate. Yet partisanship as a politico-
theoretical notion occupies a central place in Hegel’s system. For Hegel, the role of the 
ethical State and the role of philosophy in society are the same. The tasks of the State 
must be significantly supported by philosophy, which is only concerned with the public 
sphere. Philosophy, like politics, always takes place in the struggle of contradictions, as 
the constant confrontation between opposed views, philosophy as partisanship.  
Yet one hardly finds explicit statements for political opposition in Hegel’s 
political philosophy. Such a paradox can be explained through context rather than 
philosophy. The Carsbad decrees in 1820s Prussia made it very difficult for the 
progressives to advocate for political dissent. Yet closer to the text, Hegel speaks of 
opposition and parties in subtle, cunning ways. The Philosophy of Right is full of 
references to political opposition, but using the less polemic term Gegenstand instead of 
Opposition or Konkurrenz, competition.
102
 And the Estates, remnants of medieval 
Germanic law still present in Hegel’s model, have like modern parties a “mediating 
function that display their organic function, i.e their incorporation into a [political] 
totality.”103 Thus, in a key paragraph, Hegel states,  
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“The attitude of the executive toward the Estates should not be essentially hostile and a 
belief in the necessity of such hostility is a sad mistake. The executive is not a party 
standing over against another party in such a way that each has continually steal a march 
on the other and wrest something from the other. If such a situation arises in the state, 
that is a misfortune, but it cannot be called health.”104  
 
The importance of the Estates for Hegel, the only available party-like organism in 
Prussia, is useful to understand how partisanship is not only contingent to his political 
evaluations of the time, but a necessary feature of his speculative political imagination,  
“An estates assembly cannot be regarded as having actually engaged in activity until it 
included an opposition. If on the other hand the assembly were unanimously in favor of 
the government, it would not be fulfilling its vocation or attaining its goal. Of necessity 
there must be an opposition within the assembly itself; the cabinet must have the majority 
in an assembly, but the opposition must necessarily be there as well. The estates 
assembly is the main council of the State.”105  
 
Hegel, of course, has in mind first the preservation of the State and while 
recognizing the necessity of partisanship and opposition between two main blocks, he 
introduces a third supposedly non-partisan element in order to favor the government 
which is to be preserved at all costs. As with von Treitschke, Hegel’s approach can be 
explained as his way to salvage the State, especially the relatively new Prussian state 
from political breakdown: “There must be three parties in the assembly, two that are 
directly opposed to each other, the party of the people and the party [that] is absolutely 
always on the side of the government, and then a sizable third party, which usually takes 
the side of the cabinet but on the whole is nonpartisan in its approach.”  
It is not the Kantian and positivistic tradition, now dominant, but the Hegelian 
tradition that first recognized the importance of partisanship. Eduard Gans, a leading 
Hegelian philosopher of his time, theorized partisanship not as an isolated exception but 
as a necessary and universal feature for all modern states. He went further than Hegel 
defending the need for legal opposition parties and for active social welfare policy in the 
Prussian State. Gans, a liberal, greatly influenced Marx, Gans thought that partisan 
opposition, which assumes the task of negation in philosophy is indestructible and that 
governments must allow room for antagonism unless it degenerates into cabals and 
anarchy: “Where the State” Gans writes, “does not have to deal with an opposition, the 
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State will rot. The opposition has to be systematic as the negation must not be 
contingent.”106 Opposition for Gans is universal starting from the family, civil society, to 
the State. The family originates in two separate and autonomous personalities, a unity of 
differences that is ruled by love; however, competition, the type of opposition ruling civil 
society, affects also the family. Once members of the family enter civil society and acts 
like self-interested units in the public economy, this new development affects family life 
(spouses, sons) introducing new richer elements in the family. Likewise the State needs 
to accept the opposition ‘naturally’ emerging in civil society (the struggle between 
different classes) to arrive at the ‘truth’ in politics.107  
Like the Hegelians, Marx and Engels placed partisanship at the center of politics. 
Most of their political writings developed around parties from the Orleanists to the 
Commune, from the Communist League to the US Republican Party, and most 
importantly, both men were not only party theorists, but partisans. This unity of theory 
and practice accounts for their dialectical approach to parties. Marx and Engels did not 
only give an objective account of how parties work, that is, as representatives of class 
interests, but they also provided a subjective dimension of that special organization, the 
revolutionary party, and how it can compete with other parties in parliaments and streets. 
Yet Marx and Engels did not celebrate parties as darlings of modern democracy. Mass 
parties unquestionably represented progress to other political forms, insofar they bring 
the class struggle to the open. Parties are valuable only because they carry social conflicts 
into the political arena, and partisanship is the political manifestation of social conflict.
108
  
Marxist party theory always stressed the relationship between parties and classes, distinct 
from mainstream party theory in debt with Weber to whom parties are self-interested 
organizations separate from classes. For Marx and Engels, parties were channels in which 
“individuals form a class only insofar as they are engaged in a common struggle with 
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another class.” Marx and Engels rebuked the idealist view that parties transcended classes 
and social forces to express universal human values and interests. For Marxists, this is a 
form of political ‘holism’, proper to capitalist parties, in order to deny objective class 
differences and affirm abstract equality.  
The importance of the revolutionary party remained after the long 19
th
 century 
and its significance accounted for the great importance accorded to political parties in 
general by interwar theories of politics, in the age of ideological extremes. Theorists like 
Lenin, Gramsci, Weber, and Schmitt appreciated political parties to different degrees, but 
politics for them was unimaginable without partisan struggles, impossible without ‘lines 
of enmity’. For Lenin, partisanship is inevitable in class society. Capitalism already splits 
society in opposed blocs. For this reason, Lenin again and again recommended studying 
the adversary.
109
 Partisans always learn from their enemies. Conflicting interests are 
doggedly rooted in social relations and forces of production, and just as commodity 
exchange is mandatory under capitalism, the idea of being politically neutral is 
unrealistic. It is like imagining oneself outside capital relations. Lenin writes,  
“In a society based upon class divisions, the struggle between the hostile classes is bound, 
at a certain stage of its development, to become a political struggle. The most purposeful, 
most comprehensive and specific expression of the political struggle of classes is the 
struggle of parties. The non-party principle means indifference to the struggle of parties. 
But this indifference is not equivalent to neutrality, to abstention from the struggle, for in 
the class struggle there can be no neutrals; in capitalist society, it is impossible to 
“abstain” from taking part in the exchange of commodities or labor-power. And exchange 
inevitably gives rise to economic and then to political struggle.” 110 
 
For Lenin, capitalism is already objectively partisan for the capitalists, yet to wish 
for non-partisan politics is in all a capitalist idea. The idea that the liberal bourgeoisie 
represents all people against the old aristocratic order, independent of class is the 
ideological root of non-partisanship. Since liberal politics effaces class content, the 
abstract nature of the ‘rights of man’ leads to non-party politics, to a widespread political 
morality beyond parties.
111 
Non-partisanship is also strategic.  Before liberal revolutions, 
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there were no parties in existence, and the new dominant class kept the old monarchic 
precautions. Non-bourgeois parties had to be prevented from taking shape. But from a 
purely social perspective, there is no escape from taking sides, partisanship is a necessity, 
birthed by the very system that disowns it.  
Mass parties were for Lenin a great advancement provided by representative 
democracies, because parties were schools of politics. Parties made people politically 
literate. Yet Lenin’s party manifesto What is to be Done is a document of non-ideal 
theory. Lenin had no illusions about representative democracy but how to work with the 
party system for revolution. Theory emerged as analytical tool to learn how to anticipate 
the adversary; it was not a dogmatic morality for action.
112
  Following Lenin, Gramsci 
also celebrated partisanship as the embodiment of “an historical act that can only be 
performed by the ‘collective man’, nothing less than a modern Prince.113  But modern 
parties only exist as long as there is class struggle. Revolutionary parties seek to end class 
divisions, and such party-form would cease to exist once class power is gone. This anti-
partyism ‘for the future’ plays however a subsidiary role in the critique of class societies. 
Anti-partyism in capitalism rejects class mobilization while keeping class inequality. 
Partisanship seeks to eliminate class violence and party politics dialectically through 
matchless class struggle and party mobilization. Again Gramsci states that,  
“One may say that a party is never complete and fully-formed, in the sense that every 
development creates new tasks and functions, and in the sense that for certain parties the 
paradox is true that they are complete and fully-formed only when they no longer exist – 
i.e., when their existence has become historically redundant. Thus, since every party is 
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only the nomenclature for a class, it is obvious that the party which proposes to put an 
end to class divisions will only achieve complete self-fulfillment when it ceases to exist 
because classes, and therefore their expressions, no longer exist”114 
 
The neo-Kantian school did not grasp this necessary relation between classes and 
parties, and hence parties and politics were circumscribed to the field of appearances, of 
politicians and government. This dominant tradition in political science is one of political 
formalism, in which parties are outside to classes, and they attempt instead to mold 
passive social forces. But the October Revolution realized Marx and Engels’s 
achievements of an openly partisan philosophy, in which classes and party were part of 
the whole. Weber and his student Schmitt responded by accepting the seriousness of 
parties to political theory and practice, but by rejecting the notion of mass party to 
counter Bolshevism -and in Schmitt’s case, to counter also liberalism’s purported 
weakness to confront the Soviets. 
Weber represented the liberal response to Marxism. Parties were indeed effective 
components of social structures of domination. Like Marx, Weber stated “By virtue of 
these structural differences of domination it is impossible to say anything about the 
structures of the parties without discussing the structural forms of domination per se.”115 
Weber dissected social domination in ideal types that can be applied to different societies, 
but for his methodological individualism, these structures were unconnected. Classes 
belonged to the economic sphere, status pertained to the social sphere, and parties were of 
the political sphere with the goal to control the State’s resources.  Weber distinguished 
parties as material organizations but also as ideal communities of meaning with rational 
values. These ‘rational’ values prevented parties, ideally, to take over the State at any 
cost without risking their ‘ethics of conviction’. Thus, Weber did not consider parties 
representative of classes. Parties also had a commitment, a responsibility to the State. In 
addition, Weber saw in the notion of class an un-clarified collective concept with no 
explanatory value. Parties were elite organizations formed by individuals. Parties 
managed politics pragmatically within the existing system; they moved towards 
integrating, not challenging the electoral system. Weber welcomed party centralization 
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and bureaucracy, despite his gloomy diagnosis of general bureaucratic domination.
116
 On 
the contrary, Lenin complained until the end of the growing centralization of the Soviets.  
Bureaucracies opportunely robbed working class parties of their revolutionary projects.  
Weber’s neo-Kantian dualism of ideal types and methodological individualism 
could not conceive of classes embodying philosophical principles, and less of course of 
the key principle of partisanship as the standpoint of a class. The result was an elite and 
pessimistic power theory that removed the idea of mass political education and predicted 
that domination would become more pervasive and capacious in developed representative 
democracies. Weber was pessimistic about the bureaucratization of modern societies, but 
was glad a bureaucratic system could control radical social demands. His views on Russia 
were an example of how a poorly managed bureaucracy could not pact a transition to 
liberal democracy, unless “fatally wounding itself”.117 Popular mobilization was high due 
to Tsarism’s low state capacity. For this reason, Weber had to assign the masses a passive 
role. Classes had to be demobilized to change into power groups: “More and more the 
material fate of the masses depends upon the steady and correct functioning of the 
increasingly bureaucratic organizations of private capitalism. The idea of eliminating 
these organizations becomes more and more utopian.” Weber’s positive sociology 
conceived ideal types as impermanent; yet they reinforced present practices of power by 
forcing out collective agency. Masses were objects, impossible to intervene in political 
developments.
118
 Compare to Lukács’s formulation of the revolutionary party, in which, 
the masses becomes classes for itself, and the individual through its membership and 
participation becomes a political subject; “for the first time in history the active and 
practical side of class consciousness directly influences the specific actions of every 
individual.” For Lukács, the Weberian conception, our conception, sees parties as “not 
active in the objective historical sense of the word, as their ostensible activity is only a 
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reflex of the way in which they are borne along fatalistically along historical forces they 
do not comprehend.”119 The way our parties respond to the diktats of the IMF is proof of 
Lukács’s accusation of the ‘contemplative’ nature of our “catch-all parties.”  
 Weber’s student, Carl Schmitt is famous for conceiving politics in terms of 
friends and enemies, for developing a theory of the partisan, and for having an 
epistemology in which struggle was premier. Political ideas and concepts are partisan 
weapons. They are only clear in line with specific contexts and interests. Yet, Schmitt’s 
specific texts show an intense hostility to parties. Parties are undemocratic, mercenaries 
of liberal parliaments. “Parties -Schmitt upholds- do not face each other today discussing 
opinions, but as social or economic-power groups calculating their mutual interests and 
opportunities for power.”120 Parties briskly trade power by manipulating the masses in 
this “government by [superfluous] discussion”.  According to Schmitt, parliaments 
represent an extraordinary reversal of democracy. In The Crisis of Parliamentary 
Democracy, Schmitt understands democracy in a classical civic sense, conservatively as a 
homogeneous community. Polities only endure through speedy decisions to expel danger.  
Survival depends on a realization of equality adverse to liberalism. For Schmitt, liberal 
equality exists abstractly, without the contrary of inequality. For this reason, it does not 
exist anywhere, only in the liberal imagination. Liberal equality is hot air; “one cannot 
abstract out what is political leaving only universal human equality” which then “be 
equally understood only in terms of itself and without risk”. Equality is meaningful only 
when equals are treated as equals and unequals as unequals.  Concrete equality is only 
‘distributed’, not granted to all evenly. In order to ensure durable regimes, democracy 
should expel difference within the polity, “a democracy demonstrates its political power 
by knowing how to refuse or keep at bay something foreign and unequal that threatens its 
homogeneity.”121 Schmitt observes that ignoring inequality is sound with liberal anti-
politics. Schmitt argues that with equality becoming an “indifferent concept” without 
opposites, inequality returns with a vengeance. The repressed inequality reappears in 
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economics and ethics, “inequality then comes into play with ruthless power… under 
conditions of superficial political equality”.122  
In sum, from the revolutionary left, Lenin and Gramsci considered that 
partisanship was inexorable in class societies and that non-partisanship was a nocuous 
ideology hiding conflict under false layers of class benevolence.  For Weber, parties did 
reflect structures of dominations, but to convert class interests into partisan politics was 
implausible. Weber’s party bureaucracies control classes for their benefit. Once 
domination becomes opportunity, parties become averse to political change. Finally, 
Schmitt sees parties as parasitical liberals, which in turn is an ideology aloof to conflict 
and communal survival. Parties are un-political, “opposition belongs to the essence of 
parliament”, and dialectics is the “metaphysic of the two party systems” at the expense of 
the State’s unity.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE SPECULATIVE EXPERIENCE  
HEGELIANISM RE-LOADED 
 
 “Hegel’s philosophy has no social import if the Absolute cannot be thought.” 
-Gillian Rose 
 
“Hegel’s is a spirit that finds its appropriate dwelling in a body with 
numerous protruding members and with deep fissures and sections.”   
-Ludwig Feuerbach 
 
“There is no way out of entanglement.” –Theodor Adorno 
 
______________________ 
 
The Speculative Middle Way: Partisanship and Recognition 
 Liberal and post-structural political theories oscillate between the State and civil 
society never valuing the mediating function of parties and partisans. Although parties 
are key political actors, they are considered negative for the majority of political theorists 
to the present. Parties present a paradox to dualist thinking. As intermediary bodies, are 
parties of the State or do they belong to civil society? The party is indeed an anomaly, 
external to the canonical pair of state and society, sovereign and subjects. Yet 
dialectically, what is considered external to the opposition between State and Society, an 
excluded third, becomes internal and essential to that relation, as many Hegelian 
philosophers saw in the rise of political parties and organized opposition throughout 
Europe.
123
 Parties embody the dialectical principle of opposition and mediation in 
politics. 
The speculative perspective does not favor absolute identity like liberalism or 
absolute difference as in post-structuralism. The speculative proposes a third moment; it 
erects a third instance where identity and difference come into contact through a structure 
of recognition,  a triadic model that at once involves a) the unity of opposites (ideal 
identity), b) the difference of opposites (ideal difference), and c) the unity in difference of 
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opposites (actuality).  I propose this speculative mode of political reason from Gillian 
Rose’s innovative interpretation of Hegel. According to Rose, the speculative does not 
mean an absolute identity or unity of opposites as traditional interpretations of Hegel 
have said, but the speculative is also a lack of identity:  
“To read a proposition ‘speculatively’ means that the identity which is affirmed between 
subject and predicate is seen equally to affirm a lack of identity between subject and 
predicate… From this perspective, the subject is not ‘fixed’, nor is the predicates 
accidental: they acquire their meaning in a series of relations to each other. Only when 
the lack of identity between subject and object has been experienced can their identity be 
grasped…”124  
 
Rose thinks that speculation takes place in the act of recognition. What is known, i.e. 
through a formal identification between concept and experience, must be re-known and 
re-cognized (again) in order to see the difference between the idea and its actuality. 
Difference or non-identity appears in the second moment of re-cognition. But the 
speculative is a triune structure since attention is given to both identity (moment 1) and 
non-identity (moment 2) where coincident recognition of these two moments becomes 
the third moment. Thus recognition is also and at the same time misrecognition or lack of 
identity. Partisans recognize each other as partisans of opposed parties. The recognition 
of the enemy is also misrecognition, or ‘de-specification’ as enemy through ethico-
political or naturalistic categories (“reactionaries”, or “barbarians”, “savages”, etc.) 
“True” recognition or reconciliation in an absolute sense is impossible.  But 
recognition in a relative sense is misrecognition as a product of historical or temporal 
situations. Absolute recognition is only ideal, proper to absolute ethical life. This ideal is 
nonetheless at work in history as demands for freedom, but freedom only becomes 
concrete with a determinate content, through the different degrees of freedoms in 
societies that are all necessarily constituted by recognition of the other as human, even if 
she is the enemy or competitor. In Hegel’s political philosophy, recognition transpires in 
both the sphere of abstract right, a society of owners, and in ethical life, a society of 
citizens. In abstract right, recognition is granted by others abstractly as owners, as 
individuals’ formal rights of property and thus each individual is interchangeable with 
any other. In ethical life, recognition takes place in each individual’s worth as a human 
being. Hence, Sittlichkeit is a more concrete form of recognition. Yet both social 
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formations are products of freedom understood simultaneously as and not as alienation. 
The act of recognition occurs when one and others determine each other, remaining 
independent and different, and at the same time identical through recognition. In an early 
text, Hegel thinks love is the highest form of recognition and shows how the speculative 
works more in life than intellect:  “Love completely destroys objectivity”, writes Hegel, 
“and thereby annuls and transcends reflection, deprives man's opposite of all foreign 
character, and discovers life itself without any further defect. In love the separate does 
still remain, but as something united and no longer as something separate; life [in the 
subject] senses life [in the object].”125 Both lovers see each other as free different persons 
and also as identical in the relation. For Hegel, the truth of the different moments of 
consciousness is speculative, the recognition that recognition is taking place, “that the 
other consciousness sets aside its own being-for-self, and in so doing itself does what the 
first does to it.”126 Recognition of allies and adversaries constitute the first operation in 
politics, as well as the recognition of others as free or unfree. In this sense, I read the 
speculative as trying to make sense of the partisan reality of politics through this structure 
of recognition rather than framing politics from the view of universal norms or absolute 
desire.  
Despite philosophy’s rejection of partisanship, philosophy has always taken sides 
(for the “Truth”, for the “Spirit”, for “Man”). For Aristotle, practical philosophy was the 
highest form of life, and it could only be concrete in the best attainable regime, for 
regimes are formative of citizens. Hegel believed that one always had to take sides in 
philosophy. Neutrality and third parties are anti-political, belonging to a realm of ‘pure 
culture’. For Hegel, pure culture is ‘pure insight’, a ‘peaceful consciousness’ with no 
partisan insight… it is a third in the dialogue in that it puts the whole story together and 
tells it to us all.” And this position is anti-intellectual. Pure description, neglecting the 
conflict inherent in history and ideas is of those “who understands nothing about the 
subject, has no system but simple historical knowledge, [and] will obviously take a 
nonpartisan stance.” Philosophy differs from natural consciousness in that the former 
considers the long duration of history, and for the study of history we need a system of 
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reason that takes sides. In his language, Hegel states that “if the clear idea of reason is not 
already developed in our minds, in beginning the study of universal history, we should at 
least have the firm, unconquerable faith that reason does exist there, and that intelligence 
and volition is not [just] abandoned to [the] mere chance of [facts].”127  
Reading the speculative as a simultaneous identity and lack of identity between 
opposites conflicts with traditional interpretations of Hegel. Gillian Rose opened this 
reading in her groundbreaking Hegel contra Sociology and revived the almost forgotten 
notion of the speculative for social criticism. Rose argued that speculation, arguably the 
most metaphysical of Hegel’s ideas, was a real impulse to open thought, to keep notions 
moving, instead of the final closure speculation was known for. Speculation does not 
close thinking; speculation is also a non-correlation, a moment of non-identity between 
being and thought, subject and object. Rose rejected the identitarian interpretation of the 
speculative. Hegel’s Idea does not finally ‘meet’ itself in a moment of final self-
recognition with nothing left ‘outside’ to probe, know, and discover. For Rose, “Hegel 
called his discourse ‘speculative’, which means that it defers itself, or, it is never 
finished.”128  
Reflection and Speculation 
Classical German philosophy came relatively late to the European Enlightenment, 
given Germany’s backwardness to the western half of the continent. Yet German thinkers 
after Kant built an original synthesis of prior systems of thought, which they called 
reflective in opposition to their new, more modern speculative orientation. The 
speculative comprehends the workings of reflection, which idealists placed in the intellect 
or the understanding, but philosophies of understanding could not give account for the 
speculative because they lacked the notion of totality and its resulting unity of 
opposites.
129
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The reflective aims to solve problems by dissecting and analyzing. The main 
faculty working here is the understanding or the intellect. The intellect treats problems as 
puzzles for the individual mind to solve, not as real appearances of objective 
contradictions. The intellect casts problems in a negative light. Solutions take priority; 
problems occupy an inferior role in the life of the mind. To put it in the language of the 
early critical theory, solutions confirm the mastery, the lordship of the subject over the 
object. The priority of solutions over problems reveals the supremacy of the subject. 
Another reason is the intellect’s fondness for natural science. Reflective reason is 
observing reason “whose truth of law is found in experience” of immediate sensuous 
beings. In natural philosophy, systems are treated as sum of individual parts. Totality is 
understood as an interaction between individual elements.
130
 Reflective reason is not self-
reflective; it does not have reason as its own object of study, as an objective reason 
working in social relations and in understanding the universe.
131
 Consequently, the 
reflective favors mechanical views of the social and natural universe. Physics is the 
model science.  
Yet Kant, a reflective thinker, entered into speculative territory in his late works. 
In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant recognized the limitations of the 
mechanistic worldview to understand complexity and purpose, “no finite Reason can 
hope to understand the production of even a blade of grass by mere mechanical 
causes.”132 In the Opus Postumum Kant criticized the “formal idealist” opposition of 
mind versus experience of the physical sciences. Kant attempted to unite both opposites 
in his “self-positing doctrine” (Selbstsetzungslehre). Here the subject posits and becomes 
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itself an object of experience, but the doctrine still gave primacy to the subjective, even if 
the subject becomes object.
133
  
Early German romantics, Novalis, Schelegel, and especially Fichte regarded 
Kant’s posthumous doctrine of ‘subject-as-object’ as the most immediate, intuitive, and 
therefore, true form of cognition.
134
 However, these attempts, despite their speculative 
appearance, were still reflective. On the one hand, the subject became the object, the 
subject settling in the other pole of thought; on the other, the object was conceived 
negatively as the non-ego to be ‘colonized’, so to speak, by the ego’s operation of 
‘positing’. For Fichte, positive became positing, positivity, to fix and arrest movement 
while the negative became resistance, movement, restlessness. 
Fichte and the early romantics opposed subject and object, despite their intention 
for totality. For moral action to be possible, freedom for Fichte and Kant must be placed 
in the subject as a regulative idea and at the same time denied in the phenomenal world. 
The inwardly free subject lives in an unfree world. Objects can never be free including 
other subjects that appear as phenomena, as objects. Fichte reasoned that moral action 
exists only in thought, in ‘striving’ as the core activity giving existence to objects. “In 
relation to a possible object” Fichte writes, “the pure self-reverting activity of the self is a 
striving; and as shown earlier, an infinite striving at that. This boundless striving, carried 
to infinity, is the condition of the possibility of any object whatsoever: no striving, no 
object.”135 Like Kant’s theory of duty, Fichte justified moral agency as a never-ending 
striving without achieving actual freedom. If striving is rooted duty, freedom is present as 
subjection.  
But these dichotomies between subject and object, freedom and unfreedom, in 
Hegel words, represented “the unfree and given aspect of the whole [social and ethical] 
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configuration.”136 Hegel considered this disjunctive logic of subject and object belonging 
to a misconception of infinity and the absolute. It is the self-enclosed infinity of the 
intellect, an infinity that opposes itself to finitude. In Kant, the opposition appears 
between a subject ruled by a finite number of categories that make phenomena possible 
and the infinite world of invisible noumena, of essences that can only appear to the 
subject as moral commandments. In Fichte, the relation was reversed under the same 
opposition. Now, the subject is infinite in its endless striving for freedom, but by the 
same reason, the subject is also finite, her limitations is the reason for striving. Positing 
points to the infinite but by the same act of positing, it also limits.
137
 
Bad infinity also works quantitatively, as mathematics, going on forever on a 
straight line, producing inconsistencies in theoretical and practical philosophy. In theory, 
linear infinity depends on causality, looking to the past. Causation needs to posit a first 
cause to avoid infinite regress. But by postulating a first cause, the cause then becomes its 
first effect, which is a contradiction. In practical philosophy, infinity depends on 
causality, this time looking to the future. To be free, men must act as if they were first 
causes or self-causes, based on an idea of freedom that is regulative, but never actual. But 
here there is also a contradiction. To become free, freedom (or democracy, or sense) must 
be denied in actuality and affirmed in a far future, forever differed. Both accounts of 
theoretical (causality) and practical rationality (autonomy, self-causality) depend on the 
understanding’s linear concept of infinity that cannot help but to involve contradictions.  
True infinity, by contrast, is built upon a bounded model of totality. Rationality 
and freedom are realized not in reference to a beginning or end of time, but 
comparatively and historically in reference to other societies and epochs. Theoretically, 
true infinity works on how causes and the human intellect determine each other. 
Causality is anything but natural; it is the product of a working consciousness, which is 
the effect of a long process of natural and cultural evolution. Here, the model of 
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rationality is social, not natural. In practical philosophy, true infinity appears in the idea 
of absolute right as the very right to have rights. Absolute right is infinite right, belonging 
to all humanity, expressed in history as the materialization of finite, different rights. That 
is, freedom is a real, existing condition of humanity and not only a moral ideal.  
Hegel’s speculation was a critical response to the naturalism of modern 
philosophy. Natural philosophy projected the ‘intangible’ questions of the absolute into 
the inward life of faith for reason only showed the scientific limits of belief, but then the 
Absolute became identical to belief inaccessible to positive knowledge. Kantian 
philosophy demolished claims of knowing beyond phenomena and called pure reason the 
phony faculty of speculative dialectics. Yet for Hegel, Kant’s critique was the seed for 
modern speculation. Kant made possible to address question regarding metaphysics 
without the aid of religion and theology. But philosophy, for Hegel, needed to go beyond 
the boundaries of representation offered by natural sciences and transcendental 
philosophy. Freedom of thought, as well as political freedoms, had to be grounded in the 
idea of infinity, an idea that, by its own essence, limits only itself. For this reason, infinity 
in thought meant to overcome representational thinking (a thought grounded in 
sensations, intuitions, and concepts of the understanding), to access a sphere of pure 
conceptual mediation, or what Hegel called “concepts of Reason”.138 Kant’s distinction 
between a formal, lawgiving subject and a passive object depends on representational 
concepts. Here, the subject uses concepts to identify objects. The concepts of 
understanding are discrete and separate from each other and distinct from the subject. 
Kant’s philosophical name for the subject –“the transcendental unity of apperception”- is 
not a concept, but the first mover of concepts. For Hegel, however, the subject is already 
a concept and at the same time produces concepts. Concepts are not really separated from 
objects as representations. First, there can be no concepts without objects, and there are 
no objects that are completely indeterminate.
139
 Second, contrasting concepts and objects 
is already a conceptual distinction. Third, there is no immediacy, a non-conceptual access 
to reality; intuition and sensation are already conceptually mediated. And fourth, 
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concepts are also internal to the object: a thing becomes what it is also by virtue of its 
own concept, and not solely by the impact of external forces.
140
 
Three Sides to Every Story 
Hegel provides a theory of mental activity and reality based on three aspects of 
reason. These are the understanding or the intellect (Verstand), negative reason 
(Vernunft) or dialectics, and positive reason or speculation. These three sides of the mind 
are equally necessary and form a system. They work together or consecutively from 
abstraction to determination.
141
 The notion of the absolute as process and as the most 
comprehensive category, cannot begin immediately as a principle, definition, or axiom 
“as if shot from a pistol”; “[the Absolute] must travel a long way and works its 
passage.”142 
The understanding (or intellect) analyzes, separates the numerous elements of the 
whole to “grasp them in full precision so that nothing should remain vague or 
indeterminate”. Without the understanding, theory and practice are imprecise.143 The 
understanding transforms observational findings into universal laws. Yet the 
understanding “stops short at the fixed determination and its distinctness vis-à-vis other 
determinations” as its exactness becomes dogmatic. The understanding formulates 
scientific laws, elevating them, putting these laws in opposition to experience. The 
dogmatic stage of understanding behaves towards objects “in a way that separates and 
abstracts from them”, in what Hegel calls abstract universality that subsumes and 
dominates objects but does not comprehend them. The understanding operates by fixing 
meaning, so it grasps oppositions between the universal and the particular as 
dichotomies; it “assumes that of two opposed assertions one must be true and the other 
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false, adhering to one-sided determinations of the understanding whilst excluding their 
opposites.”144 As result, the understanding does not achieve true universality; by 
opposing general universality to particularity, such laws become also particular as the 
particulars these laws aim to master.
145
  The understanding operates as a particular when 
it excludes particulars. Particular phenomena in turn acquire a universal nature precisely 
by being grasped by the universal categories of the understanding. 
Dialectics or negative reason mitigates the understanding by revealing how 
opposite terms involve each other. “Reason is negative and dialectical,” writes Hegel, 
“since it dissolves the determinations of the understanding into nothing.” Dialectics 
works through chiasmus in which the order of words in one sentence is inverted in a 
second sentence, when “the two sides [of the opposition] contaminate each other by 
means of exchange”, introducing movement and confusion into dichotomies in order to 
open them into a new set of oppositions.
146
  
However, if understanding leads to dogmatism by being inflexible with 
oppositions, dialectics may lead to skepticism by confusing and without showing a way 
forward out of the confusion of opposites. For Hegel, ancient dialectics ended in this 
way, yet unlike modern skepticism like Jacobi’s, which destroyed positive claims to 
knowledge leaving only blind faith, ancient skepticism had a reconstructive impulse, a 
kind of pre-modern critical theory. Plato, for example, still preserved the thought of the 
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absolute, even by negation.
147
  Following Kant and Hume’s critiques, modern skepticism, 
by contrast, banned to think the absolute, making it a matter of religion.
148
   Hegel’s 
version of dialectics was propaedeutic, a preparation providing “the soul for further 
development.” Like all philosophers, Hegel disliked the use of dialectics as a tool to trick. 
Dialectics was not something “rooted in mere conceit”, “with an obsession for subverting 
and bringing to naught everything true and firm.”149 More than a powerful critique, Hegel 
conceived dialectics constructively and real. Although Kant demonstrated the 
contradictions of dialectics in the antinomies of pure reason from a subjective angle, for 
Hegel, these contradictions were objective and actual.  Contradictions are rooted in being, 
not only in thought. Grasping the objective, ontological nature of contradictions opens the 
“positive aspect” of speculative reason. For Hegel, “It in this dialectic, understood here, 
and hence, in grasping the opposites in their unity, or the positive in the negative, that the 
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speculative consists. It is the most important aspect of the dialectic, but for the still 
unpracticed, unfree faculty of thought, the most difficult.”150  
An Alchemy of Sense 
Speculation in Hegel’s philosophy is a process that binds opposed ideas and 
things. Benjamin’s notion of ‘constellations’ or Adorno’s idea of ‘force fields’ present 
similar formations to the speculative, flowing through tensions, crystallizing in notions 
and embodying opposite forces, “a dynamic interplay of attractions and aversions, 
without a generative first principle, common denominator, or inherent essence.”151 For 
this reason, speculation can be a powerful tool to think the conflict proper to politics in 
unison with philosophy’s insistence in concepts.152 
Hegel defines speculation as “the unity of [conceptual] determinations in their 
opposition”.153 If the understanding stresses the non-identity between opposites, and 
dialectics stresses the identity of opposites, the speculative is the concurrent identity and 
lack of identity of opposites, “the identity of identity and non-identity”. Oppositions are 
stationary for the understanding; dialectics transforms them in mutually determined 
contradictions, and speculation turns these contradictions into one speculative identity, 
concept of reason in which contradiction is at its highest. A speculative identity shows 
that difference is what opposites have in common. Partisans, for example, are identical in 
their mutual opposition for each other. 
Hegel’s most famous speculative proposition appears in the oft-quoted “double 
sentence’ (Doppelsatz) in the preface to the philosophy of right, “What is rational is 
actual; and what is actual is rational.” As a speculative proposition, the sentence affirms 
and denies the actuality of reason and the rationality of the actual, Hegel attempts to 
“distance [himself] as far as possible from the obligation to construct a state as it ought to 
be… rather it is to show how the State, as the ethical universe, should be recognized.” 
Yet, Hegel’s Doppelsatz was misunderstood in opposite ways. The identity between 
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reason and reality justified both revolution and absolutism. For Right Hegelians, the 
Doppelsatz justified Prussian nationalism.  For the Left, the Doppelsatz was a manifesto; 
the present is irrational and revolutions put things right according to reason. Yet both 
interpretations were one-sided; they read the Doppelsatz as an ordinary proposition: 
reason is either real or unreal, but must be real. But the speculative points at the 
impossible untangling of being and ought, that reality is rational and irrational at once. 
Either the ideal or the real meaning takes over because, for Hegel, both ideal and real are 
“a union [that is] an unrest of simultaneous incompatibles, a movement.”154 Hegel calls it 
actuality. 
Ordinary propositions cannot express speculative relations. Ordinary propositions 
assert either an identity or non-identity since subject and predicate are two separate 
entities.
155
 Predicates provide contingent contents upon the subject and the subject is a 
formal and necessary but empty figure, bearing whatever attributes from the predicate. 
Hegel also calls ordinary propositions judgments of existence. They affirm or deny what 
is. According to the rules of Hegelian logic, ordinary propositions develop further into 
speculative regions. One of these expansions is the odd figure of infinite judgment. An 
infinite judgment is “supposed to be a judgment, and consequently to contain a relation of 
subject and predicate; yet at the same time such relation is supposed not to be in it”; it is a 
logical construction that lacks sense in reality. For example, instead of saying, “Socrates 
is not a man” which would be a negative judgment of existence, a negative infinite 
judgment would state, “Socrates is a non-man.” The particular subject, Socrates, affirms a 
universal concept, mankind, as negative and empty. For Hegel, this is an abstract 
(logical) possibility but a concrete (living) impossibility. A positive infinite judgment, on 
the other hand, would have a grammatically correct identity that is not supposed to be 
there, i.e. “the rose is an elephant.”  
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Infinite judgments do not make sense in real life, even when they are correctly 
formulated.
156
 Still, they point to the internal form of judgments themselves. The Science 
of Logic regards infinite judgments as transitional figures from judgments of existence to 
judgments of reflection. For the latter, predicates are concrete realizations of the subject. 
Socrates, the individual is really mortal, and not just an empty name for mortality. The 
abstract content of the predicate (mortality) is made real by being embodied in the 
subject. “Socrates” embodies mortality. That “Socrates is non-mortal” is non-sense for 
judgments of reflection since nothing that is living embodies a negative notion. Life is the 
proof of logic.
157
 
Judgments of reflection prepare the last stage for speculative propositions. In 
these judgments, subjects and predicates go back and forth, revealing that concepts are 
the real central characters. Concepts whirl persistently between subjects and objects, 
making them moments of it.
158
 Ordinary propositions cannot express speculative 
propositions because ordinary language cannot state contradictions and cannot violate 
linguistic conventions, but the speculative presents itself in ordinary language. Hegel 
observes that “the most trivial of examples –‘above and under’, ‘right and left’, ‘father 
and son’, and so on ad infinitum –all contain opposition within one and the same 
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speculation in detail in the next chapter. 
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term.”159 Hegel uses musical (rhythms, meters, and accents) and artistic (plasticity, severe 
style) metaphors to explain it. 
The speculative perspective is easier to grasp in the practical sciences such as 
politics. Natural sciences rely on intrinsic qualities, instead of relations. Practical 
sciences, like politics, are embedded in living relations. “Practical sciences –Hegel 
argues- bear by their nature on some real universal or on a unity which is a unity of 
differences, the feelings too must comprise in practical empiricism not pure qualities but 
relations, be they negative like the urge to self-preservation, or positive like love and 
hate, sociability, and the like.”160 The speculative appears in relations and while it 
recognizes and “brings forth the truth that between the two extremes, there is difference”, 
it also sees that difference is a relation and a unity; it is again what opposites have in 
common.  
The dynamism of the Hegelian speculative opens one’s position to the “false” 
positions of others for there is also a moment of truth. The other’s ‘incorrectness’ reveals 
the truth of our own position, and conversely, their moment of truth reveals our falsity.
161
 
Thus, the speculative insists on continuous self-criticism and self-adjustment, 
representing the opposite of closure. The speculative affirms impermanence between 
opposites: subject and substance, passivity and action, and so forth.
162
 Politics thus is 
speculative and self-correcting. Sensitive to the speculative moment in Hegel, and 
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considering antagonism as the essential element in politics, Lenin wrote, “Nothing 
facilitates an understanding of the political essence of developments as greatly as their 
evaluation by one’s adversaries.”163 
A final trait of speculation is its communal dimension. Speculative philosophy 
does not understand individuals in a state of private immediacy. Hegel opposes the liberal 
narrative that individuals join society deliberately. The person is “not exclusive 
individuality, but explicitly universality and cognition.” Individuals are in the speculative 
relation of “being impenetrable and at the same time identical with one another, hence 
not independent and not impenetrable, but, as it were, fused with another.” Thinking 
takes place through universal and social categories, on situated contexts, cognitive 
domains, frameworks, and moments in history. The very recognition that we are all 
capable of reason, and that we cannot escape universal thinking is the recognition of 
individual universality. Hegel understands education thus: “Thinking as consciousness of 
the individual in the form of universality, that I am apprehended as a universal person, in 
which respect all are identical.”164  
Speculative Politics 
How significant is speculation for political theory? Consider the relation between 
freedom and power, two concepts apparently opposed and implicit in Hegel’s 
Doppelsatz.  If reality is rational, then freedom is realized; if reality is not rational, there 
is only power, repression, and violence. Power represses freedom and freedom speaks 
truth to power. Yet, this is a trans-historical view of both concepts. 
The speculative sees polities as fragmented unities loaded with ‘irrational’ power 
and ‘rational’ recognition. In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel shows ethical life as a 
divided unity. Ethical life is the outcome of a painful process of coercion (Right) and 
compliance (Morality), both forms of violent constructions of the individual as a legal 
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person and moral subject.
165
 A speculative reading shows ethical life as a totality that 
involves laws and customs, and not only as the final outcome of a political teleology. 
Right did not appear first as coercive property law to yield to morality as inner life of the 
individual, to finally develop into ethical life, the life of communities and nations. Right 
and morality are by themselves abstract. There is no pure coercive system or a pure 
moral, ideological system.
166
 History is the realm of systems of ethical life to which right 
and morality are their abstract objective and subjective aspects. All polities in history are 
systems of ethical life standing as unities of opposites; they emerge through the 
contradiction between society and individual. Speculatively, individuals are social and 
asocial; societies make individuals possible and societies represent the individuals’ most 
powerful negations. Freedom and alienation go hand in hand. The positive aspect of this 
negation resides in what Hegel calls the individual’s duty to society when she is liberated 
from immediate drives and becomes an ethical entity (i.e. citizen). Society’s negation of 
the ‘individual’ constitutes her liberation, “duty is not a limitation of freedom, but only of 
freedom in the abstract, that is, of un-freedom (necessity)”. The negative aspect lies in 
that society guarantees individual freedom and at the same time denies freedom, in 
practice and content, in the individual. Such a conflicted notion of individual accounts for 
Hegel’s struggle to conciliate corporatist and contractual traditions in his treatment of 
ethical life. As Adorno put it, “Freedom, which would arise only in the organization of 
free society, is sought precisely where it is denied by the organization of existing 
society.”167 Against reading ethical life as the end of history or the ideal State, the 
speculative is not equal to reconciliation as a final state. The speculative expresses 
conflict and restlessness as the real movement of history and thought. Political 
temperaments should be at home here. Alliances and reconciliations are made and 
unmade. Shifts in the situation demand multidimensional awareness, flexibility, and 
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imagination. Enemies become friends; friends turn into foes. Subjects of power become 
objects of power; defeat and victory are both temporary, and so on.  
Freedom and power form a speculative identity. While freedom as idea does not 
admit un-freedom, the ideal is still one-sided since it fails to conceive actual practices of 
freedom that are crusted in power relations, as slavery and the corresponding ‘free’ 
political institutions that justified it. Freedom is also a form of unfreedom, as the freedom 
of contract or the freedom to labor 12 to 16 hours a day, or to wage just wars to free weak 
countries. However, this is not to say that freedom is equal to wholesale violence. Such 
idea would be as one-sided as it is to conceive freedom solely as moral idea. The concept 
need further determinations.
168
 Types of domination are types of freedom and freedoms 
are concealed and grounded in forms of violence. Greek slavery was essential to Greek 
conceptions of freedom. Christian serfdom belonged to Christian personalism. In modern 
society, when slavery is not transparent, conceived as an outdated aberration, modern 
subjectivity is represented as universally free but freedom is hardly politically realized for 
all. Slavery is condemned through a pre-political and pre-social concept of human rights, 
but freedom is only realized formally as legal subjectivity. Yet the actual and material 
lack of freedom is not known because we fail to conceive new forms of slavery such as 
debt, wage-labor, human trafficking, and so on. Current conceptions of formal freedom 
do not contain these practices and do not comprehend them. For Hegel, to contain and 
comprehend is to give content to a notion, a content that is a unity of opposites. Thus, to 
comprehend modern freedom and power speculatively means that in the presence of 
universal human rights, civil and political freedoms, debasement and economic slavery 
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are equally massive and out of sight. As Adorno and Horkheimer opened their Dialectic 
of Enlightenment, a highly speculative text, “The wholly enlightened earth is radiant with 
triumphant calamity.”169 In modernity, destruction and reason, labor and capital, 
universal freedoms and global exploitation go hand in hand. Thus, universal freedom is 
also universal un-freedom.  
Speculatively conceived, liberal ethical life conceive freedom as negative right, 
depending on wrongs to become actual. The concept of rights do not embody freedom 
completely. They are only a particular concept of freedom as property (my body, my 
things). Rights activate when wrongs visit these two bodies; rights become visible when 
they are taken away. As Hegel points out, in abstract Right, the wrong actualize the 
notion of right.
170
 Rights are necessary moments in the conception of freedom, but it is a 
crass reduction to understand freedom solely as right. Such definition of freedom would 
depends on its limitation, violation, and absolute negation, contradicting its own form as 
idea.  Thus, universal human rights depend on massive violations to individual and 
collective rights to achieve actuality. Without these violations, human rights become only 
an ideal that is invisibly enacted in society and without people being aware of their 
enjoyment and possession. 
Hegel conceived freedom in a dual form. First, freedom is the form of a subjective 
will represented in legal codes. But freedom for Hegel is also actual and practical, 
contrary to Kantian and Fichtean notions of freedom. Existing societies are really free, 
not partially free according to an ideal. Slavery is a product of society’s freedom. Hegel 
thought this way for the fundamental reason that men had to provide a free account of 
their actions, that institutions were decisions out of liberty and that we bear responsibility 
for their rights and wrongs.
171
 Slavery represent the free will of one class to dominate, 
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enslave, and annihilate others. In the Phenomenology’s account of the Jacobins, in the 
freedom of the abstract will, Hegel provides an example of a formal freedom made actual 
through destruction. A political form dies once formal freedom loses actuality, 
hegemony, when the legal codes become openly reactionary for the new historical 
consciousness that is developing. Lenin, basing his views on this Hegelian distinction, 
thought that even if the system is in-actual, nonetheless it must be dealt with, and not wait 
for history to destroy it.  Lenin called “tactical actuality” interventions that speed up the 
decay of inactual institutions.
172
  
Hegelian Actuality 
The Hegelian speculative has received a relative positive attention recently, 
despite post-structuralist attempts to see speculation as philosophical tyranny. In France, 
Jean-Luc Nancy and Catherine Malabou have focused on the linguistic aspects of 
speculation. Although Hegel always emphasized that concepts are not only linguistic and 
subjective categories, Nancy and Malabou see in speculative language an instrument to 
subvert ordinary language “from within” according to deconstructive canons of 
deconstruction. Speculative propositions become modes of transformative reading. Zizek 
and Badiou interpret the Hegelian speculative from a dialectical perspective for radical 
revolutionary purposes. They stress the non-identity moment of the speculative which is 
operative in revolutionary subjectivity. Badiou interprets the dialectic along the Maoist 
lines of one becoming in two, the speculative unity of opposites must open scission. The 
rightist interpretation of dialectics is to recall the ‘old One’ as a holistic synthesis of two 
opposed parties.
173
   Zizek, on his part, read the speculative (lack of) identities 
psychoanalytically. He stresses the moment of lack of identity in identity, arguing that the 
speculative is not a pacifying medium that “unite diverging particularities, but the 
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unfathomable limit that prevents the particular from achieving identity within itself.”174 
The non-identity of opposites is internal to a split reality. Thus, the speculative emerges 
in the suspension of the gap between opposites. This suspension shows the speculative’s 
relation with existential narratives. The speculative does not form a new relation of unity 
between subject and object, but rather, this suspension is subjectivity (and objectivity) 
itself.
175
 Thus, in contemporary accounts of the speculative, one sees ontological claims 
linked to the possibility of political practice. I would like to formulate how the 
speculative is open to this possibility from an ontological perspective.
 176
 
The speculative allows for a simultaneous identity and difference between 
opposites, between thought and existence. That is to say, the speculative allows for a 
simultaneous synchronic correlation and a diachronic non-correlation between thought 
and reality. Correlationism have marked all sorts of ‘absolute’ idealisms in the history of 
philosophy. In this idealism of unity of thought and reality, dualism was also present. 
Reality had to conform to the laws of thought in order to become one. Skeptics and some 
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materialists advanced a diachronicity and non-correlation (or non-identity) between 
reality and thought. The result was irrationality. The world cannot be known for matter is 
absolutely other than thought. In one, we have the law of absolute identity, and in the 
other, the law of absolute difference. The ways to predicate thought qua being appears in 
many forms, by analogy (being is predicated by analogy with Beings), univocism (Being 
and beings are of the same substance, absolute identity), or finally equivocism (Being can 
be predicated in many ways, through multiple difference). All these forms of ontological 
predication depended on the unshakeable identity between thought and reality proper to 
the metaphysical Absolute. The absolute has been the province of idealism, either in its 
dogmatic or skeptic versions. 
Is the notion of the absolute possible for non-idealist approaches? Can the 
absolute be thought without the law of identity, of the correspondence of thought and 
being? Can a materialist absolute that respects the otherness of materiality still maintain a 
relation with thought and concept? I think the Hegelian notion of the speculative can 
provide such notion. Hegel’s speculative allows one to eliminate the domination of 
thought over reality while retaining the possibility of apprehending reality through 
concept. The Hegelian speculative affirms an ontological non-identity that can be grasped 
by the identities of conceptual thought. The double nature of the speculative also allows 
to divorce necessity from ontological determinism and to affirm the necessity of 
contingency in reality. The speculative denies necessity in reality affirming necessity in 
thought. Contingency is affirmed in reality and simultaneously denied in thought. Instead 
of contingent events being construed as part of a hidden structural chain, the test is to 
accept the “primacy of facticity”, as Adorno would put it. To accept the primacy of the 
non-identical without giving up conceptual thought. Epistemological necessity, the 
necessity of concepts and reason, grasp its opposite of ontological contingency and the 
openness of history. To extrapolate explanatory, epistemological necessity to the 
ontological plane is to trade on ambiguity using a term (necessity) with the same meaning 
in two equivocal planes (ontological claims on reality and epistemological claims of 
reason).
177
 Hegel provides the ground for the necessity of contingency, as a contingency 
that can be rationally and systematically apprehended. To rationally apprehend 
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retrospectively historical contingency is to see contingency as necessity; conversely, to 
see history as a realm of open and contradictory possibilities is to affirm the necessity of 
contingency. History forms thus a speculative identity between contingency and 
necessity. Engels pointed correctly to this idea in Hegel:  
 
“In contrast to both conceptions (absolute contingency and absolute necessity), Hegel 
came forward with the hitherto quite unheard-of proposition that the accidental has a 
cause because it is accidental, and just as much also has no cause because it is accidental; 
that the accidental is necessary, that, on the one hand, necessity determines itself as 
chance, and on the other hand, this chance is rather absolute necessity.”178  
 
For speculative idealism, the in-itself can be thought because it is the concept as 
such, the correlation/non-correlation, identity-in-difference as such. Speculative idealism, 
or the traditional idealist readings of Hegel of speculation as unity of contraries, takes the 
relation between those contraries as absolute.  The concept becomes the final word. A 
materialist reading of the speculative, on the other hand, affirms the contingency of the 
correspondence between thought and being, the contingency of such correlation. 
Contingency must be necessary, not because necessity is unknowable but because 
contingency necessarily exists.
179
 However, this is not an absolutization of contingency in 
the sense that everything must change, or that Being (Subject) is now absolute Becoming 
(Substance). This post-modern reversal will just elevate contingency to yet another 
metaphysical necessity as it is found in Nietzsche or Deleuze. Absolute contingency 
implies that permanent fixity (“subject”) and eternal flux (“predicate”) are both 
contingent. There are no guarantees on both sides. In this sense, it is a non-metaphysical 
speculative perspective. Yet, absolute necessity, iron law teleology has been one of 
Hegel’s false legends.  
Since his early production, Hegel thought the relation between contingency and 
necessity.
180
 These texts show that Hegel is not a philosopher of absolute necessity. In the 
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Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences and the Science of Logic, Hegel develops the 
opposition between actuality and possibility in a series of tightly argued propositions. In 
all its generality and abstraction, actuality is only what exists as pure Being. Possibility, 
also formally thought, is the opposite of actuality. Possibility includes actuality as its 
ground and at the same time possibility lacks actuality. Possibility is positive in that it 
recognizes actuality as containing many possibilities, and at the same time, possibility is 
negative because it lacks actuality. The Understanding separates actuality from 
possibility by seeing possibility as completely lacking actuality. But according to Hegel 
possibility also points towards an ought of actuality, a fulfilled actuality pointing out the 
negative aspect of real actuality. Real actuality lacks self-actualization according to 
possibility. Thus, the possible is rooted in the ‘demands of the actual’. Yet, speaking of 
possibility in general does not take far the contradictory character of possibility. It is in 
thinking multiple specific possibilities that contradictory possibilities appear out of the 
actual. Given a determinate situation, A and non-A are equally possible and coexist 
together. When we say that something is possible, we are also saying that its opposite is 
also possible. Yet, how can we relate contradictory possibilities back to the identity of the 
actual, if the actual is already the source of this contradiction? Hegel sees, on the one 
hand, that the actual is a kind of possibility, not possibility in general, but as one possible 
world among many possibles. On the other hand, all these other ‘possible’ worlds are also 
actual in the sense that they are thought. This unity of actuality as one among many 
‘possibles’ and the many possibilities as actual thoughts is what Hegel identifies as 
contingency.
181
 Contingency is the unity of actuality and possibility. 
The mutual determination of contingency and necessity allows us now to view the 
ontological, historical chain of events as contingent (since they can be perfectly 
otherwise), and its retrospective reading as constituting the rational necessity of these 
events. That is why the owl of Minerva is not an oracle, a foreign speech to actuality; it 
always flies too late after actuality. This afterwardness or ‘secondness’ plays a crucial 
role in knowledge. The rationality read into history in terms of Spirit being ‘at war-with-
itself’, or as unsustainable contradictions of a system are forms of post-hoc rational 
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necessity read into ontological contingency. Necessity arises out of contingency, yet 
contingency is a form of necessity when it breaks down into yet another new form. It is 
necessary that things change in their permanent impermanence, or self-destruction, what 
is not necessary is the direction they take. What is contingent about necessity is the 
afterward rational consistency that accounts for the ‘real moment’.  
In this sense, diachrony (the temporal non-correlation between thought and being) 
does not only arise out of a historical sense; it also constitutes the nature of logic and 
historical critique. This does not mean to reduce necessitarian structures to purely 
historical and diachronic narratives, to give up a rational account of history for the 
‘random’ emergence of isolated epistemes and dispositifs. Capitalist categories are 
historical, but not as ‘things of history’, but as proper to a specific mode of production in 
history. History is part of the structural account, but it does not constitute the full 
structural account. Structural necessity, in Hegel as well as Marx, is construed by 
grasping diachronically the contingent event of history. As Alfred Schmidt puts it, 
“Contrary to superficial critique, the ‘standpoint of reason in world history’ does not 
exhaust itself in a priori constructions which do violence to their material. Hegel stresses 
how little ‘the wish for rational insight, and for knowledge, not merely to be a heap of 
facts’, can be satisfied by fabricated concepts. Rather ‘in history thought is subordinated 
to the given and the existent.’ He insists that we must respect the material before us and 
‘must proceed historically.’”182 
The Hegelian speculative accounts for the constant failure of knowledge to 
ascertain absolute necessity in the face of history’s stubborn facts. Sense-consciousness 
cannot endure as concrete knowledge if it sees consciousness as immediate; the master 
and slave consciousness cannot endure as the definite form of consciousness once the 
slave is freed from bondage. Every change in the situation requires a new kind of 
consciousness with a new kind of object. Thus, the speculative relation of reality and 
thought destroys ‘firstness’. These constant collapses and breakdowns are the medium of 
speculative Truth. This is when, I think, the speculative truly overcomes metaphysics. If 
metaphysics represents the idealist hope to establish an eternal, rational structure beyond 
matter, the speculative is material in that our reason and ‘natural’ representations are 
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already the effects of a consciousness laboring silently. Marx’s view of exchange qua 
value illustrate this process. Capitalist societies create value from labor and realize it 
through exchange, but workers and capitalists don’t know why they exchange and this is 
proven because exchanges happen no matter what we think. For this reason, Capital is an 
“automatic Subject”.  Thus, absolutely speaking, any type of ‘enlightenment’ is a figure 
of false consciousness, unaware of its own working capabilities, which can only be 
manifested through ‘delusions’ and breakdowns, transitioning from one ‘false’ 
consciousness of one relative ethical life slipping yet into another form of ‘false’ 
consciousness of another ethical life. Hence, absolute knowledge is not omniscient. This 
is the theological and mythical version of the absolute. Thought is absolute and infinite 
because reality is always unsurpassable, of a spaciousness thought cannot fully grasp. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE SPECULATIVE VALUE-FORM  
THE SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF PARTISANSHIP 
 
 “Thinking and being are thus certainly distinct, but at the same time they are in 
unity with each other.” – Marx 
 
“A thinker such as Marx, who was after all at the opposite extreme of idealism, was 
nevertheless a speculative thinker. A philosophy that is non-idealist in principle can 
nevertheless not dispense with the element of speculation.”  
–Theodor Adorno 
 
“The really concrete unity of two or more interacting individuals, particular things 
(phenomena, processes, men, etc) always appears as the unity of mutually exclusive 
opposites. Between them, between aspects of this concrete interaction there is 
nothing abstractly identical or abstractly general and neither can there be. In this 
case, the common as concretely general is exactly that very mutual bond between 
the elements of interaction as polar, mutually complementary, and mutually 
presupposing opposites. Each of the concretely interacting sides is what it is, that is, 
what it is in the context of a given concrete link, only through its relation to its own 
opposite.” –Evald Ilyenkov 
___________________________________ 
 
The Money of the Mind 
In 2008, the Federal Reserve published a booklet named “Modern Money 
Mechanics” to “describe the basic process of money creation in a fractional reserve 
banking system.” Banks keep a fraction of deposits made by the Fed as reserves. Some 
reserves are then lent out to other banks. In turn, these other banks lend money at the 
lowest interest and so forth. All this financial speculation takes place independently of 
gold and industry. Following the fetishism of money, the Federal Reserve concludes, 
“Just how this happens all too often remains a mystery”.183 
Likewise, two hundred years ago, German philosophers considered speculation as 
a ‘higher’ perspective able to see the hidden interconnections and transformations in 
physical and social life. German philosophers claimed to discover for the first time a 
vision of totality by casting opposites into a single field of vision bridging the empirical 
and the intelligible, the finite and the infinite. But for radical critics like Marx and Sorel, 
speculation was cheap mysticism, a hogwash philosophy lending autonomy to ideas, 
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instead of action, just like Wall Street sees money –money begets money; ideas beget 
ideas. 
There is some truth to Marx’s assertion that speculation is “the money of the 
mind”. Speculative philosophy conceives reality as a ‘unity of opposites’. Hegel calls 
speculation the perspective of infinity, and Capital’s creation of value and accumulation 
of wealth can also be considered speculative. Capital points towards infinity through 
limitless accumulation. Capital’s self-expansion quantifies, colonizes, and exploits 
disparate, non-identical realms of life through the totalizing law of value. As a 
speculative structure, labor and capital stand as a unity of opposites in capitalism. There 
is no labor without Capital, no proletariat without the bourgeoisie since capitalist labor is 
always-already reified labor, an offspring of Capital.
184
 Ideologically speaking, since 
exploiters and exploited are free agents, the exploited must think like the exploiters and 
the exploiters see themselves exploited. The poor must think like capitalists; “the 
capitalist is a rational miser”.  
But the speculative also represents the lack of identity between opposites. Labor 
and capital are engaged in mortal struggle, as CLR James says. The system of universal 
private property denies private property to the immense majority. Use-value and 
exchange-value are also opposites. Speculation also points to a beyond Capital, about 
which more later. Capital’s speculative structure is not given by analytical tools but by a 
critique of political economy that sees Capital as a system of polar unities, unities of 
extreme opposites.  
Capital’s breathtaking creativity and adaptability are traits of the Understanding, 
“the mightiest of all powers,” a terrifying power that dissolves everything and stirs an 
endless fragmentation of social life. But capitalism as a global system makes the concept 
of totality possible; Capital makes speculative philosophy possible. Capital produces an 
effective totality, but at the same time, again, totality disappears through the 
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fragmentation of instrumental reason: the individual becomes isolated, and society loses 
its sense of collectivity.
185
 Capital produces unities of opposites, but also conceals the 
unity of opposites between capital and labor through endless subset of dichotomies like 
(mental) theory and (manual) practice, categories and experience, freedom and necessity, 
ethics and politics, etc. Dichotomies as traits of understanding have social roots in 
Capital’s imperative to divide labor and extract value from it.186 
Capital indeed has a speculative structure, and the speculative can be an 
immanent critique of Capital. On the one hand, the speculative represents the identity of 
Capital; the speculative is the ideological affirmation, ‘the standpoint of political 
economy’ as Marx claimed. But also the speculative can claim a lack of identity with 
Capital, as criticism of Capital’s reification.187 Therefore, as a complement to Marx’s 
sentence, the speculative is and is not “the standpoint of political economy.” This last 
claim is in consequence with Hegel’s recommendation, “The genuine refutation must 
penetrate the opponent’s stronghold and meet him on his own ground; no advantage is 
gained by attacking him somewhere else and defeating where he is not.”188  
Capital is absolute and the absolute is the field of speculative theory. Capital is 
the most rational and the most expansive system ever emerged; it systematically 
secularizes the social world. And also Capital is absolute because it is the most irrational 
and the most ruthless system ever devised. It relentlessly destroys the social and natural 
world. Speculative critique unveils Capital as a speculative structure, as a historical 
totality of opposites, and also criticizes the absolutism of Capital, as a false and final 
absolute. 
This chapter historicizes Hegel’s philosophical claims on the speculative by 
conceiving the speculative as the thinking in and of capitalism through Marx’s 
interpretations. I read -following Marx re Hegel- that the speculative is the specific 
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structure of Capital, but also -against Marx- that the speculative is a mode of theorizing 
that points beyond Capital immanently, from Capital’s own categories. Mainstream 
political economy ignores speculative and dialectical modes of analysis. It is focused on 
isolated antithesis when conceiving capitalism, such as producers v consumers, income v 
spending, buyers v sellers, money v commodities, taking these oppositions and figures as 
given. Marx shows that these antitheses are appearances of deeper, self-contradictory 
unities. Capitalist consumption, being the opposite of production, is also a form of 
production
189
; buying and selling constitute in reality one single act, “but the apparent 
retardation of the currency [exchange] reflects the separation of these two processes into 
isolated antithetical phases
”190
.  
This chapter also traces Marx’s ambivalence towards Hegelian speculation. I 
argue that Marx was critical and a radical inheritor of the speculative tradition of German 
idealism. Although the complete work of Capital is unsystematic, I believe Marx 
employed a speculative perspective to his theory of value, commodities, and the 
commodities’ “most glaring form – money.” But instead of seeing speculation as the 
pinnacle of high theory, Marx discovers that Capital is the real-historical unity of 
contraries, dwelling in the infernal, ‘hellish structure of the commodity’, as Walter 
Benjamin would call it, a restless movement, eternal return, and twofold development 
between several poles in the production, circulation, and culmination of Capital.  The 
commodity’s speculative metamorphoses towards the money-form make possible 
boundless, limitless, infinite accumulation, and become an inverted mirror of the ideal of 
speculation of Marx’s ‘idealist’ predecessor. Uncannily, Marx relates the ideal of infinite 
reason in philosophical speculation with the infinite accumulation of capitalist 
speculation. Marx reveals that the speculative is not the highest form of reason, a 
fulfillment of Humanity’s powers, but its material realization in the money-form is also 
the lowest, most brutal and irrational expression of human relations. Yet speculation, the 
structure of Capital in Marx’s relentless pursuit for the production and realization of 
value, becomes a partisan weapon for the critique of Capital. 
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Marx and the Speculative 
Marx’s engagement with the Hegelian speculative appears since his earliest 
works. His doctoral thesis was a study of the ancient materialism of Epicurus and 
Democritus’.  Marx’s interest in atomism aimed at formulating a materialist account of 
freedom. The central concept of German classical philosophy was freedom, yet Marx 
opposed to this tradition a concept of freedom rooted in the body and matter, not just the 
mind and ideas. Marx argued that the unity of opposites was fundamental to ancient 
materialism in creating a monistic ontology instead of the dualism of body and mind that 
characterized idealist systems.
191
  
For ancient atomists, matter originated from a radical contingent event. 
Democritus and Epicurus thought that before the material world, atoms were falling in a 
straight line. However, one atom for whatever reason deviated from this fall and crashed 
with other atoms, creating a chain reaction that formed small bodies, then larger ones, 
until the whole universe was created. This atomic swerve or ‘clinamen’ did not have a 
cause. The world originated by complete accident. 
The resemblance between both philosophers ended here. Epicurus and 
Democritus disagreed on their account of the material world. Democritus thought that 
time, space, and matter were only appearances without importance.
192
 Material existence 
and human liberty did not matter. Epicurus on the contrary gave equal importance to 
material appearances and atomic essences with the conclusions that human freedom is 
all-important because it is grounded in nature. To Marx, Epicurus’s radical contingency 
of the swerve was the source of radical freedom. The notion of time was another source 
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of contention. For Democritus, time was eternal and indifferent to existence. For 
Epicurus, time is the supreme appearance; the supreme reality in the world of 
appearances. Human sensuousness is “embodied time”, the ability to have different 
sensations in the spacious world of matter.  
Applying Hegelian concepts, Marx thought that Epicurus allowed for an “inner 
determination” of atoms, while Democritus was only fixed with “external 
determinations”. Epicurus saw essence and appearance, atomic necessity and the world’s 
material contingency, speculatively. They were two different realms, equally important in 
the constitution of the universe. Freedom was possible to Epicurus’s materialism because 
appearances were as important as essences. For Democritus, contingency and necessity 
were completely separated. The world’s contingency was a false appearance of true 
atomic necessity. For this reason, Democritus’ cosmos was completely deterministic.193 
Marx became hostile to Hegelian philosophy with his turn towards communism 
around 1843. At this time, Marx thought that speculation represented bourgeois 
philosophy at its highest powers, an ideology to be taken seriously. Speculation was 
secularized religion, falsely substituting revealed religion for a “consummate religion”, a 
religion where secular reason becomes divine. In the Contribution to the Critique to 
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, the speculative was a negation of theology in the realm of 
theology. “Speculative philosophy –Marx writes- is the thought of alienation, not only of 
religious objectification but as an objectification of historical change with its own 
mysterious laws beyond man’s control.”194 Marx criticized the speculative from the Left, 
but assuming the identity between real and rational like a conservative Hegelian. If for 
left Hegelians, the speculative was considered a veiled call for Revolution, Marx thought 
that speculative philosophy legitimated existing relations of domination.  The speculative 
denied particular and concrete reality, taking the Idea as true Subject, an inversion of 
things, a “topsy-turvy” world. The Holy Family opens with a lapidary statement: “Real 
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humanism has no more dangerous enemy in Germany than spiritualism or speculative 
idealism, which substitutes “self-consciousness” or the “spirit” for the real individual 
man.”195  
Marx famously wrote in 1844 that the Hegelian speculative embodied the political 
economy of his time. Speculation is the philosophy of Capital. Hegel’s Logic is “the 
money of the mind, the speculative thought-value of man and of nature, their essence 
indifferent to any real determinate character and thus unreal; thought which is alienated 
and abstract and ignores real nature and man.” Hegel founds “only the abstract, logical, 
speculative expression of the movement in history, not the actual history of man as a 
given subject.”196 These are extraordinary passages in suggesting that speculation, not 
only as a subjective ideological thought-process, but also as the deep objective structure 
of capitalism.  
Before the revolutions of 1848, Marx and Engels presented a negative treatment 
of the speculative. Yet, Marx’s initial engagement with political economy was empirical 
and historical, especially in the Poverty of Philosophy. Marx’s approach prior to the 
Grundrisse and Capital is humanist and materialist, based on universal human needs and 
a concept of human nature. According to Henri Lefebvre, however, there were still no 
proper concepts to think relations of domination. Marx sees exploitation “being given 
practically and verified empirically.”197 Marx and Engels were then only historical 
materialists without a coherent philosophy. Hegel’s philosophy returns to Marx and 
Engels after the experience of defeat of the 1848 revolutions, just like Lenin engaged 
with Hegel after the catastrophe of 1914. Marx used Hegelian methodology throughout 
the Grundrisse. Hegelian logic is everywhere in Capital yet concealed in the presentation 
since Marx’s works were destined for political activism; flaunting Hegelian philosophy 
was not particular useful for agitation.  In the Grundrisse and Capital, the critique of the 
speculative disappears, yet the term appears nowhere. Instead Marx uses the term ‘polar 
unities’, or ‘unity of excluding opposites’ 
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The Speculative Identities of Capital
198
 
Marx begins his critique of Capital focusing on a special object, the commodity, 
as the “economic cell-form” of our societies. Unlike other thinkers who begin with 
subjects, Marx attempts to speak for an object that attempts to escape reason and produce 
mystified human relations. Adorno describes this paradox within commodity society as 
“an object [being only] conceived by a subject but always remaining something other 
than the subject, whereas a subject by its very nature an object from the outset.”199 A lack 
of identity between Subject and Substance may mean openness in some cases and 
alienation in others. Subjects in capitalism are objects from the outset, reserves and 
sources of living labor, and as subsidiary agents and delegates of Capital. From an 
external perspective, Capital proceeds dialectically through oppositions in the capital 
relation and the circuits of circulation between capitalists and workers. But Capital is 
speculative internally in the crystallization of opposites within one entity. The commodity 
embodies opposite forms of value and action in an extreme dense form as a constellation.  
Marx sees the commodity as a polar unity of two extreme opposites. Commodities 
develop opposite values in a single unity, the qualitative character of use value also called 
the substance of value, and the quantitative magnitude of exchange values. There are 
some exceptions as air or soil, things with use-value without having or embodying value 
for there is no labor involved. Also a thing can be useful without being a commodity like 
the products of one’s labor. But a commodity must always embody a use-value expressed 
as exchange value. Marx uses the terms ‘useful labor’ and ‘labor power’ as necessary 
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conditions for the existence of humanity. I think the significance of these two terms is 
‘naturalistic’, not trans-historical. Useful labor is metabolic, emerging from ‘an eternal 
nature-imposed necessity, without which there can be no material exchanges between 
man and Nature, and therefore no [social] life.”200 Yet useful labor treated thus is abstract 
since ‘labor’ as concrete labor belongs to specific social formations. On the other hand, 
labor-power is the universal capacity of humanity to survive. Labor-power is 
physiological, muscles and blood and energy, and takes the historical form of alienated 
labor under capitalism.
201
 Labor is abstract but in a different way than the abstraction of 
useful labor. Abstract labor marshals labor-power for the production of autonomous 
commodities. Useful labor is a general condition for the survival of the human species.  
Both types of labor create total social wealth, yet abstract labor produces it for private 
appropriation. Useful labor is an empty universal; abstract labor historicizes or 
determines this universal with a particular content and social relations. Abstract labor and 
the concreteness of useful labor, however, represent the first polar unity concrete to 
capitalism.
202
 
The division of labor organizes useful labor, but this division is not necessarily 
capitalist. For Marx, it is true that Capital needs to specialize labor to produce 
commodities, but the existence of commodities does not necessarily emerge from the 
division of labor alone.  This distinction between division of labor and capitalist division 
of labor is important because Marx is not making the classic evolutionary argument that 
the division of labor necessarily leads to capitalism as the most efficient mode of 
production. Rather, Marx sees capitalism as a specific historical organization of useful 
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labor, and there is nothing in the production of commodities that is essentially or 
necessarily capitalist. It is when the production of commodities becomes total and 
imperative that one can speak of capitalism. Commodities were traded since Antiquity. It 
is the mode of their production, as embodying value through labor, and their 
predominance as the central and imperative organization of society that makes production 
capitalist. To constitute a society of mass commodity consumption, production must also 
be commoditized and masses converted into armies and reserves of wage-labor power.
203
  
The Speculative Structure of Production 
The form of value [or value-form] represents a social relation of commodity and 
commodity. This social relation is expressed in the money form; commodities are bought 
with money and capitalists pay a money wage to laborers. Commodities are objects of 
utility and depositories of value, “not a single atom of matter enters into its composition.” 
But in order for commodities to become equivalent under money, a prior process must 
take place before money unites their qualitative difference in a quantitative identity. This 
prior process lies in the second polar unity we encounter in Marx’s theory of value 
between relative and equivalent form of value. In the formula 20 yards of linen equals 1 
coat, linen is the active (subject, relative value) and coat is the is passive, predicated on 
the value of the former, an equivalent form. Relative value is the subject and equivalent 
value the predicate. In this case, then the coat is a use-value that expresses an exchange 
value. As Marx says, “The first peculiarity that strikes us is considering in the form of the 
equivalent value is this: use value becomes the form of manifestation of its opposite 
value.”204 There is difference in this unity of value, the exchange value depends on 
something outside commodification: “The relative value presupposes the presence of 
some other commodity under the form of an equivalent. That second commodity is not 
the one whose value is expressed.” Marx asserts that these two components of value 
stand in a relation of identity-in-difference: “The relative form and the equivalent form 
are two intimately connected, mutually dependent and inseparable elements of the 
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expression of value; but at the same time, are mutually exclusive, antagonistic extremes, 
i.e. poles of the same expression.”205 
The equivalent form of value is important in expressing the speculative character 
of commodity. The relative value expresses the pure exchange aspect of the commodity, 
but it is one-sided. The equivalent form, on the other hand, expresses value and also 
expresses nature (concrete utility); it manifests a “materialization of human labor in the 
abstract and at the same time the product of some specifically concrete labor”.  Moreover, 
the equivalent form is where concrete labor becomes the form under which the opposite 
of abstract labor manifests itself. The equivalent form of value manifests the unity of 
opposites hidden in the purely mercantile aspect of the relative form of value. “The 
opposition or contrast –writes Marx- existing internally in the commodity between use-
value and value is therefore made evident externally by two commodities being placed in 
such relation to each other.” Yet it is only when commodities circulate in the 
marketplace, when money expresses the exchange value of commodities, when the 
opposition of use and exchange values within the commodities is manifested.
206
 Labor 
‘invisibly’ creates value, but money realizes value for all to see.  
This polarity of equals makes capitalism qualitatively different from other pre-
capitalist formations that may look capitalist, such as late-medieval financial centers and 
early modern commercial societies. In these mercantile societies, ruling interests were 
focused in circulation, trade, and import of luxury and vital goods. In capitalist societies, 
dominant interests are focused in production, cost-effectiveness, and increased 
productivity, especially of food, the essential, irreducible need for life and consumption. 
That is why capitalism started in the expropriated countryside. Then capitalism moved to 
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the cities with industrialization, bringing an impoverished, expropriated mass that later 
would become the industrial proletariat. Production and consumption (circulation) are 
united in real capitalism, whereas in commercial societies or trade empires, consumption 
took predominance over production.
  
Hence, original accumulation, the forced 
expropriation of peasants and indigenous peoples is necessary, but not sufficient, to 
explain the emergence of capitalism. Without increased competitiveness and pure 
economic coercion in the countryside, this primitive accumulation of enclosures would 
have led at best to a second type of serfdom.
207
 
 
“The process of production, considered on the one hand, as the unity of the labor process 
and the process of creating value, is production of commodities; considered on the other 
hand as the unity of the labor process and the process of producing surplus-value, it is the 
capitalist process of production, or capitalist production of commodities.”208 
 
So far I described the speculative structure of the process of valorization. But capitalist 
production is also the unity of two opposite processes: of valorization of value and 
exploitation of labor, the unity of an ideal self-valorization materially grounded in 
exploitation. In the labor process, Marx describes the expropriation of labor through the 
twin process of surplus-value and mechanization that does not produce value in itself 
since it is “dead labor” but helps to increase the rate of exploitation.  
The exploitation of labor is conducted through another polar unity, the unity of 
relative and absolute surplus value. When there is absolute surplus value, the rate of 
exploitation is lower for the capitalist as when there is relative surplus-value. With low 
capital and high labor-intensity, the capitalist has to extend the working day to incredible 
lengths in order to extract surplus-value from workers. With high-capital, technological 
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production, and labor legislation, productivity turns higher, but with a corresponding 
higher rate of exploitation; the worker now needs less and less hours for her social 
reproduction, but the capitalist keeps him busy as allowed by law in order to extract more 
surplus-value and paying him less real wages. In absolute surplus-value, exploitation is 
absolute but the rate of exploitation is not as high as in relative surplus-value, where the 
rate of exploitation takes on a more complex nature of time-labor domination, even with 
an increase in consumption, and ease of working hours for the laborer. Even if working 
conditions and salaries improve, the rate of exploitation remains the same or higher 
because what is important is time-domination. A process can become automatized, yet 
workers still remain working 8 to 10 hours.
209
 
“From one standpoint the distinction between absolute and relative surplus-value appears 
to be illusory. Relative surplus-value is absolute, because it requires the absolute 
prolongation of the working day beyond the labor-time necessary to the existence of the 
worker himself. Absolute surplus-value is relative, because it requires a development of 
the productivity of labor which will allow the necessary labor-time to be restricted to a 
portion of the working day. But if we keep in mind the movement of surplus-value, this 
semblance of identity vanishes. Once the capitalist mode of production has become the 
established and universal mode of production, the difference between absolute and 
relative surplus-value makes itself felt whenever there is a question of raising the rate of 
surplus-value (i.e. exploitation)” 
 
The Speculative Form of Circulation 
Value for Marx embodies a unity of opposites manifested in the structure of the 
commodity (use value and value), and in commodities in regards to money. But if 
commodities are structured as a unity of opposites, money “the God of commodities” 
embodies the speculative structure in the highest form. Marx has a monetary theory of 
value and production. Money is not an added supplement to fetishized labor. The value of 
commodities is crystallized in money, and not only as ‘socially necessary labor time’. 
Rather, labor becomes socially necessary once it is recognized by society in the sphere of 
circulation. In order for the value of commodity to be manifested, commodities must 
enter into the sphere of relations (of exchange). Thus, money fulfills fetishism being itself 
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the supreme fetish. Factories produce value, but the marketplace realizes value. That 
value is a socially necessary means that it is recognized in society as such in the process 
of acquisition of commodities by buyers.  Seeing the commodity as only substance 
(instead of relation) as a one-sided embodiment of labor and labor-time is a formal 
approach, relying on the commodity’s so-called ‘intrinsic’ qualities. It is true that the 
sphere of circulation and exchange is the surface of capital, and ‘the hidden abode of 
production’ the ‘essence’ of capital, yet, the fetishization of exchange, at the level of 
appearance, is as necessary as commodities as embodied abstract labor.  
Circulation has its own determinations. Circulation precedes capitalist production, 
yet it is qualitatively transformed under capitalism. Money and the circulation of 
commodities predate capitalism, but in capitalism, commodities are not substantialist 
embodiment of human labor, time, and skill. Like classes, commodities are not 
substances but positions and relations. They are commodities in face of other 
commodities, just like social classes are defined by their relation to other classes. This 
relational aspect is proper to the value-form. This speculative structure already contained 
in the value of the commodity is necessarily acted upon in the sphere of exchange and 
universal equivalency. Money is an essential category in the structure of the commodity 
and it does not stand just as a supplement for their general equivalency in terms of time-
labor.  
Marx’s theory of money and circulation shows the same structure of polar unities, 
now in an extremely condensed form, standing alone as pure exchange value, as pure 
fetishism. Money, for Marx, as he develops his theory in the Grundrisse and the 2
nd
 
volume of Capital, is a polar unity of measure (coin as a “symbol of itself”) and 
exchange (as the mediator between production and circulation, “one produces in order to 
exchange, one produces by exchanging”), and also as an instrument of production, as in 
money capital. Or to put it in more Hegelian terms: money is first a common measure 
among commodities, a universal equivalency or identity; second, money is a medium of 
exchange among qualitatively different commodities as use-values. But finally, third, 
money as money-capital is a complex unity, an identity-in-difference, “which arises as an 
independent unit when the same money commodity is used in both the function of 
measure of value and as medium of exchange, has the potential to function as capital and 
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therefore is linked to reproduction the unity of production and circulation.”210 Therefore, 
money in pre-capitalist times acted as the first two (as measure and as exchange in terms 
of merchant capital). It is in capitalism, where money is an instrument of production 
completing this unity everywhere, where money is also advanced for production, beyond 
the simple sale-purchase circuit.
211
 When money becomes money for itself, as the 
commodity of commodities through hoard, it leaves the sphere of simple circulation to 
enter expanded reproduction to become then money-capital. Money breaks all barriers 
especially as international money, since it is both an exchange medium and a form of 
capital increasing the scale of production. But every moment of this process appears 
isolated from the other.
212
  
Commodities thus lead a double existence, as products of labor and objects of 
exchange. Once commodities become independent from producers, the gap between these 
two natures widens, and money enters the scene as a measure, medium of exchange, and 
representative of commodities: “Money has a dual character –writes Marx-: it is measure 
or element in which the commodity is realized as exchange value, and means of 
exchange, instrument of circulation, and in each of these aspects it acts in quite opposite 
directions”213. On the one hand, commodities must express an exchange value ideally 
expressed as price. On the other, money as means of circulation also mean that as 
instrument is external to the commodities. Money is equally the same and not the same as 
other commodities.
214
 Thus, exchange is determined by this double structure of use-value 
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and exchange-value.  “All commodities –Marx writes- are non-use values for their 
owners and use-values for their non-owners. Consequently, they must all change 
hands.”215 This alienated social form gives rise, as we know, to the fetishism of the 
commodities. Fetishist subjectivation embodies alienated objectivation. In the same 
process, the commodities-objects become subjects invested with magical powers and 
autonomy made possible by abstract labor, and the subject-producers of commodities 
become objects invested with a labor force to be sold and engaged in mercantile, 
objectified relations with other producers - on the one hand, object-subject; on the other, 
subject-object.
 216
   
Marx will find yet another polar unity in the money-form, in the capitalist’s act of 
selling and buying. It constitutes a unity of opposites revealing the money’s self-
circulation and self-development. As Marx states,  
“The sale and the purchase constitute one identical act, an exchange between a commodity 
owner and an owner of money, between two persons as opposed to each other as the two 
poles of a magnet. They form two distinct acts, of polar and opposite characters, when 
performed by one single person…. To say that these two independent and antithetical acts 
have an intrinsic unity, are essentially one, is the same as to say that this intrinsic oneness 
expresses itself in an external antithesis.”217 
  
Simple reproduction and expanded reproduction of capital possess the same structure of 
unity of opposites. At the material level, one begins and ends with money, and the other 
with the commodity. The merchant capitalist embodies this act: he buys in order to sell 
and sells in order to buy. The industrial capitalist does the same, but with labor, buying 
and selling the source of wealth itself. These polar unities are moments in the many 
metamorphoses the commodity, from the antithesis of use value and exchange value, to 
the contradiction between abstract labor and concrete labor, to the personification of 
objects and the objectification of persons, all the way to the money-form, “the riddle 
presented by commodities, only now in its most glaring form”.  
For Marx, all these steps however contain the possibility of a crisis because of the 
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intimate connection between these antitheses and of the split becoming “too pronounced” 
in its unity. What makes crisis inevitable in capitalism is the disproportionate unity 
between production and circulation. Equilibrium, balance in the process of capital 
accumulation requires that commodities are sold at their value at the time of production, 
that the realization of value in the market place through money be equal to the 
production of value in the factory. Money is a commodity, the only commodity that 
embodies pure exchange value, and commodities’ value are only realized in money, yet 
the identity in the commodity character between money and commodities becomes a 
disunity in the transition from production to circulation, what Marx calls in the second 
volume the “effects of turnover time”, i.e. the working period of production being 
greater, smaller, or equal to the circulation period. Turnovers are due to advancements in 
technology, the increase in labor productivity, competition, etc., all material factors that 
create a tendency for the value of each commodity to decline. In this sense, if the 
teleology of Capital is self-valorization, or the valorization of value, periodic crises, and 
contradictions between production and circulation induces de-valorizations of Capital, 
crisis of over-production (of unsold) commodities, and social polarization induced by 
market imperatives and exclusions of massive sectors from consumption (under-
consumption). Overproduction to make up for the fall in the rate of profit shows the 
conflict between the forces of production and the relations of production. As Marx put it,  
“Capital forces the workers beyond necessary labor to surplus labor. Only in this way, it 
realize itself, and create surplus value. But on the other hand, it posits necessary labor 
only to the extent and in so far as it is surplus labor and the latter is realizable as surplus 
value. As soon as it cannot posit value, it does not posit necessary labor… It therefore 
restricts labor and the creation of value by an artificial check, as the English express it… 
By its nature, therefore, [Capital] posits a barrier to labor and value-creation, in 
contradiction to its tendency to expand them boundlessly.”218 
 
The Speculative Dimension of Capitalism 
In chapter 4 of Capital, volume 2, Marx strikingly parallels Hegel’s theory of the 
mind in his concept of ‘total social capital’, as the unity and interaction between the three 
different circuits of money capital, commodity capital, and productive capital. This short 
section shows the homologies of Marx’s critique of capitalism with the structure of 
Hegel’s speculative logic. Marx writes, 
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“If we take all three forms together, then all premises of the process appear as its result, 
as premises produced by the process itself. Each moment appears as a point of departure, 
of transit, and of return. The total process presents itself as the unity of the process of 
production and the process of circulation; the production process is the mediator of the 
circulation process and vice versa.”219 
 
Marx grasps the inner moments of capital, each circuit not in isolation but internally 
related to each other, just like in Hegel, the three faculties of the mind are necessary to 
each other. Without it, no system or conceptual depth to capitalism is possible. The 
metamorphosis of Capital described in volume 2 is an attempt to identify a more concrete 
universality to Capital beyond the abstractions of value-form and the capital relation. 
This more concrete universe is industrial capital which stands as the real unity of the 
three circuits. Marx’s criticized other theories of political economy in their inability to 
think these three circuits as a whole, focusing for example only on money-capital like the 
Mercantilists, or productive capital as the British classical political economists preferred, 
or in just commodity capital as the dominant form in Physiocracy. Just like Hegel and his 
critique of empiricism as philosophies of understanding, or rationalism as philosophies of 
pure reason, Marx puts into relief the philosophical one-sidedness of economic theories 
that did not address capital as a social form, and only as object and stock. The circuit of 
capital as a whole is Marx’s speculative attempt in volume 2 of conceiving Capital as the 
unity-in-difference of the three circuits and only to be “grasped as movement and not as a 
static thing” or as an arrested dialectic, like many post-Hegelian philosophers understood 
the speculative to mean. Thus, 
“Money-capital, commodity-capital and productive capital, do not therefore designate 
independent kinds of capital whose functions form the content of likewise independent 
branches of industry separated from one another. They denote here only special 
functional forms of industrial capital, which assumes all three of them one after the other. 
Capital describes its circuit normally only so long as its various phases pass 
uninterruptedly into one another. If capital stops short in the first phase M — C, money-
capital assumes the rigid form of a hoard; if it stops in the phase of production, the means 
of production lie without functioning on the one side, while labor-power remains 
unemployed on the other; and if capital stops short in the last phase C' — M', piles of 
unsold commodities accumulate and clog the flow of circulation.”220 
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Further evidence for Marx’s speculative method in the circulation of capital is 
found in the unity of fixed and circulating capital in volume 2, which further specifies the 
more general unity of constant (machinery, instruments of labor) and variable capital 
(living labor) found in the production of Capital of volume 1. For Marx, fixed capital 
never leaves the sphere of production; it creates value that circulates but its use value is 
solely productive, a machine wears out by producing commodity supply.  
“The instruments of labor properly so called, the material vehicles of the fixed capital, are 
consumed only productively and cannot enter into individual consumption, because they 
do not enter into the product, or the use-value, which they held to create but retain their 
independent form with reference to it until they are completely worn out.”221 
 
By contrast, circulating capital goes through all metamorphoses of capital. The unity of 
both opposites constitute a further concretion in terms of machinery and labor power, 
metamorphosis and circulation that comes fully expressed in one of Marx’s most original 
contributions to political economy: the unity of the two departments of social production, 
that of means of production (“commodities having a form in which they must, or at least 
may, pass into productive consumption.”) and articles of consumption (“commodities 
having a form in which they pass into the individual consumption of the capitalist and the 
working-class”). Money is all-essential in this dual schema since this is how capitalists 
pay workers, yet money stays in the workers’ hands only temporarily. The cost of living 
and the workers’ simple reproduction C-M-C makes sure that money soon returns to 
capitalists. 
 Marx’s reproduction schemas conceptualize the turnover of capital and 
commodity production and consumption also as a dual schema of opposites, mirroring 
more concretely the abstraction of use and exchange value presented in Capital I. 
Department I must realize a flow of value in the process of production and Department II 
must fulfill such value in the process of circulation. What was presented in volume 1 as 
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the unity of opposites between simple and expanded reproduction is now presented in 
volume 2 as a more concrete unity of opposites inherent in total social capital, as 
macroeconomics and sectoral analysis. 
Volume 3 of Capital studies capitalism in its real concretion, as the unity in 
difference of diverse capitals that are the same in terms of Capital as general, according 
to the average rate of profit and dirempted into many capitals in their fierce competition. 
In the first parts of volume 3, the different capitals are united under the identity of profit 
and the average rate of profit as necessary appearance of surplus-value. Later, the unity of 
capital explodes into different factions of industrial, commercial, and finance capital with 
their own apparent surplus-values. As Marx writes, “The fragmentation of the total social 
capital into many individual capitals, or the repulsion of its fractions from each other, is 
counteracted by their attraction.”222 The polar unity represented in the third volume of 
Capital is one of Capital in general as a universal and many capitals as individuals. This 
polar unity between the universal and the particular makes capital ‘repelling itself from 
itself”, while at the same time, maintaining a unity of inner fragmentation. 
“Conceptually,” writes Marx, “competition is nothing other than the inner nature of 
capital, its essential character appearing in and realized as the reciprocal interaction of 
many capitals with one another, the inner tendency as external necessity.” This is what 
Hegel precisely understood as speculative actuality, ““Actuality is the unity, become 
immediate, of essence with existence, of inward with outward.” Capitalism achieves 
speculative actuality when its universality is riddled with conflict between the parts, of 
value and counter value.  
Identity and Difference in the Capital Relation  
Beside the internal unities of opposites in capital’s structure, Capital is also a 
relation between irreconcilable opposites, between the party of capitalists and the party of 
workers, Capital and Labor. The capital relation is speculative since both parties stand at 
the same time in unity at the level of structure and in antagonism at the level of 
appearances, both equally essential and important. At the level of essence, capital relation 
is an identity. Abstract labor derives from capital; capital extracts value from labor. It is 
the unity of capital’s valorization and exploitation of labor. The rate of exploitation points 
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to this structural paradox of the ever-growing and subsumption of capital over labor even 
under the betterment of labor conditions.
223
 At the level of appearance, class struggle 
manifests two different subjectivities and class consciousness. Yet for Marx, the goal is 
to eliminate the proletariat by eliminating capitalist exploitation, not to romanticize a 
proletarian subjectivity vis-à-vis capitalism.
224
 This twofold relation of essence and 
appearance, of unity-in-difference of the capital relation (Capital and Labor) has had a 
profound effect in interpretations of Marx’s Capital. 
Fredric Jameson argues that interpretation only takes place within political 
coordinates. Therefore, it is not possible to locate the historical meaning of a text outside 
the text’s own polemical interventions. Interpretation includes the text itself and its 
succeeding interpretations. Jameson calls these derivations “meta-commentaries” which 
includes the original text’s polemical interventions and the ‘sedimented reading habits’ 
from different interpretive lineages. For Jameson, meta-commentaries are “construed 
essentially as an allegorical act, which consists in rewriting a given text in terms of a 
particular interpretive master code.”225 These different codes, for our purposes, revolve 
around narratives of identities and difference. Jameson’s mention of the ‘allegorical act’ 
is central to interpretation. Allegories do not intend to reconstruct the true meaning of the 
text. Allegories actively and arbitrarily adjudicate meanings. If Hegel has been 
interpreted as a philosopher of closed totalities, that is, as a symbolic philosopher, it is 
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because the pinnacle of his theory, the speculative, has been understood as a system of 
absolute identities without outsides. This type of closure is the function of symbols, 
however. Symbols unite. They synthesize ideality and materiality. For symbols, things 
have a transcendent dimension. They embody ideas, as Kant’s artworks, or they are 
metaphors of higher ideals and notions. In philosophies of history, symbols unite, 
reconcile the material and the ideal within history. Symbolic philosophy of history 
becomes a history of salvation, teleology, a cosmogony or theosophy, the journey of the 
Spirit or of Capital. In the case of Capital’s ideology, the symbolic idealist reading is that 
Capital eventually will subsume everything without further contradiction. Capital’s 
utopia is to completely conquer use-values: labor and land. Use-values will disappear 
completely in a purely capitalist society along with negativity. 
According to German aesthetic tradition from Kant to Adorno, symbols have an 
ideological function of anticipating reconciliation. Allegories, on the other hand, establish 
the non-identity between the material and the ideal, conceiving history as an incomplete 
task, a never-ending process.
226
  That the speculative is a simultaneous unity of identity 
and difference, can also be read as a simultaneous activation of allegorical and symbolic 
interpretations. On the one hand, the speculative retains the symbolic aspect of thinking 
through totalities, but these totalities are also non-identical, ‘torsos’ as Benjamin calls 
them, a version of actuality and totality that can never ‘coalesce with the ideal’. But in 
Hegel’s philosophy, there is always something other, un-totalizable and irreducible which 
is unintelligible, that thought cannot penetrate yet. Contrary to tradition, Hegel does not 
reduce facticity to logical necessity. 
Marx’s Capital is speculative in this sense. Like the commodity, Capital is 
symbolic, mystical, and full of theological niceties. Money, Capital’s medium, is also 
symbolic. It is a medium of exchange and also the “God of commodities.” Commodities, 
as Marx famously says, are “a very queer thing abounding in metaphysical subtleties and 
theological niceties.” But also, commodities are allegorical entities; they hide and conceal 
use-value in plain sight for exchange value. The meaning of the commodity does not lie 
in its concrete usefulness, nor in the labor invested upon it, but in the abstract universality 
of money, a universality that is imprinted arbitrarily through the system of prices. As 
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Benjamin says, “the allegorist imprints her monogram in paintings and texts.” But use-
values survive, however distorted by the real and effective imaginary of exchange values; 
these non-identities are the reason for exchange value; commodity’s value must be 
realized with the sphere of circulation for their use value. Nobody buys anything that is 
useless.  
Positivism: absolute Labor and relative Capital 
The supposed objectivity of use-value and appropriation of labor as use, concrete 
value versus the totalizing grip of Capital have determined historical readings and 
interpretations of Marx’s Capital. On the one hand, the logico-historical interpretation, 
from Engels to Mandel explains Capital as a history of successive stages. Capital’s 
phases of development are presented as historical phases of modes of production. The 
mode of presentation is historical. The logic of the commodity, hence, is not only a 
logical presentation of the inner structure of Capital’s commodity, but a figure of ‘simple 
commodity production’, preceding Capital proper. This view argued that ‘simple 
commodity production’ is a feature of all economic systems, proper to whenever trade 
happens. Exchange value is a feature common to all modes of production. Yet, Marx 
never uses the expression of simple commodity production.  As Engels put it,  
“Marx takes simple commodity production as his historical presupposition, only later, 
proceeding on this basis, to come on to capital’: the advantage of this was that he could 
proceed ‘from the simple commodity and not from a conceptually and historically 
secondary form, the commodity as already modified by capitalism.”227  
 
The problem with Engels’s assertion is that it takes value outside Capital; it 
grounds labor as a source of value in a positive light. Capitalist alienation is a historical 
development of labor, and by implication, the possibility of non-alienated labor exists. 
The critique of Capital implies an opposite ontology of labor which sees Capital as 
producing a type of alienated, abstract labor from an unbroken labor-power. Here, the 
main ‘orthodox’ and brightest critical exponent is Lukács from his History and Class 
Consciousness to his late Ontology of Social Being. For Lukács, following a key passage 
in Capital on the end of labor processes, states that it is “Through labor, that a 
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teleological positing is realized within material being, as the rise of a new objectivity. 
The first consequence of this is that labor becomes the model for any social practice.”228  
 This had important political consequences in the history of communist theory. 
Theorists of labor as pure use-value imagined socialism as labor without surplus value, 
just value. Yet this is impossible since the creation and appropriation of value necessarily 
presupposes surplus value. Or to put it in another way -that retroactively posits the 
presuppositions- that surplus value and the rate of exploitation exist unveils something 
called value within the commodity that is already appropriable and exchangeable. Value 
appears only when there is abstract labor, an objectified form embodying an abstract 
principle since its source to living work has been cut. Value can only come out of 
alienation of the worker from its product. As Marx strongly states in the Grundrisse, “It 
is just as pious as it is stupid to wish that exchange value would not develop into capital, 
nor labor which produces exchange value into wage labor.”229 
“Wert-Theorie”: Capital as Subject 
 An influential school of interpretation that privileged the absolute identity 
between labor and capital is the ‘value-form theory’. Value-form theorists read Capital as 
an inner logic of value. For this school, influential in Germany and Japan, Marx develops 
Capital’s deep structure from core categories where history and class struggle only play a 
subsidiary role. Soviet economist Isaak Ilych Rubin advanced this reading. For Rubin,  
“One of two things is possible: if abstract labor is an expenditure of human energy in 
physiological form, then value also has a reified material character. Or value is a social 
phenomenon, and then abstract labor must also be understood as a social phenomenon 
connected with a determined social form of production. It is not possible to reconcile a 
physiological concept of abstract labor with the historical character of value which it 
creates.”230  
 
For Rubin, this antinomy between nature (physiology) and history (social forms 
of production) cannot be solved. Labor has a unique nature in capitalism; capitalism 
produces a form of labor that is abstracted from its product and a source of value. Labor 
as creator of value is a form unique in history, therefore, to understand labor is to 
understand the functioning of Capital’s valorization. Rubin’s insights were rediscovered 
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by Postone and led to one of the most significant interventions in the recent theory and 
social history of labor. Postone argues that to treat labor as the standpoint of critique 
represents the position of traditional Marxism. According to traditional Marxism, labor is 
trans-historical, naturalized, and capital’s subjugation of labor through surplus value 
constitutes alienation. The proletariat, once liberated from surplus-value and exploitation, 
can dispose of labor as it wishes. For Postone, however, this view fails to see the deeper 
structural logic because it concentrates in appearances, in class struggle as the motor of 
history. Following Rubin’s critique, Postone argues that we must dispose of this ‘natural’ 
character of labor to avoid the pitfalls of traditional socialism of positing an idea of 
liberated or emancipated labor. Labor is the core form of capitalist domination.  
Postone’s main target is Lukács’s speculative-idealist understanding of the 
proletariat as the subject-object history in “Reification and the Consciousness of the 
Proletariat”, the foundational text of Western Marxism. The trans-historical, Kantian 
conception of labor comes also with an understanding of capitalism as an antinomian, not 
a speculative system. The works of Lukács and Sohn-Rethel are representatives of this 
conception through different ways. In his classic essay “Reification and the 
Consciousness of the Proletariat”, Lukacs criticizes the antinomies of bourgeois-liberal 
thought arguing that they reflect capitalist structural antinomies. Lukacs sees these 
antinomies as a totality specific to bourgeois thought. Each class in a Leninist way has a 
perspective of totality formulated openly or latently. Yet Lukacs sees capitalism as 
antinomian and therefore he takes the proletariat as the class that solves these antinomies 
as the speculative subject of history. For Lukacs, the antinomies of bourgeois thought are 
reflections of the antinomy of Capital, which then produces alienation.  
My view, however, is that Capital is not antinomian, but stands as a unity of 
opposites. Effectively bourgeois and liberal thinking are dominated by antinomies, and 
that rightly so the bourgeois view of totality -even though the concept of totality is absent 
in bourgeois ideology- is analytical, a fragmented sum of individuals in antagonism with 
each other, the perspective of civil society according to Hegel.  Yet that Capital is 
antinomian is to see it only from the standpoint of its appearance, the class struggle 
between workers and capitalists, but from the standpoint of its essence, Capital is 
structured around the capital relation, labor is a function of Capital from which Capital 
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extracts value. They both stand as a unity of opposites. Lukacs, in this sense, understands 
Capital from a positivistic perspective, or rather from the perspective of the 
Understanding. Bourgeois reason is a reflection; the proletariat and socialism incarnate 
Reason. Lukacs does not argue in terms of political economy, but philosophically. 
Society in his presentation stands only as an indeterminate realm of productive forces; 
Lukacs makes only the most general statements about society along his impressive 
philosophical analysis. 
“For the contradiction does not lie in the inability of the philosophers to give a definitive 
analysis of the available facts. It is rather the intellectual expression of the objective 
situation itself which it is their task to comprehend. That is to say, the contradiction that 
appears here between subjectivity and objectivity in modern rationalist formal systems, 
the entanglements and equivocations hidden in their concepts of subject and object, the 
conflict between their nature as systems created by ‘us’ and their fatalistic necessity 
distant from and alien to man is nothing but the logical and systematic formulation of the 
modern state of society.”231 
 
Lukacs concludes that capitalist reification is of course old wine in new bottles. 
Modern rationalization is as irrational as the first nature destroyed for a more rational 
society. Though distinct in nature, the differentia specifica between the alienation of raw 
necessity of first nature and the ‘free’ alienation of second nature is understated in his 
essay. This lack of more difference between first and second nature represents also a lack 
of engagement of Lukacs with the concrete capitalist law of value. Lukacs does not 
sufficiently delineates the social-scientific contours of antinomian bourgeois thinking, 
and like Sohn-Rethel (although Rethel engages more concretely with the laws of 
exchange as the origin of capitalist abstraction, yet again extrapolating them to 
Antiquity), traces this relation between capitalism and antinomian thinking vaguely 
beyond the emergence of capitalism as a historical mode of production.  With Lukacs’ 
trans-historical understanding of labor, antinomies as product of capitalism also stretch 
beyond capitalist formations, though not in their more realized form.  
In other passages, the essay presents this relation restricted only to capitalism, but 
the dialectic between concrete antinomies (which Lukacs definitely shows) and the laws 
of capital (which Lukacs ignores) are not there. Indeed, antinomies are also present in 
Greek philosophy, as Lukacs recognizes that ancient society had “some degree of 
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reification.” One only needs to think of Plato and Aristotle and their oppositions or 
unities between ideas and matter. Yet, classical antinomies are not deployed as starkly as 
in a modern thought rooted in the subject. For classical realism and idealism, objects are 
measure of all things, including the subject. It is with modern philosophy and, of course, 
the rise of capitalism that the antinomy of law begins from the subject. Kant, for Lukacs, 
“only developed its implications more radically than his predecessors had done.”  
Lukacs theorizes the totality of history as dialectical and labor as common to all 
modes of production. Liberal bourgeois antinomies belong to a specific reified stage in 
this history of labor and the dialectical labor of history, against which the final unfolding 
of history and the liberation of labor are synonymous. The proletariat organized under a 
Party can only bring the unity of opposites between subject and object. I think however 
that the subject-object of our history is Capital and that antinomies as they are presented 
in modern philosophy and liberal ideology are specific products of such history. That 
antinomies were also present in ancient thought is beyond the scope of this work. 
However, in order to make this claim, we need to find out if social practices before 
capitalism were deployed under a system that was effectively organized under a unity of 
opposites and initiated under wage-labor. 
Like Lukács, the other example of capitalism understood as Kantian antinomies is 
found in Sohn-Rethel.  For Sohn-Rethel, Kantian dualism is ‘a more faithful approach to 
the realities of capitalism’ than Hegel’s speculative approach. Lukács only suggested that 
antinomies were present in non-capitalist societies; in Sohn-Rethel, all philosophy since 
the pre-Socratics contain capitalist alienation in nuce for the presence of the concept of 
exchange value. Sohn-Rethel calls real abstraction to the market division of mental labor 
as logic and manual labor as value, making the social nature of labor undetectable. If 
abstraction in thought is possible is because there is also abstraction in social relations 
and in the organization of needs. Capitalist social abstraction represents the condition of 
possibility for philosophical mental abstraction. For Sohn-Rethel, mathematics is the 
exemplar science of abstraction. Apriorism manifests in mathematical axioms that 
separate its postulates from the concrete determinations present in social practices. For 
example, the identity principle makes possible exchange principles and cash-nexus but it 
is not the same as these. If mental labor is a product of social practices, this social 
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background is concealed by focusing only in the ideas themselves. The exchange 
principle in capitalist societies roots out labor as concrete, qualitative social practice and 
places all human activity in a single process of exchange. Thus, in material activity –
labor- use-values are subsumed under exchange value; in ideal activity –logic- material 
phenomena are examples of universal categories. Exchange values and categories make 
all concrete products of manual and mental labor equivalent, abstract.  
Yet, even if Sohn Rethel recognizes the historical production of subjects under 
capitalism, there are three differences that differentiate his approach from a speculative 
critique of antinomies. First, Sohn-Rethel applies a Kantian approach to the problem of 
reification. Second, his critique of reification extrapolates, like Lukacs, its scope to non-
capitalist societies, since Sohn-Rethel does not differentiate money circulation and 
exchange from capitalist production and exchange. Here, there is an implicit assumption 
that circulation and exchange processes produce value instead of realizing it, what 
Brenner calls “Smithian Marxism”. What happens under capitalist therefore is a 
universalization of value and abstraction, already implicit and partial in pre-capitalist 
societies. And third, there is no explanation present of the apriori of capital abstraction, 
what is its structure. We know only the apriori by its effects (reification and ‘necessary 
false consciousness’). In this sense, Sohn-Rethel posits -like many Kantians in the 
Marxist tradition such as Colletti or the Austro-Marxists- a transcendental principle that 
is then ‘verified’ in historical social practices. This is contrary to a Marxist and Hegelian 
perspective for which social recognition and misrecognition constitute first social 
practices and then the organizing principle is ‘discovered’ afterward by positing the 
presupposition as product of such social practices. Thus, the awareness of exchange leads 
us to the hidden reality of production where value is extracted and produced. Value as the 
organizing principle of capital is visible in exchange but takes place in labor and 
production. It is not posited but read retroactively as product of concrete social practices.  
A deeper logic sees that labor is actually produced by capitalism, that labor 
mediates social processes in capitalism, and that it is the main channel for capitalist 
alienated social forms. Capital uses labor to extract value; labor is the origin of value, and 
in order to abolish capitalism, value must be abolished, hence labor itself. Yet, Marx is 
very ambiguous when he discusses the nature of labor at the beginning of Capital. Marx, 
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as described above, asserts that labor implies a metabolic exchange with nature. Labor 
does not have a trans-historical character, but against Postone, Marx sees that labor 
definitely possess a physiological and natural character. While Postone recognizes that 
nature becomes the sort of object to be exploited in capitalism –a Heideggerian Bestand, 
“a standing reserve” of natural resources ready to be conquered232-, he does not 
sufficiently emphasize the material, ‘other’ character of nature, thus perhaps participating 
the quasi-idealist framework of society, however historical it may be, as a set of inter-
subjective alienated social mediations without an ‘outside.’ Thus, I think that Postone 
substitutes Lukács’s idealism of trans-historical labor for an idealism of labor-as-capital. 
Since Capital produces alienated labor, it follows that labor is identical to capital. Abolish 
labor and capital is abolished. This presupposes a complete, absolute, formal and real 
subsumption of labor to Capital, a smooth space where there is no resistance, where use-
values are completely eliminated. In the dialectical reading of Capital represented by 
“value-form theorists”. Capital’s inner logic is a totalizing and the problem is history. 
The dialectical approach to Capital is Capital-centric. With some variants, Capital’s core 
structure completes itself through a progression of logical categories, as a Hegelian 
world-spirit. Value-form theorists often treat Capital as ‘pure Capital’ where the 
historical and the logical are homological, fused in an identity of opposites. For Sekine, 
following Hegel’s logical development of being, essence, and concept,  
 
“The dialectic of capital too consists of the three doctrines of circulation, production and 
distribution. The dialectical methods used in those doctrines are respectively, becoming, 
internalization, and unfolding. The guiding force of the dialectic of capital is the 
contradiction between value and use-values. Capital, the dialectical subject, reveals itself 
step by step by letting ‘value’, its most abstract specification, prevail over ‘use-values’ 
which represent everything ‘other’ than capital.”233 
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Communism means the abolition of this total subsumption, hence, of labor.
234
 
Yet, do we have to wait for Capital’s total subsumption of labor, for the disappearance of 
use-values and of opposites in order for Communism to make its entrance again, without 
the illusions of liberated labor? 
Autonomism: The antinomy of Capital and Labor 
The response is in a less analytical and more voluntaristic approach of 
Autonomism which, resembles orthodoxy with a twist. This school approaches Capital 
and Labor as a relation of absolute differences. Labor is a revolutionary subjectivity 
completely opposed to Capital not in objective terms for the capital relation is one of 
exploitation of labor, but in terms of subjective will, of a radical antagonism between 
workers’ and capitalists’ subjectivity despite Capital’s total valorization of labor. The 
theory of surplus value is a weapon in the workers’ struggle and class struggle knows no 
synthesis. Antagonisms cannot be negated and they will always reappear. This third 
differential approach is that of workerism. For instance, Negri dismisses Capital’s 
‘objectivism’ for the Grundrisse, its predecessor. The Grundrisse is a book of radical 
revolutionary subjectivity. Negri says,  
“Certainly Marx developed a theory of profit, which is to say a theory of the subjectivity 
of capital, while –in spite of his intentions- he did not develop a theory of the subjectivity 
of the working class – in the figure of a wage, for instance… We must see in these two 
spaces the formation of opposed subjectivities, opposed wills and intellects, opposed 
processes of valorization… The Grundrisse aims at a theory of the subjectivity of the 
working class against the profitable theory of capitalist subjectivity.” 235 
 
Negri’s original blending of Foucault with Marx in terms of production of 
subjects has many problems in terms of Marx’s own theory of Capital, especially in 
Negri’s theory of wages which is the polar opposite of Marx.236 Negri does not define 
labor’s specific process of valorization. Also, Negri categorically dismisses Hegel and 
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dialectics as reactionary when there is an almost unanimous consensus that the radical 
Grundrisse is Marx’s most Hegelian text. Yet Negri’s accent on the irreducible, non-
identical difference of labor to Capital is important, since Capital produces labor as its 
mediation, but it is only through the activity of labor, and also of Capital’s technology 
and automated production (which is outside the law of value as ‘dead labor’) that labor as 
creator of value can be abolished.
237
 
The problem therefore is what to make of the fissure between the historical and 
the logical/systematic manner of presentation. This is where the speculative aspect of 
capital comes useful as an interpretive code. A speculative reading posits an identity and 
non-identity between Capital’s inner totalizing logic and the contingency proper to 
history, the rocky materiality of class-struggle. It cannot be doubted that Capital is a 
totalizing force, but at the level of history, it never achieves a totality. I think that to 
privilege the identity of Capital’s logics and history or Capital with society is still one-
sided despite dialectical insight and second, that the non-identity within Capital’s system 
has been largely overlooked. Use-value, nature and labor itself constitute limits inherent 
to Capital. Nature and labor as entities not capitalistically produced resist Capital in terms 
of workers’ resistance to labor and time domination, and nature’s resistance to Capital’s 
destructive demands for production.
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Capitalism and Ethical Life 
Ethical life for Hegel is the speculative unity of the realms of morality and 
legality, which is to say, the unity or “interpenetration of the subjective and the objective 
aspects” of a particular society.  In Hegel’s classic account, the state (as politics) and 
religion (as ethical life) form a speculative unity in that inner life corresponds to external 
political institutions. All forms of polities constitutes species of ethical life, and at the 
same time, political institutions and subjective dispositions are estranged, dirempted from 
one another forming a non-identity between religion (culture) and the state. Hegel calls 
the moment of unity, absolute ethical life, and the simultaneous moment of disunity, 
relative ethical life. Both coexist since freedom is an ideal and a practice altogether. 
Relative ethical life is such since it is the ethical life seen from the standpoint of social 
relations, “which make absolute ethical life invisible.” Hegel as a classicist sees absolute 
ethical life, the identity between religion and the state in Greece. Here, it makes no sense 
to speak of legitimation since customs and law already express each other; law is living 
law expressing the spirit of a people. Yet Hegel the modernist perceives that this mode of 
political existence is impossible in modern capitalist societies, in the “spiritual animal 
kingdom”, the monarchy of particularity. Even if Greece did not need religious 
representation because political institutions and the religious life were in harmony, 
Judaism, Roman religion, and Christianity relied on representation of private individuals 
external to its institutions. Unlike Greece where the few free individuals were ‘concrete’, 
that is, the particularity of their existence was represented in the specific universality of 
their institutions; in these other religions, we speak of subjects, not individuals, since 
universality and particularity are separated, in gap with each other. Therefore, the 
individual represents itself as universal, or posits an external entity (God) as an alien 
universality in relation to their particularity. This theology of subjectivity, not 
individuality, is thus transferred to the political realm in that institutions start to have a 
reified, remote character in relation to its citizens.
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 When Marx calls capitalism as the culmination of Christianity, he makes this 
claim from the above Hegelian standpoint of alienation in ethical life, secularized now in 
the commodities. The objective aspect of capitalist societies, that of identity of capital 
and labor in the capital relation coexists with the opposite ‘subjective’ aspect, the 
morality of bourgeois law and property relations that “make individuals isolated and 
‘moral’ who can only relate to each other externally” as opposed classes. There is no 
possibility of unity, of what Hegel calls an ‘absolute’ ethical life in capitalism, because 
the legal institutions and the social sphere are at odds; bourgeois legal institutions conflict 
with any concept of society. Capitalist institutions of property rely on a fundamental 
inequality among people to institute equal but abstract property rights. Un-freedom is 
smuggled as freedom, and these institutions that are also products of freedom produce 
unjust practices. Freedom as un-freedom comes when a particular becomes an absolute, a 
‘spurious absolute’ as Hegel would see in property and as Marx would see as Capital.  
Yet absolute ethical life is not separated from relative ethical life in capitalism or 
in any other system. To separate them would lead to two opposite forms of neo-Kantian 
subjectivities, one liberal where relative ethical life, the norm of property and 
individualism is made absolute; the other post-structural, in which absolute ethical life is 
made relative, an a-historical injunction that merely extrapolates current social relations 
without their conflicts. In Hegel, relative and absolute ethical life have very particular 
meanings that are useful to think capitalism as a specific system of ethical life, of a 
meshing of freedom and un-freedom. The system of relative ethical life, as Rose restates 
it, is twofold. One, it is relative because the sphere of enjoyment, work, and property is 
only part of the whole. Two, it is also relative because capitalist relations are based on a 
lack of identity (relation); “they make people into competing, isolated, ‘moral’, 
individuals who can only relate externally to one another, and are thus subjected to a real 
lack of identity.”  
Having described capitalism as relative ethical life, how does capitalism stands in 
relation to absolute ethical life beyond the Kantian negative ideal? For Rose following 
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Hegel, “absolute ethical life must be understood in a way that is not itself abstract and 
negative as in Kant.” Since the relative system of ethical life understands itself to be 
absolute, any other opposed system of [absolute] ethical life must appear abstract and 
empty. Thus the ethical life of capitalism is the absolutization of relative ethical life, 
where absolute ethical life is represented as relations of private property. In this sense, the 
opposition between relative and absolute ethical life remains hidden for we take the 
relative world of property relations for the absolute. Where the absolute and the relative 
are in a differentiated unity, then real relations within relative ethical life become visible, 
and for Hegel, this visibility is brought by the recognition of the critical consciousness. 
Absolute ethical life in capitalism, which is the brutal identity of the capital relation 
remains hidden and suppressed in favor of the relative ethical life, the equality of abstract 
property bearers supporting the inequality of classes.  
Alienation from a speculative perspective, beyond how Marx understands of 
alienation as total un-freedom, points to a reality that even under reified conditions, social 
practices are also products of freedom. Yet, philosophy and its privilege of representation 
privilege a one-sided reading of historical products as un-freedom, putting therefore free 
meaningful action only in a jurisprudence of duty, in Sollen, where rights are secondary. 
Yet, by thinking culture and politics through representation, political philosophy 
produces an estrangement of its object, which is mirror of estranged social relations. As 
Rose states, “philosophy has not been read speculatively, because the reality of un-
freedom has determined its reading.” Following Adorno, it can be said that representation 
comes after a prehistory of subjectivity; representation occurs when mimetic social 
relations are repressed. This mimesis is crushed with the origin of a second subjectivity, a 
constitution of power that represses one’s social nature and external nature through 
representation. Representation presents that which is not anymore present; it is evidence 
of that estrangement, that absence of self-aware or self-justificatory [absolute] ethical 
life. Rose accuses this representation as estrangement as one target of Marxism, but as 
one which Marxism cannot escape. For Rose, the Marxist theory of revolution is not 
concrete but abstract for revolution involves always a subject who is in opposition to 
existing structures, a subject with historical consciousness but in an antinomian 
opposition to history as it is. She thinks that Marxism is only a culture because the ideas 
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of Marx have not been realized; they have not been made for it-self, materialized in 
society. It is a revolutionary, but abstract culture because Marxism does not have an idea 
of how its institutions might look like. In this sense, for Rose, Marxism, not Marx, is only 
a revolutionary theory, even though its object is Capital and its aim the liberation of the 
working class from bourgeois exploitation. But Marxism attempted to apply the same 
class analysis to bourgeois and non-bourgeois societies alike and losing hence the 
specificity of Hegel’s analysis to non-bourgeois societies in his philosophy of history. 
According to Rose, “Revolutionary consciousness is subjective consciousness, just as 
natural consciousness is, that is, it is a determination or re-presentation of substance, 
ethical life, actuality, in the form of an abstract consciousness. An abstract consciousness 
is one which knows that it is not united with ethical life. It is determined by abstract law 
to know itself as formally free, identical, and empty. It is only such an abstract 
consciousness which can be potentially revolutionary…” The problem with these 
profound remarks is that Rose understands Marxism, along with many Western Marxists, 
only as consciousness, and moreover, as an abstract consciousness, which in the Hegelian 
framework of the Philosophy of Right means a voluntaristic consciousness, or 
consciousness understood as will.  Rose ignores the other side of the relation Marx and 
Hegel, and that is, how can a speculative perspective be conciliated with historical 
materialism and revolutionary theory. For the same accusation can be thrown to Hegelian 
science of being completely theoretical, therefore, as equally abstract as the abstraction 
Rose accuses in Marxism’s ‘revolutionary’ consciousness. Yet, in her retrieval of the 
speculative, Rose overlooks how the Understanding, the most abstract category, returns 
in the form of abstract denial through ‘abstract’ analysis of the present conditions, often 
in violent forms. If the speculative is the recognition of human freedom and agency even 
in the most reified conditions, it is the understanding, as it is shown in the 
Phenomenology, the faculty that wages a violent revolt against reality. In Hegel’s 
passages, we see the dialectics of virtue and terror in respect to the Jacobins, but the key 
faculty at work in such dialectics is the will of the understanding. CLR James reminds us 
of this ever-presence of the understanding, which can be construed as the motor of 
history and as a permanent threat of reification as Jameson also reminds us. For CLR 
James, the understanding is necessary and dangerous; it is dialectical to the extent that it 
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negates and doubts the object, and by doing so, it formulates logical categories, a true 
revolution from common sense and everyday experience. Yet, the reification appears 
when the understanding assumes these categories as permanent. Reason comes to destroy 
this permanence, but then it becomes understanding and so on. Yet, what is 
unacknowledged is that the understanding also destroys reason turned into common 
sense.  
Seeing Marx’s use of speculation in the critique of Capital and his immediate 
preoccupation with political action, is speculation then only a form of consciousness, or 
could it be a form of praxis? Even if Marxism could be transformed into a speculative 
Hegelian science, a form of analysis of capitalism that deploys Hegelian speculation and 
it is historically specific only to capitalism, could Marxism also be a speculative praxis, 
not just an abstract consciousness from a speculative perspective? How can this praxis be 
conceived? Is it revolutionary praxis? Hegel always pointed to the practical character of 
speculation against Kant’s formalism of duty and obedience.  
Thus, speculation is not a purely theoretical task. In Hegel, completely concrete 
matters in The Philosophy of Right such as ethical life, family, sexual love, the interests 
of the ethical State, etc. are speculative. Hegel claims for example, “When it is supposed 
that the speculative is something remote and inconceivable, one has only to consider the 
content of these interpersonal relationships to convince oneself of the baselessness of this 
opinion”. Hegel understood these speculative matters under an ethical State, but how can 
these matters relate to revolutionary consciousness? Is the ethical State in Hegel the 
“post-revolutionary State”, or a “really existing State” like Marx thought in his Critique 
to Hegel’s Philosophy of Right? Can speculation provide insight and justification to not 
just critical philosophy but to political organization, and can political organization and 
philosophy, theory and practice stand in a speculative relation for partisan purposes? The 
next chapter addresses, the external determinations of partisanship and the modalities of 
philosophy and political organization. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CRASHING THE PARTY: 
ISSUES IN THE COMMUNIST PHILOSOPHY OF ORGANIZATION 
________________ 
 
“One of the biggest and most dangerous mistakes made by Communists is the idea that a 
revolution can be made by revolutionaries alone.” – Lenin 
 
“Speculative thought entails a recognition that the two parts of the unity are in violent opposition, 
contradiction, to each other. It is when Subject realizes that contradiction is a fundamental 
principle of all life, that it jams the opposites together and so unlooses inherent movement…. 
Ultimately the new developing reality faces an opposition with which it must engage in mortal 
struggle. This stage the Logic describes as Actuality. It is the self-mobilization that the Labor 
movement has been seeking.” –CLR James 
 
“Organization is a form of mediation between theory and practice.” -Lukács 
_________________________ 
 
Neo-Leninism and Partisanship Today 
On the uneven moralism of contemporary political theory, Raymond Geuss 
recommends that “If political philosophy wishes to be at all connected with a serious 
understanding of politics, and thus to become an effective source of orientation or a guide 
to action, it needs to return from the present reactionary forms of neo-Kantianism to 
something like the ‘realist’ view, or, to put it slightly differently, to neo-Leninism.”240 
Neo-Leninism in Geuss’s conception views politics organized around parties, and I might 
add on theories of partisanship, its organizational tactics and political strategies. But how 
is a return to Leninism understood in communist philosophy today?  
This last chapter addresses the significance of the speculative conception for the 
current debates on partisanship and militancy, on what Badiou not long ago termed the 
“the communist hypothesis” a propos the election of Sarkozy in France.241 Second, the 
chapter explores the relation between the different modes of militancy proposed with a 
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corresponding comprehension of the capitalist crisis, how their understanding of the 
cyclical crises inform their model of partisanship. Finally, a speculative return to 
Leninism is proposed. 
The isolation of the party-form from society and its neo-Kantian legitimation has 
carried a profound de-politicizaton. Yet this new type of anti-politics is presented as a 
positive democratic development since it makes management easier. Expert decisions, 
“independent bodies”, and executive authority replace political debate for fear and 
security.
242
 De-politicization also responds efficiently to democratic challenges by 
making unassailable the basic rules of a country or organization. Yet the pragmatic, 
technical ideology of depoliticization is absolutely misleading. Politics does not go away: 
de-politicization simply shifts the arenas of debate.
 243
 
Also, as explained in the first chapter, the expansion of post-war capitalism 
coincided with the emergence of post-partisan parties in the West. The living standards of 
the masses rose; class parties lost their salience being replaced by catch-all parties, 
targeting an ever-growing middle class, where the majority of the active electorate 
resided. Yet with the rise of neoliberalism, due to the economic and fiscal crisis of the 
1970s, capitalism made a comeback, producing an explosion of inequality in the United 
States and the world, matching perennial Latin American levels. This produced, of 
course, a corresponding political polarization. Depending on the institutional system, 
polarization either took a rise in partisanship in two-party systems such as England and 
the US, competing fiercely for private money to run their campaigns, or the rise to 
prominence of third parties in multi-party systems, from the far-right and left. This is the 
example offered by continental Western and Southern Europe and Latin America. The 
current return to a neo-Leninist version of party politics come from both backgrounds.  
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The transformation of politically active classes into masses due to the complex 
development of late capitalism, its patterns of consumption and global production, and 
the makeover of mass parties into state party bureaucracies made some sectors of the left 
to abandon forms of political organization overall, returning to an earlier economism 
centered in social movements and the workplace, or to focus on very specific demands 
proper to identity politics (minorities, immigrants, women). In any case, class lost 
political salience with rising consumption and the increasing deindustrialization of the 
economy into service economies –with its corresponding low wages, high inflation, high 
debt, but without the classical figure of the industrial worker. 
The relation between masses and political organization is formulated in diverse 
ways now, as, ways however that reproduce many of the tensions that existed in the 
international communist movement in regards to the question of organization, whether 
the organization should lead, follow, or be in constant mediation with the masses. These 
changing aspects between organization and masses, seems to me, mirror those between 
capital and labor, their antagonistic unity proper to capitalist societies.  
This first relation is ultra-leftist or spontaneist, at present formulated along the 
lines of Spinoza’s ontology, an immanent worldview where there are no subjects, but one 
substance, the undifferentiated masses, the multitude, bursting as one agent in exceptional 
situations. Negri would approach the question of organization from this perspective, 
contrary to his political economy that posits otherwise an absolute difference between 
Capital and Labor, conceived as a theory of wages formulated as workers’ subjectivity.244  
The second relation is the antinomy between parties and masses. Although this 
worldview is proper to our modern parties and the neo-Kantian tradition, in the Left, this 
tendency historically took the form of authoritarian vanguardism, especially with the 
tradition of Jacobinism and Blanquism. Here the arrangement is a substance becoming an 
exceptional subject, the Immortal few in Badiou’s term, those revolutionaries willing to 
do the unthinkable. What Alain Badiou ironically terms ‘speculative leftism’ is a varied 
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group of theorists that fall into some kind of voluntarism. This tradition however neglects 
political economy (Being) in the name of “pure politics (Event)”.  
The third approach is the identity-in-difference between parties and masses. Here 
the party and leadership although separate from the undifferentiated masses, ‘listens’, 
‘organizes’ the truth of the masses, stand in line, in identity with the people, for it is the 
people that will always surpass in truth to the party; they are the index as well as the 
force. The party lags behind the masses, especially in the very complex conditions of late 
capitalism, but the party formulates and interprets the situation to the masses, give the 
masses a sense of direction. In some sense, the organization reads the events and 
interprets them in order to formulate a line of action in consultation with the masses, not 
in terms of absolute knowledge, but as exchange and association of ideas and actions. 
This of course relates to the double nature of political representation, whether the party is 
a superfluous delegate or a trustee of the masses. The party is effectively a delegate of the 
masses, and at the same time, its trustee; it is a constant negotiation (that is given by the 
constant accountability of the ‘party’ to the masses) that makes this relation open-ended. 
The masses however are always in advance, so to speak, to its representation and this is 
the party’s ultimate referent; the masses, the social are always in excess of the political. 
The masses are the living movement, and the party is the mediator.  
These three traditions, political Spinozism as absolute unity, political Kantianism 
as political difference, and Hegelian speculation conceive the party-form from the 
standpoint of philosophy.  The relation between subject and substance, politics and the 
social, is solved in different ways.  I would like to use the medieval logic of univocism, 
equivocism, and analogy to address these relations between organization and masses. 
These three terms will allow me to better grasp the logical form of the identitarian, 
differential, and speculative approaches to the question of leftist political organization.
245
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What Party? 
Negri belongs to a tradition of ‘autonomous workers’ movement’ that rejected 
party-building during the emergence of the New Left after 1968. For many autonomists, 
according to Wright, “The worst and oldest error is the constitution or reconstruction of 
the ‘group’ [is the] paleo-Leninist schemas of organization (democratic centralism, 
professionalization of leaders, organized division of labor).”246 Autonomists regarded 
Leninist organization as authoritarian and substitutionist.
247
 
 Negri does two things to recant Leninist models of organization and leadership for 
our time. The first thing is to provide a very specific contextualization of Lenin according 
to its Russian setting and to argue that Leninism does not work in other more advanced 
settings. The second move is to draw on Spinoza immanent philosophy to defend 
spontaneism and economism.
248
 Spinoza offers Negri a better framework to build a post-
Leninist model that is better suited to late capitalism, based on immaterial labor, the 
global factory, information economy, and so on. 
 Negri contextualizes and restricts Leninism to its space time, a semi-feudal Russia 
relatively isolated from global capital. The relative isolation of Russia in the capitalist 
world system takes the domestic form of an isolated party of professional 
revolutionaries.
249
 Because capitalist relations and democracy did not fully penetrate 
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Russia by the time of revolution, Lenin could distinguish between economic and political 
struggles. In Lenin’s time, capitalist discipline was discreet, confined to the factory 
allowing a similar discreet organization of revolutionaries. 
But in contemporary capitalism, Negri renews the old Economist thesis. There is 
no distinction between the political and economic struggles. Contemporary capitalism 
offers a radical new picture of domination, a domination that is ever-expanding and 
pervasive, when the disciplinary methods of the factory extends to the whole social 
life.
250
 According to Negri, Lenin must be read according to his determinate social 
formation. The development of capitalism in Russia brought about a very advanced 
working-class consciousness because of the divergence between Russian late capitalist 
development and backwardness. A combative working class such as the Russian, with its 
persistent refusal to work (the autonomist locus of workers’ subjectivity and self-
valorization) was an index of one of the most radical development within world 
capitalism by the end of the 19
th
 century. Russia had a highly politicized working class 
and this was a signal of its relative advanced position in capitalism, not in terms of 
industrialization, but in terms of class struggle, of the conflict between relations of 
production (not yet consolidated in Russia as in Western Europe) and forces of 
production. The Russian determinate social formation between 1895 and 1917 was a 
favored conjunction that brought sooner than other more advanced capitalist countries the 
inevitable clash between capitalists (albeit a small, relatively weak class in Russia) and 
the working class (nascent and combative):  
“There was an extraordinarily backward economic situation that made a bourgeois 
revolution inevitable; on the other hand, as extraordinary a degree of political maturity 
and combativeness in the proletariat made its hegemonic function possible in the course 
of the revolution. Lenin’s position on the revolution in Russia, and consequently on the 
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organizationally, a working class aware of its objective isolation, and to turn this isolation in the 
vanguard.” 
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revolutionary organization of social democracy, is characterized by a constant 
confrontation between these two terms.”251 
 
Another reason for the intensity of the Russian class struggle was the Tsar’s industrial 
policy of creating massive production in the main urban centers of European Russia. This 
sharpened and accelerated the tendencies of capitalist crisis, the tendency of constant 
capital (industrialization) to grow faster than variable capital (labor costs), undermining 
wages and proletarizing vast swaths of population.
252
 These tendencies towards crisis 
took a specific social formation such as the Russian as a special emergence of 
spontaneous revolts.  
According to Negri, Lenin’s refusal to submit to spontaneity is in fact an 
affirmation that spontaneity is at its highest and needs organization. And key to that was 
the Leninist idea of party organization as the essence of strategy and the internal 
unification of the proletariat. This organizational view, again according to Negri, was 
specific to Lenin and the Russian situation. 
“Both historically and logically, in Lenin the need for an organization of this kind 
emerges from the analysis of the determinate social formation and of the determinate 
working-class movement in the particular phase to which he directs his practical 
reflections. Here theory does not wish to be a negation of the spontaneity of economic 
struggle. On the contrary, it is its internal critique and comes from within the formidable 
and spontaneous mass movement that determined itself.”253 
 
Negri sees Lenin at this point as a spontaneist in questions of strategy while applying 
high centralization as a tactical need. For Negri, Lenin’s political analyses and 
intervention had three phases. The first phase around the 1890s witnesses the 
spontaneous rise of mass movements in Russia. In the second phase after the revolutions 
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of 1905, Lenin advocates a rigid external centralization to channel this energy. In the 
third phase after 1914, the pre-revolutionary phase, Lenin returns to the earlier 
spontaneity with a transfigured proletariat, which suffered a long process of painful 
Bildung. “From spontaneity to spontaneity”, writes Negri, “if this is Lenin, it is perfectly 
understandable that during the Second International, any possibility of expressing his 
thought was practically closed off to this Asian Marxist barbarian.” The initial proletarian 
energy is reconstituted from above, from a consciousness brought from without,
254
 which 
then, appropriated and in full maturity, the masses overthrow the capitalist state. The 
second phase is the stage of mediation, and the revolutionary takeover in the third stage is 
full unmediated power.
255
 
 Throughout his reading of Lenin, Negri repeatedly states that this evolution 
between masses and organization, and party and class composition is not dialectical. In 
rehabilitating Lenin from a supposed authoritarianism, the result however is a new 
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reading of ‘democratic’ Leninism, dismissed as an outdated model due to current 
objective conditions.  
 For Negri, Lenin really regarded the relation between masses and organization as 
expressive, immediate. It is here when Spinoza’s philosophy is suitable, seeing the 
Communist question of organization as a limitless expansion, “the infinite as 
organization”, as a progressive acquisition of power. Opposition play no role in the 
political constitution of the working class. Negri’s neo-Leninist partisanship is 
spontaneist, anti-dialectical, and expressive. 
 Negri like Althusser regards Lenin’s intense engagement with Hegel after the 
disintegration of the second International, as an “interregnum of the dialectic”, that ends 
up on “a positive note’ beyond the dialectics offered by Hegel.256 For Negri, Hegel 
provides Lenin a way to think how to reverse the conditions or sequences that separate 
pre-revolutionary from post-revolutionary politics. The pre-revolutionary sequence is 
class composition, political organization, and military insurrection. For the purposes of 
the revolution and the construction of the revolutionary State, the sequence is reversed 
dialectically into revolutionary insurrection, party organization of the revolutionary State, 
and composition of the new revolutionary subject. While Hegel is useful for pre-
revolutionary politics, Spinoza is the philosopher of revolution, of preparing for a new 
society and the end of negativity. When one compares the April Theses next to What is to 
Be Done, the reversal is visible, especially when Lenin declares in 1917,  
“The specific feature of the present situation in Russia is that the country is passing from 
the first stage of the revolution—which, owing to the insufficient class-consciousness and 
organization of the proletariat, placed power in the hands of the bourgeoisie—to its 
second stage, which must place power in the hands of the proletariat and the poorest 
sections of the peasants.”257  
 
Negri sees approvingly that this second sequence amounts to the “practical annihilation 
of the democratic phase.” Yet Lenin’s Theses meant a reinforcement of the democratic 
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process in the form of Soviets rather than the Duma, not the indiscriminate annihilation 
of democracy.
258
 For Negri, “Lenin succeeded in making the dialectics into a real-history 
reading instrument, a scientific tool with the same precision of a microscope or a rifle.” 
But in order to do so, Hegelian dialectics has to be overcome by another ‘higher’ 
dialectics. Lenin’s materialist dialectic allows him to grasp the self-constitution of the 
masses, of productive praxis, in which dialectics “is no longer circular”, but an endless 
expansion of power.  
The first set of problems of Leninist dialectics had to do with the unitary relation 
of ideas with reality, the second is that dialectics reduce reality to a set of [over-
determined] connections by history and context, and the third problem is how to redefine 
dialectics as a tool of productive movement (of the New), not just connective movement 
(between already existing ideas).  Negri turns Lenin’s Hegelianism into a Spinozism in 
his emphasis on production. Lenin saw dialectics as logic of essence and connections [of 
the different moments] in the overall and unifying process of the Concept. Negri calls this 
definition as one of ‘universal relationism’, yet this Hegelian version of dialectics does 
not provide any sense of novelty, nor a “new definition of matter”; it does not account for 
leaps, but rather everything existing is reconstituted in a higher order of concepts. 
Hegelianism thus is relational and comprehensive but it is not productive. Hence, for 
Negri, Lenin needed to transform “the series essence-connection-movement needed into 
essence-movement-production because only the latter could represent dialectics at a 
higher level and directly turn it into a tool not only of materialism but also of the 
proletariat.”  
To complete the reversal from a party that organizes the existing forces of the 
proletariat as a transcendent organization to a party that is identical to the proletariat in 
the creation of a new State, Lenin turned to Hegel for this reversal, but to Negri, through 
a materialist (Spinozian) ontology, Lenin now saw the party as the agent of the New. 
Connective dialectics (Hegel) provided the tactics to organize the proletariat in relation to 
the whole, but non-dialectical productive praxis delivers the strategy of revolution, of a 
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new constitutive power.  Yet Lenin does not go far enough in conceiving dialectics as 
production because he is stuck, so to speak, in the connectivity of concepts, on how the 
world of ideas and the world of facts are united in the concept. But Lenin’s unification of 
ideas and facts rather than being conceived as a Hegelian idealist history, a history 
determined by the primacy of the Idea, has for Negri the quality of a “Spinozian 
compactness”, a dual compactness where each world (of mind and facts, of philosophy 
and politics) retains its parallel or correspondent independence and autonomy, united in 
the overall process of human activity.
259
 
 The key word for Negri’s criticism on Hegel’s dialectics via Lenin is production. 
Hegel’s dialectics is of connection and mediation, in short, a bourgeois dialectics of 
appropriation. Spinoza’s model is of production and immediacy, a dual model that 
mirrors both the explosive power of nascent capitalism as a formidable human energy 
harnessing the Earth, and a philosophy of future liberation. Spinoza’s philosophy is a 
product of a Dutch society with the Low Countries’ “disproportion between the 
constructive and appropriative dimensions.” “Here,” Negri writes, “the capitalist order of 
profit and the savage adventures of accumulation on the seas, the constructive fantasy 
that commercial dealings produce and the amazement that leads to philosophy –all this is 
woven together.”260 It seems here that enthusiasm for Empire equal philosophical 
amazement. 
Deleuze’s term philosophical expressionism is the term for this productive 
immediacy. Expression is the immediate relation between cause and effect, concept and 
its determinations, or in Spinoza’s language, God as the immanent cause of what is. 
Expressionism is the univocal view that “on the one hand, is an explication, an unfolding 
of what expresses itself, the One manifesting itself in the Many. Its multiple expression, 
on the other hand, involves Unity. The One remains involved in what expresses it, 
imprinted in what unfolds it, immanent in whatever manifests it.”261  
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Negri translates Spinoza’s productive immediacy into the Marxist language of 
“productive forces” of human creativity, labor-power in Capital’s terms. What capitalism 
does is to mediate these productive, liberating forces through relations of production; 
capitalism mystifies and transforms forces of production with relations of production. But 
here we stand at a most trans-historical concept of production and labor, proper to 
traditional Marxism, now understood as a metaphysics of force. “[Spinoza’s] 
metaphysics”, writes Negri, “is the clear and explicit declaration of the irreducibility of 
the development of productive forces to any ordering.”262 By organizing and mediating 
productive forces under the law of value, capitalism restricts their creativity. Mediation is 
negative and the power (potestas) of the negative attempts against life and the power 
(potential) of creation. In other words, mediation is capitalist appropriation reflected in 
Hegelian philosophy. 
If Spinoza provides a comprehensive ontology, an ontology that seeks power as 
unlimited affirmation, Negri’s commitment to subsume economics to politics is an 
obstacle, I think, to stay faithful to Spinoza and Lenin, especially since Lenin saw 
economism as an extremely narrow view of organization, confined to factory demands 
and economic negotiation, leaving out of view general issues such as political repression, 
daily exploitation, war, etc. The other more theoretical problem about economism is that 
given advanced capitalism and the development of the proletariat, eventually the 
multitude appropriates the production of reproduction of social life without passing 
through politics, that somehow the forces of production will eventually overtake the 
fetters imposed by the relations of production. In the name of ontological expansion, the 
political result is sectarism. Blending political and economic struggles in order to not 
limiting and negating each (or according to Lenin, ‘to give the economic struggle a 
political character’), the political is reduced to narrow economic demands, on the one 
hand, and on the other, to an ultra-leftist model of guerrilla politics and insurgencies, 
outside institutions and lacking legitimacy among all classes.
263
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economism and ‘terrorism’ complementing each other, 
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“The Economists and the terrorists merely bow to different poles of spontaneity; the 
Economists bow to the spontaneity of “the labor movement pure and simple”, while the 
terrorists bow to the spontaneity of the passionate indignation of intellectuals, who lack 
the ability or opportunity to connect the revolutionary struggle and the working-class 
movement into an integral whole.”264 
 
 Workerism tends to have a very narrow idea of working class concerns. It tends 
to think mainly of factory-based struggles over wages and working conditions, and tends 
to devalue the very important political struggle for state power, control over the police, 
army, courts, parliament and administration. Negri dismisses the Statem defining it as a 
counterrevolutionary project of the Enlightenment. The State was invented to contain the 
multitude in this philosophical history a la Hobbes. As Hardt and Negri state in Empire, 
“the liberation of modern humanity could only be a function of its domination, the 
immanent goal of the multitude is transformed into the necessary and transcendent power 
of the State.”265 A State had to be invented, especially in Hegel, who for Negri disciplines 
an amoral plurality of desire to an ethical unity.  
In the absence of a theory of political articulation, how then partisanship is 
possible in this pantheistic expansive view? Negri speaks of the “Infinite as 
organization”, but where is the politics? Seems to me that Negri’s dismissal of Lenin 
does not presuppose an advance from Leninism, but a regression towards economism and 
even the ‘terrorism’ of his earlier years. Giving absolute importance to production and 
not relation, praising spontaneity, lacking political articulation, advancing pure direct 
action, self-organization of workers without a party, and fixating with extra-
parliamentary activity are all themes of the old Economists. The result is a fascination 
with extreme particularity (or singularity), the worker’s empirical existence as a 
privileged agent of universal turmoil, bypassing politics and the middle term of political 
articulation and parties. Singularity and universality fuse without mediation. This view of 
politics can be called also univocism, politics is predicated the same in the small as in the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
intellectuals as its class composition, “bowing to [their] passionate, who lack the ability or 
opportunity to connect the revolutionary struggle and the working-class movement to an integral 
whole.” Lenin adds, “It is difficult indeed for those who have lost their belief, that this is possible, to 
find some outlet for their indignation and revolutionary energy other than terror.” What is to Be 
Done? 
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world scale, that is, politics can only have one meaning and the connection between 
meaning and its effects are the same. Each struggle is tantamount to any struggle. “The 
Spinozian mechanism”, writes Negri, “denies any possibility of a conception of the world 
that is not represented as a singular flat, and superficial emergence of being. God is the 
thing. God is multiplicity. The one and the multiple are equivalent and indistinguishable 
forces… Each is absolute in itself.”266  
For political expressionism the separation between masses and parties is 
superfluous. The Party expresses the masses immediately; the Party stands as an attribute 
of the Masses, it follows the masses’ own energy. This ontological immediacy provides 
the model for spontaneism in that a prefigured identity, the Masses, is reproduced in the 
name of organization, the Party, without difference. “This is the method of spontaneism, 
of the affirmation of the unique and substantial reality by means of its theoretical 
doubling.”267  
The (Non) Party As Axiom 
The antithesis of Negri’s expressionism is Badiou’s politics of the Event. Badiou 
comprehends politics equivocally. Each situation is completely particular, and arranged 
of infinite elements that cannot be transferred to another circumstances. Each event 
constitutes a discreet infinite set. Badiou’s notion of universality is not quantitative, but 
qualitative, to announce the Truth of a particular “sequence”. Truth is not in the 
generality intersecting the political world, but it is condensed in a particular struggle. 
Another difference with Negri’s economism is Badiou’s defense of pure politics. 
Badiou’s partisanship is transcendent in the recognition and fidelity to a revolutionary 
Event), antinomian in that pure politics, the Event is an absolute negation of economics 
and Being, and individuated because the political subject is constituted by an outside, and 
politicist, pure politics is not concerned with mere animal survival, escaping pain and 
want, as in economics, but with following an ethical conviction to the end. The result of 
Badiou’s conception is a highly voluntarist and authoritarian conception of party, a 
Platonist (and also Kantian) form of politics.  
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 Badiou’s approach comprehends dialectics as a lack of identity of history and 
politics; it allows for a subjectivism and voluntarism proper to the Maoist tradition.
268
 
Badiou formulates this version of dialectics in his many engagements with Hegel. More 
so than other political philosophers of the present, Badiou’s engagement with Hegel is 
intense. For Badiou, Hegel is the philosopher of uniting Two into One privileging the 
moment of identity. Following a distinction made by the Chinese Cultural Revolution, 
Badiou thinks that this fusion of Two into One, the total unity of Spirit and the Party is 
reactionary. Badiou proposes the revolutionary formula arguing the opposite, that One 
divides into Two, defining politics as difference and struggle,  
“Truth is what has no identity other than from a difference; hence the being of all things 
is the process of its division into two. For as much as we apprehend the qualitative 
identity of a force, it remains with respect to: 1. the place that it exceeds, 2. the structural 
system (system of distribution) that it destroys. Thus the actual revolutionary identity of 
the French proletariat is given in the excess of its place in union workerism 
[l’ouvrierisme syndicalisant] which has confined it in a long tradition and which 
constitutes itself as a political class driving for the destruction of the existing social 
system (French imperialism). However embryonic it might be, this identity (in terms of 
political practice and Maoist organization) always exists as a differential destroyer of 
another. This is what it means for an identity to change itself in difference.”269 
 
Hegelian negation is an “improper name” for the dialectical operation of scission, of 
breaking into two. Negation is an idealistic category, maintaining an ideal unity or 
continuity to what in reality occurs as a process of dissolution and disorganization.  
Badiou’s critique of Hegel’s identity in favor of absolute difference occurs in two 
levels, through the ontological critique of being (mathematics), and the 
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phenomenological critique of ‘appearing’, (logics). Both critiques are addressed 
respectively in Being and Event and Logic of the Worlds. The politico-philosophical 
result is an equivocality of the situation. Unlike Hegel for whom logic is ontology and 
phenomenology, consciousness throughout history, for Badiou, however, consciousness 
(or subject-formation) is constituted in rupturing with history.  
 Badiou’s ontological critique of Hegel revolves around the concept of (bad and 
good) infinity to attack the Hegelian idea of the One-Whole. He does so from the vantage 
point of the German mathematician Georg Cantor, the creator of transfinite set theory, 
born 15 years after Hegel’s death. For Cantor, there were multiple infinities -ones larger 
others smaller- and not just one uncompleted and undefined infinity. Infinity is not 
potential, but actual, it must be decided among different set of numerical successions; 
thus, there is an infinity proper to cardinal numbers, other infinity proper to imaginary 
numbers, irrational numbers, etc. Each relative infinity is represented by the Hebrew 
aleph א 
Without going into the intricacies of Cantor’s theory, Badiou addresses Hegel’s 
conception of infinity as an intuitionist concept, like most of philosophers’ notion of 
infinity. For Badiou, infinity in Hegel as well as in Kant, is undefined like Hegel’s 
concept of absolute idea where everything is reconciled and gathered as process. But in 
Hegel, infinity is divided between good (historical, bounded by each situation) and bad 
infinity (the linear succession towards a never-ending goal). Bad infinity for Hegel is 
mathematics. There is an important element in Hegel’s qualification of the mathematical 
infinity as bad. In pre-Cantorian times, infinity was indeed ‘bad’ in the sense that it was 
either forbidden to think of, in line with Aristotle to Descartes and Kant, or understood in 
mystical terms as emanation of God. What Cantor does, according to Badiou, is to make 
infinity rational by an active intervention of the human intellect in defining infinite and 
transfinite sets. Although Hegel had a low regard for mathematical infinity, he 
historicizes infinity in seeing it bounded to each figure of consciousness, that is, there is 
an absolute in each historical epoch. Badiou is not interested in this temporalization of 
infinity, which is phenomenological as appearing. He is interested in comprehending the 
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infinity from the standpoint of eternity, mathematics and number. In this regard, Badiou’s 
Platonism is revealed.
270
 
The central problem for Hegel, according to Badiou, is to put quality above 
quantity. Thus, Hegel sees quantity as a lower concept as quality and degrades 
mathematics, solely concerned with quantity and number to the ‘lower’ determinations of 
concept, i.e. being instead of essence. Quantitative infinity cannot grasp the totality 
within the Hegelian system; it does not comprehend the opposites but simply is in-
different to existence in the operation of counting, “what founds quantity, what discerns 
it, is literally the indifference of difference, the anonymous One.” Qualitative infinity, on 
the other hand, recognizes difference in that in putting a limit, already has a 
consciousness of its finitude and goes beyond the boundary, though in negative terms, as 
something that is not itself. This is the well-known Hegelian difference between limit and 
boundary. In the limit, the negative is exterior, a limit not to be surpassed, the Kantian X. 
In the boundary, the negative becomes interior, the own production of consciousness that 
surpasses the boundary by thinking of the two sides of it. For Badiou, despite Hegel’s 
dialectics of the opposites, his aim is truly to be a philosopher of the One, of absolute 
identity: “The profound root of this movement”, writes Badiou, “is that the One if it 
marks being in itself, is surpassed by the being it marks… The One, inasmuch as it is, is 
the surpassing of its non-being. The being-of-the-one consists in having the frontier to be 
passed beyond. ” Badiou’s solution is to retain the divisive moment of the dialectic 
without recurring to a One through the scission, that is to retain the logic of opposites, 
without recognizing a common situation or ground. One dividing into Two means 
absolute scission, two universes and logics.
271
 Thus, Badiou returns to the quantitative, 
                                                          
270
 See Alain Badiou, 2006, Theoretical Writings, London: Continuum, p.24: “What is the crucial 
presupposition for the gesture whereby Hegel and his successors manage to effect this long-lasting 
disjunction between mathematics on the one hand and the philosophical discourse on the other? 
In my opinion, this presupposition is that of historicism, which is to say, the temporalization of the 
concept… Thus the ideal and atemporal character of mathematical thinking figured as the central 
argument in this deposition. Romantic speculation opposes time and life as temporal ecstasis to the 
abstract and empty eternity of mathematics. If time is ‘the existence of the concept’, then 
mathematics is unworthy of that concept.” 
271
 Alain Badiou, 2007, The Century, London: Polity: “The century is summoned as the century of the 
production, through war, of a definitive unity. Antagonism is to be overcome by the victory of one 
camp over the other. Thus one can also say that, in this sense, the century of the Two is animated 
by the radical desire of the One. What names the articulation of antagonism with the violence of 
the One is victory, as attestation of the real. Let us note that we are not dealing with a dialectical 
139 
 
numerical conception of a [Cantorian] infinity in order to establish, by axiom, two 
infinities, one ideological that absorbs everything to one, and the other revolutionary that 
substracts from the one an irreducible opposition. The difference is that in one [the 
generative ontology where everything gathers in one] infinity is dominated by law, and 
the other operates by suspension of the law through axiomatic decision.
272
 
How is this ontological law expressed in phenomenology, in the logic of 
appearing first, and in politics, the logic of the event, later? Badiou shares with Hegel the 
identity of thought and being, although he does not conceive it speculatively, but like the 
philosophers of his generation, Badiou shares the traditional view of Hegel as a 
philosopher of absolute identity. However, this idea of absolute identity is a ‘local 
ocurrence’ for Badiou in a world of infinite situations, of the non-Whole. Hegel’s unity of 
reason is valid as a local logic of absolute identity in a world composed of different 
situations. Thus, contrary and parallel to Hegel’s dialectical triplicity of immediacy 
(being), mediacy (essence), and sublation (concept), Badiou’s schema run as follows: 
infinite multiplicities (transfinities) of Being, which unbinds Being from the whole into 
multiple ‘wholes’; different worlds of appearing (infinite situations with their own logical 
sequence), and truth-procedures (the world of ‘subjective eternity’). The Event is a 
“vanishing cause, which is the exact opposite of the Whole, an abolished flash.”273 
Badiou understands very well however the idea of the speculative in Hegel. For 
Hegel, there can be neither an absolute identity nor an absolute difference between two 
things. Badiou correctly points out that “For [Hegel], opposition is in effect nothing less 
than the unity of identity and diversity”. “For example,” Badiou continues, “things only 
display their difference to the extent that each is One by differentiating itself from the 
other, and therefore, from this angle, is the same as the other.” His grasp of the Hegelian 
speculative only applies in a situation as a ‘singular universality’, that the whole can only 
be actualized locally, but Badiou rejects at the same time Hegel’s totality by re-
                                                                                                                                                                             
scheme. Nothing allows one to foresee a synthesis, an internal overcoming of contradiction. On the 
contrary, everything points to the suppression of one of the terms. The century is a figure of the 
non-dialectical juxtaposition of the Two and the One. The question here is to know what is the 
century's assessment of dialectical thought. In the victorious result, is the motor antagonism itself 
or the desire of the One?” 
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introducing a radical dualism into his philosophy. Badiou shares with other post-modern 
philosophers of his generation (despite his attack against almost all post-modern ideas) 
the idea of an absolute difference, this time conceived not through an univocal “ultra-
One” or Being, as he detects from Heidegger to Deleuze, but equivocally (there is no 
One, things and processes are irreducibly local building their own truths). “On this 
point”, Badiou writes, “Hegel’s doctrine is thus diametrically opposed to ours, which 
instead articulates the absolute intra-worldly difference between two beings into the nil 
measure of their identity”. As he concludes against Hegel, “There can be Twos without 
Ones.”274 
Badiou also stands at the other extreme of Spinozian economism in a neo-Kantian 
world of political moralism through a positive adaptation of the transcendental to unveil a 
constitution common to all different worlds according to the axioms of set theory, as well 
as to provide space for a theory of the subject subtracted from phenomena, from the 
appearing. Yet, in materialist style, Badiou conceives the transcendental rooted in the 
object. It includes the subject insofar as the subject recognizes the objective structure in a 
situation of Event. Unlike Kant, for Badiou, the thing-in-itself is knowable, it is 
mathematics; however, this does not include the world of phenomena, only its 
transcendental structure. The noumena is the number, yet phenomena entails another way 
of organization, which is not mathematical, but transcendental, in order to do justice to 
the object,  
 
“Every singular being is only manifested in its being locally: the appearing of being of 
beings is being-there. It is this necessity of the ‘there’ which, for a being thought in its 
multiple being entails a transcendental constitution (without subject)… something that 
the mathematical (ontological) theory of the pure multiple, despite conveying the whole 
being of the being, does not allow.”275 
 
A good example Badiou’s neo-Kantian antinomy are his “pure politics”, the far-reaching 
disjunction between the economic world of needs (the figure of “the Animal”) and the 
ethical world of will (the figure of “the Man”, the Immortal). Any consideration of 
economics and the material turns the subject away from his ‘true’ desire; the Subject 
“gives in”, becomes depoliticized. As Badiou would state this idea in Ethics, “ethics 
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[become] a servant of necessity”, in which the main figure is death and finitude as mere 
survival in the system of goods and needs. Opposite to this economic ethics, Badiou 
opposes an ethics of ‘pure politics’, to which instead of animals as biological organisms, 
man becomes Man, an Immortal in the service of an ethic of Truths. Thus, a proper ethics 
solves the typical problems of partisanship, whether such course of action is taken or not, 
with the typical doubts associated with material resources, organization and political 
work. 
Ethics “dissipates the paradoxes of partisanship”, Badiou states in Theory of the 
Subject. Here, Badiou argues that ethics is superior to morality since ethics is 
incalculable, but morality belongs to the realm of reflection and calculation. Ethics is 
blindly decisionistic always demanded to act according to the situation and the 
knowledge available at the time; morality calculates according to obedience of the law or 
not. Morality turns the process of subjectivation “into a trace”; it erases the Subject. 
Because it is calculable, morality also is linked to the ‘service of goods’. The ethics of 
Marxism is one of confidence and faith which solve all doubt. The partisan becomes a 
believer: 
 
“If the political subject is what the party as body is able to bear in terms of the 
undecidable, and if betrayal is the proper opposite of ethics, can we not equate ethics and 
partisanship? The recognizable figure of the one who gives in would then be the 
renegade… In this logic, in which the State latently defines the adequate form of that 
which no longer exists as party-subject except as its semblance, it is absolutely necessary 
that the political enemy, or even just the universal suspect, be violently kept in the 
unnameable and null place of the traitor and the spy.”276 
 
The adversary, the raison d’etre of the partisan, is nullified, an agent of the State (the 
‘real’ enemy). Compare this assertion with Lenin that “Nothing facilitates an 
understanding of the political essence of developments as greatly as their evaluation by 
one’s adversaries.” The partisan is the one who is committed to this conception of politics 
as ethics and not so much to organization; the partisan embodies obedience and 
discipline, but also confidence and perseverance, in a pure subjective sense. 
 
“In order truly to arrive at ethics, we must at least not give up on politics as a subjective 
process, on communist politics. This is impossible if one chooses the wrong party, in all 
the senses of the expression… The partisan mindset can certainly involve abnegation and 
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obedience or, as Stalin says, 'conscious submission' and 'unity of will'. Ethical courage 
amounts to the force to traverse anxiety, since this means nothing else but the capacity to 
consider oneself null. It is clear that here it is the very existence of the party itself that is 
at issue, since by giving in, one would gain only its statist desubjectivization, its 
counterrevolutionary termination. The ethics of Marxism consists in resolving the 
paradoxes of partisanship on the solid terrain of the theory of the subject.”277 
 
Badiou’s process of subjectivation is of negation and subtraction. While Negri’s 
politics of the One expands endlessly in affirmation and power as potency; Badiou’s 
organizational model is radically dualistic in that the Two subtracts from the One, from 
the idea of unity and consensus, into irreconcilable antagonisms, where one side must 
win. There is no third, no middle. The Two represents two absolute opposite Truths, or 
truth-operations (although I don’t think Badiou would call the operation of the opposite 
camp a truth-operation.) For Badiou, Mao goes further than Lenin in seeing dialectics as 
conducive to more difference. The unity of opposites becomes concrete by “rightly 
rebelling against the reactionaries” within the Party. “Mao Zedong's sentence”, writes 
Badiou, “lends its precision to Lenin's enthusiasm. It is the general historical content of 
Hegel's dialectical statement. It is not just any practice that internally anchors theory; it is 
the rebellion against the reactionaries. Theory, in turn, does not externally legislate on 
practice, on rebellion: it incorporates itself in the rebellion by the mediating release of its 
reason.”278 It is the contradiction made internal or essential to the truth itself. “Truth only 
exists in a process of scission.” The Party is the instrument of class struggle almost in a 
metaphysical sense. In the unity of identity and difference, the unity is relative and the 
struggle is absolute; the identity is temporary and non-identity the essential engine of 
politics. Yet against Marx and Lenin’s commitment to history, the One dividing into Two 
lacks history; it is for Badiou the Communist invariant. For Marx and Lenin, history 
provides the referent and lessons for the class struggle and the party; for Badiou, history 
and politics are completely cut off and the Party is the embodiment of this new type of 
‘historical’ consciousness.  
From a “new Party” unedited in history to a politics without a party is a short step. 
For the late Badiou, the Party and all parties independently of class content are figures of 
bad “non-singular” universality; they participate not in the ‘pure presentation’ of a local 
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situation but in the re-presentation of the “State of the situation”; they have becomes 
parties of the State. There is no distinction here between different possible uses of 
parliamentarism, between, for example, Lenin’s “revolutionary parliamentarism” and 
“parliamentary cretinism”. Who can blame Badiou? All of NATO’s parliaments behave 
in such way.  
Badiou’s thoughts on the Party-form depicts an itinerary from an early, quasi-
mystical exaltation of the Party as the evental embodiment of the Masses – no doubt an 
enthusiastic position from the French 68 and in reaction to French Stalinism, to the late 
“politics without a Party” in response to the defeat of the Left in Western Europe and 
with the rise and consolidation of the neoliberal reaction. Even though, this may seem as 
a break, Badiou’s ethical conception of politics is coherent with both stages. For the early 
Badiou, the Party is conceived as a metaphysical event, a purifier of the Masses as they 
become Subject. For the late Badiou, given that the Marxist project is weak or almost 
dead, there is no point in party-building, for such project takes part of the State and in 
“capitaloparliamentarism (curiously Badiou’s most vitriolic attacks are against the State 
and not capitalism).” In both stages runs a deep anti-institutionalism. In one, the Party is 
the channel for a permanent revolution, for “true” politics. In the other, this same ‘true 
politics’ happens at a “distance from the State”. Saving ideological distances, Badiou, 
like Arendt have a very narrow exceptionalist conception of politics. True politics and the 
fetishism of the (non)Party has a miraculous flavor. Hence, Badiou’s ultra-leftism of his 
earlier years coincides with his non-party politics of his later years. His formalism makes 
possible the total contradictory attitudes towards the party-form. 
It seems to me that Badiou’s notion of Being as totalizing and inescapable, and an 
opposite quasi-transcendent or transcendent Event
279
 as a situation impossible to emerge 
from Being (in his words, the Event is void in respect to the state of the situation) has 
certain similarities with the understanding of capitalism of the value-form school of 
political economy. Deep into capitalist structures, labor and capital stand identical, so 
Communism and so-called “communization” can only be understood as the abolition of 
the value-form, the ‘shape’ of being in capitalism. In the preface of Being and Event, 
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Badiou advances his four fundamental thesis: 1. That Being is in-different, consisting of 
situations, 2. The situation does not deliver truths; a truth-event ruptures being and it is 
“incalculable”, 4. A subject (as opposed to concrete individuals) is she who’s faithful to 
truth, 5. Truth does not express the situation to which it intervenes (it is “generic”, not 
specific). Being is ubiquitous to the situation, and the Event is the exception to which 
Man is subject to. In setting up such stark antinomy between being and rupture, alienation 
and freedom, situation and revolution, one is not sure where the possibility of 
revolutionary human action is located, other than a passive subject declaring, like an 
Apostle, . Similarly, in the account of capitalism by Postone and others, we have an all-
embracing and pervasive dialectic of capital. No account is provided for the outside of 
capital, either as a theorization of use-values resisting to capital (yet use-values are 
already included in the dialectic of value) or class struggle across history, in penalty 
notwithstanding of subscribing a trans-historical conception of labor, which in Postone 
stands for the possibility of thinking labor outside capitalism. Especially in Postone’s 
account, capitalism is a product of labor. Exploitation relies not so much in the capitalist, 
who is as the worker a personification of capital, but in the abstract character of labor. In 
much of value-form theory, there is no account or possibility for revolution. Capital is the 
real subject, a (traditional) Hegelian Spirit that subsumes the whole thing into the 
absolute law of value. In this sense, value-form theory with its strict attachment to the 
“being” of capital and its lack of formulating the “event” of revolution transforms the 
Marxist critique of political economy into a Marxian theory of pure capital. But these are 
two different things. In the former, the critique of capital makes visible the class struggle 
between concrete individuals (the level of appearances to the value-form dialectic of 
capital) in which the value-form is an inverted or perverted form of human relations; in 
the latter, social action is embedded and over-determined by the structures of capital. 
Human praxis becomes invisible; the real actors are the categories. But as Marx states, 
“Theory is capable of gripping the masses as soon as it demonstrates ad hominem, and it 
demonstrates ad hominem as soon as it becomes radical. To be radical is to grasp the root 
of the matter. But for man the root is man himself.”280 
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So what is speculative about Badiou’s critique of speculative leftism? Let’s 
restate the speculative proposition, not only as Substance but also as Subject, that which 
is determined (predicate) becomes determining (the subject) and vice versa. The masses, 
objects of politics, become subjects in revolutions. The subjects, the living workers, 
become objects under the law of value. In a note from the Kreuznach Notebooks, Marx 
makes the following speculative statement, “In general we can note that the conversion of 
the subject into the predicate, and of the predicate into the subject, the exchange of that 
which determines for that which is determined, is always the most immediate revolution. 
Not only on the revolutionary side… The reactionaries as well”. Marx accuses Hegel of 
political teleology by taking the State as the subject instead of the predicate of society, 
that is, Marx reads Hegel’s speculative proposition as an ordinary proposition; “By 
means of [Hegel’s political teleology] all forms of unreason become forms of reason. But 
essentially here in religion reason is made the determining factor, while in the state the 
idea of the state is made the determining factor. This metaphysics is the metaphysical 
expression of reaction, of the old world as the truth of the new world outlook.”281 Yet, the 
interesting question is how Marx connects here speculative identity with Restoration and 
Revolution. By including both possibilities (the revolutionary and the reactionary) Marx 
is closer to Hegel’s speculative meaning that reality can also be irrational as well as 
rational, progressive as well as reactionary, despite his accusation that in Hegel reason 
becomes solely unreason. 
Miguel Abensour thinks that this text more than establishing the sociological 
nature of the reaction and revolution is primarily political, “It is therefore at the heart of 
an essentially political perspective, in relation to the conceptual antithesis 
revolution/reaction, that Marx thinks and determines the possible permutations of the 
subject and the predicate… At the same time that the permutation of the subject and the 
predicate aims at designating the determining principle of politics, this permutation is 
also intended, beyond that goal and at a more fundamental level, as a response to the 
question of origins.”282 This question of origins for Abensour address the essential anti-
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State character of Marx’s political theory, the origin of politics is in society, not in the 
State. The “transformative method”, for Abensour, of Marx’s use of the speculative 
proposition reveals both the primacy of democracy as the figure of political 
emancipation, and also as the method “established in the realm of theory by the 
democratic principle.” Marx’s use of the speculative proposition, his transformative 
method aims both at democracy and it is democratic. It aims at democracy since the 
speculative proposition pushes beyond the identity of the State into its non-identity, “[the 
method] indicates instead that the State should be returned to the movement that 
overwhelms it and pushes it beyond itself, that is, to the over-signification of the State 
and its real subject, the active life of the demos.” On the other, the [speculative] method 
is democratic because by going through the origin; it discovers that the effect or predicate 
of social relations in the State (family, civil society) is really the subject/cause of the 
State. For Abensour, “Marx's goal is to lead the political (in this case, the constitutional), 
cultural, or material realms of objectified life back to a source of originary spontaneity 
that would, as it were, be the nodal-point of the inversion, the base on which it would 
henceforth be legitimate to carry out this inversion, since here, finally, we would be 
grasping the foundation whereby modern history would be illuminated in its truth.” 
Whatever right or wrong Marx gets Hegel’s philosophy of Right (since the State in Hegel 
is an effect of society as well as its organizing principle)
283
, the important point of 
Abensour’s reading of Marx’s use of Hegel’s speculative proposition is first, the 
connection to both revolutionary and reactionary politics (the question of politics and 
partisanship), second, the question of democracy, and third, the question of society, “the 
plural, massive, polymorphous life of the demos”. 
All of these democratic elements are absent in Badiou’s critique of speculative 
leftism. Unlike Marx and Hegel, Badiou unfavorably regards the speculative from a 
Kantian position, which claims that the speculative mind claims no past experience, no 
history; in the Kantian sense, the speculative is that mirage of reason that can know 
outside any given experience. For Badiou, speculative leftism is 
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“Any thought of being which bases itself upon the theme of an absolute commencement. 
Speculative leftism imagines that intervention authorizes itself on the basis of itself alone; 
that it breaks with the situation without any other support than its own negative will… 
This thought is unaware that the event itself only exists insofar as it is submitted, by an 
intervention whose possibility requires recurrence-and thus non-commencement-to the 
ruled structure of the situation; as such, any novelty is relative, being legible solely after 
the fact as the hazard of an order… Being does not commence.”284 
 
Badiou’s notion of speculation would be more Fichtean than Hegelian. The 
subject in its infinite subjectivity conquers the world anew, through mere will. But 
Badiou’s critique is not so much directed towards the absolute subjectivism of such 
position, but towards salvaging the ontological uniqueness of Revolution, of the Event, 
outside the Subject. That is, Badiou insists that the Revolution creates a world out of 
nothing (the Event), but this possibility exceeds the subject. The subject is to attest 
fidelity to that Event, not to posit itself as an absolute beginning.
285
 Badiou believes in 
absolute commencement, but this commencement is not Being but Event. The subject’s 
“negative will” immersed in the world of Being cannot be the origin of the New. A 
disciple of Badiou such as Bruno Bosteels even recognizes that “Badiou’s notion of the 
Communist hypothesis runs the risk of inactuality to the extent to which it would be only 
an Idea of Reason in the Kantian sense, never a concept of the Understanding for which 
there might be a corresponding intuition.” Moreover, Badiou thinks against Deleuze’s 
continuous, univocal being that himself “conceptualize absolute beginnings (which 
requires a theory of the void) and singularities of thought that are incomparable in their 
constitutive gestures (which requires a theory- Cantorian, to be precise –of the plurality 
of the types of infinity).”   The subject’s task is to connect to past “sequences” (the 
French, Russian, Chinese revolutions) according to the structure of Being to the 
unforeseen Event. In this sense, Badiou would also partake of this speculative leftism.
286
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The Party as Mediation 
As chapter 4 showed, labor and capital stand in identity in the capital relation. At 
the level of pure productive forces both capital and labor depend on each other. There is 
no other character for labor in capitalism: it has become abstract in order to become a 
source of value. At this reified level, Capital is the real self-developing subject, but it 
lacks an opposite: the resistance of labor and the primacy of use-values. This resistance is 
provided by the political constitution of the producers in opposition to the appropriators. 
If at the level of the ‘essence’, or productive forces capital and labor are in unity, at the 
level of ‘appearances’ or social relations of production labor and capital stand into 
opposed camps. There is no other aim for labor in capitalism than to abolish itself along 
the private accumulation of capital. Both levels are not identical, but they are not 
absolutely different, and both are necessary, one for critique and the other for politics.
287
 
The worker and the capitalist are in an antagonistic unity; the capitalist cannot be such 
without the worker, the wage-laborer cannot be such without the capitalist. As Hegel 
states, “Both are in essential relation to one another; and the one of the two is, only 
insofar as it excludes the other from it, and thus relates itself to.”288 The economic nature 
of productive forces is an entry point to the political aspect of social relations. Productive 
forces pressure social relations, pushing them further, making obsolete certain aspects 
like slave-labor before, or the law of value for socialism, in which the satisfaction of 
needs does not depend anymore on the social exploitation of labor.  
Partisanship as a unity of opposites, between classes or between parties, is the 
political phenomena that articulates the essential social relation of dependence and 
mutual exclusion between adversaries. That is why speculative consciousness is not 
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rooted in the future as a utopian Platonic knowledge after the Revolution and the ethical 
State has been achieved. It is rather rooted now in actuality, in our relations of 
exclusionary unity. A speculative conception of the party as a unity of opposites belongs 
to capitalism, not socialism. It is from capitalist relations that the party as a unity of 
opposites emerges. Party politicism only focuses on the second conception of absolute 
difference, dismissing the structural constitution of capital for a political program for 
which there is no existing social theory, no social-economic foundation. It is a kind of 
moralism based on a simple categorical imperative to rebel. Party economism, on the 
other hand, focuses in the first conception; capital and labor are essential to each other, 
and political demands must aim to stabilizing and making economic their arrangements 
more just.  
If politicism is too universal but abstract, economism is too narrow and local. To 
use the old language of historical communist parties, politicism is left deviationism and 
economism right deviationism. Both tendencies exclude, in the words of Boris Groys, the 
“total logic” of the Party, of an identity in difference. Being aware of the political and the 
economic, of politicism and economism, of idealism and materialism, power and norm, 
brings the whole political field into view. In this sense, speculative logic is completely 
different from liberal logic. If for the latter, politics means to choose A, excluding B; 
partisan logic is content with being paradoxical, contradictory and ‘self-defeating’ in the 
sense that it takes into account and gives account of both opposites. Good examples are 
the many watchwords of communist politics (that Mario Bunge dismissed as oxymoron): 
concrete universal, democratic centralism, revolutionary parliamentarism, etc. 
 In Lenin’s ‘revolutionary parliamentarism’: on the one hand, the ultra-left 
dismissed parliamentary work for being too political, too satisfied with existing 
institutions. Social revolutionaries at the time of Lenin wanted to take radical action in 
armed struggle as the only strategy (for Lenin, having an “infantile disorder”). On the 
other, Mensheviks and more conservative groups regarded illegal work and agitation as 
counterproductive as if real politics only happened within the Duma, (what Lenin called 
“parliamentary cretinism”). Both sides stood for false absolutes, that is, absolutes freed 
from contradiction. Why not do both? Why not contemplate both legal and illegal 
activity, parliamentary work and underground work? “Deviationists” stood for formal 
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logic (A and not B); Lenin stood for speculative or total logic (A and B). As Boris Groys 
says,  
 
“The advantage of formulating a political programme as a paradox here becomes clear: 
the totality of the political field is brought into view, and one is able to act not through 
exclusion but through inclusion… The logic of internal Party debates of this period can 
therefore be summarized as follows: it was not what was asserted that led to a deviation 
being designated as such; the basis for this was instead the refusal to accept that the 
opposite of what had been asserted was an equally true assertion.”289 
 
The same thing can be applied to mobilization in the workplace or the Army. Why not 
engage in union activity even if that means becoming exploited wage-labor? Why not 
engage in anti-war agitation while signing in the Army? I think the Hegelian notion of 
immanent critique is made concrete in Marx’s view that while the factory is a place of 
exploitation and alienation, it also provides the workers a level of organization and 
discipline necessary for revolutionary work. No other place can provide the same level of 
political education. 
Political formalism is precisely to follow a logic of political exclusion, to sever 
the mediation between parties and social forces in their historical development. One can 
this distinguish three approaches to the question of partisanship. These are univocalism, 
equivocalism, and analogy. Univocity represents a principle of unmediated identity; 
equivocism corresponds to unmediated difference, and analogy stands for an identity of 
the abstract and the concrete through mediation.
290
   
Badiou and Negri advance an unmediated equivocal or univocal conception of 
partisanship. In Badiou, each situation has its own conditions of predication, possessing 
nothing common with other struggle in equivocal fashion. The universality of such 
struggle is completely confined to its local conditions of production. In Negri, we witness 
an opposite form of predicating Communism: each struggle is universal. A middle way is 
provided by the theorization of the party-form in classical Marxists such as Lukács and 
Gramsci, and in existentialism by Merleau-Ponty. Here the idea is that every political 
struggle attends to its singular conditions of emergence and situation while connecting it 
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to the universal advance of democracy, “to push the identity of the State into is non-
identity”, into is withering away. The speculative conception of party posits the identity-
in-difference between the masses/social forces and the party (the organizational tensions 
between articulation and spontaneity), a concrete universality (or political analogy) in 
that partisans as a particular group actualize the universal essence of political man, and in 
that every local line of (race, class, gender) struggle is connected to the universal form of 
(abolishing) class power, and finally, the question of democratic centralism, party as a 
unity-in-difference, but that unfortunately in the history of communism, traditional 
emphasis has been placed in the moment of unity and centralization, not on the moment 
of democracy and difference. 
Another way of putting it is the relation of political form with social content in 
regards to party organization. Which of the elements should take primacy, or would these 
elements coexist in a dialectical tension provided by the situation and by the internal life 
of the party? These philosophical problems of organization were common place in the 
history of the Communist movement. The Second International of Kautsky, the 
evolutionists and social democrats were the real substitutionists; they gave absolute 
primacy to the political organization and regarded the masses as backward and in need of 
Party guidance, possessors of the natural laws of dialectical materialism. For these 
“Enlightened” western Marxists, with the most advanced working classes in the West, 
form exceeded content, and the masses were like objects of nature, passive and inertial; 
hence their naturalistic understanding of dialectics in that history will solve itself 
according to its own hidden laws. The masses and the party were separate and their union 
was only symbolic, as their parliamentary representative. In this Right “naturalistic 
opportunism”, the social content becomes unknowable (for its extremely mechanical 
version of dialectics) and hence for the sake of unity, the party-form becomes a 
hodgepodge of theories that poses serious problems to organization. “The whole history 
of the Second International”, writes Lukacs, “is full of such attempts to synthesize the 
most disparate, the most sharply divergent and incompatible views in the ‘unity’ of a 
decision.”  
Luxemburg represented the other extreme, in which the masses half-consciously 
are ahead of the party organization, where the content of social forces exceeds the party-
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form. Luxembourg recognized the need for political organization only too late. For this 
Left “utopian romanticism”, the party-form is insufficient to conduct the energies of the 
masses; their revolutionary consciousness will always exceed any practical attempt to 
organize them. The inadequacy of such approach is that it fails to deal with the actual 
world, with the sensuous and hard facts of politics, and prefers to direct the social 
energies in an intimistic manner as the inner life of the masses. In both accounts, there is 
an equal diremption between the life of the masses and the life of the Party. The spiritual 
elevation of the masses in the form of revolt is the fundamental principle of left 
utopianism. 
The position of the Leninist party-form was, I think, a compromise between these 
two tendencies, but not as a “golden mean” of moderation, but as a way of transcending 
the formal objectivism of the social-democrat Right and the spontaneous subjectivism of 
Left communism. But most of the conceptions of party in current Left literature from 
Negri to Badiou, from Zizek to Laclau, are in a superficial sense, “neo-Leninist” because 
these readings are based on the myth of Leninism as a top-down, substitutionist 
philosophy of organization. In this myth lies buried two serious prejudices: one, that for 
better or worse, Leninist partisanship is totalitarian (someone like Zizek or Badiou would 
openly advocate for totalitarian solution to the “decadent” liberal democracy) and two, 
that Stalinism is coterminous with Marx and Lenin’s theory of the party. According to the 
myth, in Hal Draper’s punctual critique, Leninist partisanship 
 
“1. sees the party as consisting mainly of “intellectuals,” on the basis of a theory 
according to which workers cannot themselves develop to socialist consciousness; rather, 
the socialist idea is always and inevitably imported into the movement by bourgeois 
intellectuals. 2. Posited that the party is simply a band of “professional revolutionaries” 
as distinct from a broad working-class party; 3. Repudiated any element of spontaneity or 
spontaneous movement, in favor of engineered revolution only; 4. Required that the party 
be organized not democratically but as a bureaucratic or semi-military hierarchy.” 
 
Externality, elitism, central planification, and military bureaucratization are the so called 
central notions of Leninist strategy, even for Lenin’s friends. This misconception, which 
is really liberal, allows both leftist critics and apologists of Lenin to quickly attack or 
defend partisanship in their polemic with the current state of liberal politics. We see the 
repetition of this myth when Negri speaks of “the externality of the process of 
organization and the need to impose the recomposition of the proletariat from above 
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amounted to a need and desire for a theoretical isolation of the vanguard from the process 
of masses in conditions of emergency”, when Zizek declares that “'external' intellectuals 
are needed because the working class cannot immediately perceive its own place within 
the social totality, which enables it to accomplish its 'mission'--this insight has to be 
mediated through an external element”, when Badiou defends the idea that “the Leninist 
party was at bottom a military model obsessed with one question: how to win the war?”, 
or when Laclau and Mouffe announce that in Leninism, “the military conception of 
politics dominates the whole range of strategic calculations. But since the real working 
class is, of course, far from fully identifying with its 'historical interests', the dissociation 
becomes permanent between the materiality of the class and the political instance 
representing its ' true identity '” Other academic personalities repeat this myth through the 
more mysterious language of the ontology of Being, and in the absence of any historical 
and contextual reading. I argue instead the democratic centralism as an organizational 
concept embodies the speculative nature of Hegel’s open-ended and flexible tool instead 
of the opportunistic use of democratic centralism by Stalinist party democracies. This 
concept is essential to encounter oligarchic centralism, of our political parties, which 
Robert Michels correctly saw more than a century ago.
291
 
The Dual Mediation of Party and Masses 
Organization cannot but stand in a tense and dialectical relation with spontaneity. 
Adorno calls this relation “negative dialectics”, I would call it speculative. On the one 
hand, organization is essential for mass politics, but it needs to keep up with the masses 
energy so the people achieve and realize concrete demands. In Lenin’s words, there is no 
revolutionary organization without revolutionary theory. On the other, organization is a 
danger for popular politics; it represents the perils of bureaucracy.
292
 Also, the political 
party as envisioned by Marx and Lenin is the party within the bourgeois context. Their 
partisanship is focused within the context of capitalism, just as the conception of labor is 
the capitalist labor that must be abolished with the proletariat. Hence, if the end is the 
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abolition of capitalism, then it means also the abolition of the proletariat and the Party 
that represents it and mobilizes it.  
Georg Lukács in his last essay of History and Class Consciousness entitled 
“Towards a Methodology of the Problem of Organization” provides a dialectical 
resolution between the tense relation between party and masses, and a critique of both 
bureaucratism/sectarism and spontaneism. For Lukács, the key mistake of spontaneism, 
formulated among others by Rosa Luxemburg, was the assumption that political class 
consciousness is the simple actualization of a latent social content, as if the workers were 
essentially revolutionary, without need for political education. True, the masses react 
psychologically to economic crisis, but their political mobilization in the forms of parties 
is not an automatic consequence of these crises. “However”, Lukács continues, “such 
outbreaks come to a halt no less spontaneously; they peter out when their immediate 
goals are achieved or seemed unattainable.”293 By underestimating the organizational 
dimension of politics, spontaneism places at the same level class consciousness and the 
empirical feelings of the masses, leveling the differentiated levels of political and 
philosophical consciousness to its most basic and elemental. Moreover, spontaneism 
forgets that the ideological offensive from the ruling class, sharpened in the presence of 
massive social and economic crises, still exerts pressure on some sections of the working 
class who remain politically backward.  
Bureaucratism, sectarism, or substitutionism, on the contrary, emphasizes the 
organization one-sidedly, and privileges the party instead of the masses, acting for the 
proletariat. In this sense, it is sectarian because it posits a “correct” class consciousness 
(of the experts) vis-à-vis the more primitive life of the masses. Both orientations of 
sectarism and spontaneism see the masses really from a reified vantage point. For 
sectarism, masses are objects to be used in the ‘correct’ time decided by the organization; 
for spontaneism, masses are also an undifferentiated mass, an object failing to constitute 
a unified political subject. In one, the mass is an instrument used by the absolute 
discipline and unity of the party’s leaders; in the other, the mass is only an expression of 
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infinitely differentiated feelings and desires. Both approaches share the same one-
sidedness:  
 
“If, on the other hand, it attempts to merge entirely with the spontaneous instinctive 
movement of the masses, it is forced into making a simple equation between the class 
consciousness of the proletariat and the momentary thoughts and feelings, etc., of the 
masses. In consequence it sacrifices every criterion by which to judge correct action 
objectively. It succumbs to the bourgeois dilemma of voluntarism and fatalism. It adopts 
a vantage-point from which neither the objective nor the subjective stages of the course 
of history can be effectively judged. Hence it is led to the extravagant overestimation of 
organization, or else to the no less extravagant underestimation of it. It is forced to treat 
the problem of organization in isolation from the general questions of historical praxis 
and equally from the problems of strategy and tactics.” 
 
Lukács thus distinguishes between the psychological consciousness of the working 
masses and the historical consciousness of the working classes. This historical 
consciousness is not the total sum of the workers’ consciousness but appears when a class 
–a corporate entity- reacts rationally according to its class position to the historical 
situation. Gramsci would speak in this sense of the Party as a “collective intellectual” as 
that “middling element” between party and masses. There is the widespread common 
partisan provided with discipline and faith, then the cohesive element of leadership with 
disciplinary power, and hegemony, which puts into contact the first two elements, “not 
only physically but intellectually.” This class consciousness is not one apriori, but for 
Lukács, is embodied in a revolutionary organization. Lukács sees the party as a living 
mediator of the unorganized masses, bypassing both the Jacobin aspect, represented 
today by Badiou and Zizek and the autonomy of the masses, celebrated by the authors of 
Empire.  
The problem following Laclau, is how to constitute a Party, derivative of how is a 
People constituted? The organizational separation between party and masses signals both 
the great social diversity and heterogeneity of the class, and the partisan unification of 
that class to take power. Additionally, for Lukács, this dialectical interaction between 
mass and party permits both to keep a philosophical theoretical moment in the 
organization and the political effective consciousness of the average member or partisan, 
in a sense that allows to advance political education. The Party is a historical instrument 
that achieves both philosophy and politics through a dual mediation: first, the Party 
mediates between masses and history, seeing the objective situation from a theoretical 
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class position; second, the masses mediate the party and history, it is only through mass 
action that a party can intervene in history. Lukács then proposes a truly speculative 
understanding of the political party, as a unity-in-difference between class and party: 
 
“The criterion for and the guide to the correct relationship between class and the party 
can be found nowhere but in the class consciousness of the proletariat. On the one hand, 
the real, objective unity of class consciousness forms the basis of a dialectical alliance 
despite the organizational separation of class from the party. On the other hand, the 
prevailing disunity, the differing degrees of clarity and depth to be found in the 
consciousness of the different individuals, groups and strata of the proletariat make the 
organizational separation of the party from the class inevitable.”294 
 
The necessity for contemporary communist theories of organization is to reformulate the 
dual mediation of Lukács between popular parties and masses beyond the substitutionist, 
sectarian or the spontaneist understanding of the party-form, given the new conditions of 
late capitalism (the globalization and feminization of the proletariat, militarization of the 
capitalist State, the resurgence of far-right racism, etc.). At stake, it is not only a matter of 
politics, but philosophical understandings of society, social ontologies, and the incapacity 
of thinking mediations, which understand the party as “pure action” or the masses as 
constituting a unity by themselves, “through the collaboration of singular social subjects” 
(as Hardt and Negri’s conception of multitude).  
Maurice Merleau-Ponty provides another model to argue for this dual mediation 
between masses and party. His debate against Sartre puts into relief the radical dualism of 
Sartre’s politics and philosophy for whom the masses were completely alienated, 
“practico-inert” in need of an iron discipline as example of alienation and future 
liberation. Merleau-Ponty provides a more positive assessment of the party in its relation 
with the masses. The ground for a politics of emancipation is the existence of a social and 
historical universe where different individuals can communicate similar experiences of 
exploitation. Merleau-Ponty advances a philosophical conception of party that 
recuperates an open speculative conception of a third element which links the 
simultaneous identity and difference of the partisan phenomenon. Merleau-Ponty reminds 
the reader that Lenin’s model of the Party is not elitist; his elaboration of dialectics 
(beyond Hegel) in relation to the Party resembles many of the speculative models 
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provided here. Merleau-Ponty seeks to propose a middle way between political 
bureaucratism that treats the masses as an object, and some sort of ‘neo-anarchism’.  The 
party sees the masses as Subject, and not as a passive entity to be manipulated. In the 
words of Merleau-Ponty,  
 
“This exchange, in which no one commands and no one obeys, is symbolized by the old 
custom which dictates that, in a meeting, speakers join in when the audience applauds. 
What they applaud is the fact that they do not intervene as persons, that in their 
relationship with those who listen to them a truth appears which does not come from 
them and which the speakers can and must applaud. In the communist sense, the Party is 
this communication; and such a conception of the Party is not a corollary of Marxism-it 
is its very center.”295 
 
Value-Form and Party-Form as Concrete Universals 
The second aspect of a speculative partisanship is how the Hegelian notion of 
concrete universal relates to political organization.
296
 In the analogical or speculative 
perspective, politics produces concrete universals. Social relations give rise either to 
abstract universals and concrete universals. Abstract universals are one-sided, as in 
economic man, or democratic man, or else. That is, human freedom is an abstract 
universal when it is reduced to a single course of action, a single dimension of humanity. 
Marx saw this in his Manuscripts when he stated that capitalism reduces human needs to 
one aspect: wage-dependence and immiserating on the part of the worker, and profit-
dependence and greed for the capitalists. Ignored are other dimensions of human 
existence (creation, solidarity, dreaming, leisure, concrete labor) which makes us 
concrete beings. For Marx, freedom is the recognition of concrete [total] necessities 
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where multiple and contradictory elements are incarnated in one being. The more needs 
are recognized, the freer we become. This requires total logic instead of ordinary logic to 
recognize the manifold nature of human needs.
297
 For Hegel, education and the ethical 
state are examples of individuals as concrete universals, where freedom attains 
conceptual existence in the open recognition of the individual as universal being with 
infinite needs, not only as an abstract bearer of rights.
298
 In his political philosophy Hegel 
makes the following distinction between concrete and abstract universals concerning the 
nature of democracies, which is relevant to our current system. Voting is an example of 
abstract universality; it is registering a private, contingent preference instead of 
concretely taking power or being recognized concretely as a democratic citizen. 
“As for popular suffrage, it may be further remarked that especially in large states it leads 
inevitably to electoral indifference, since the casting of a single vote is of no significance 
where there is a multitude of electors. Even if a voting qualification is highly valued and 
esteemed by those who are entitled to it, they still do not enter the polling booth. Thus the 
result of an institution of this kind is more likely to be the opposite of what was intended; 
election actually falls into the power of a few, of a caucus, and so of the particular and 
contingent interest which is precisely what was to have been neutralized.”299 
 
In Hegel, political organizations constitute concrete universality in the form of a 
corporate body in the ethical state. For Hegel, the family or civil associations are concrete 
universal. Parties and political organizations can also be considered as examples of 
concrete universals: 
 
“This atomistic and abstract point of view vanishes at the stage of the family, as well as 
that of civil society where the individual is in evidence only as a member of a general 
group. The state, however, is essentially an organization each of whose members is in 
itself a group of this kind, and hence no one of its moments should appear as an 
unorganized aggregate… The circles of association in civil society are already 
communities. To picture these communities as once more breaking up into a mere 
conglomeration of individuals as soon as they enter the field of politics, i.e. the field of 
the highest concrete universality, is eo ipso to hold civil and political life apart from one 
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another and as it were to hang the latter in the air, because its basis could then only be the 
abstract individuality of caprice and opinion, and hence it would be grounded on chance 
and not on what is absolutely stable and justified.”300 
 
Thus, in politics, the essence of humanity, which is freedom, is realized. It is made 
concrete in people. An abstract universal would consider economic man, as someone who 
reduces all her needs to the market, but economic man from the perspective of the 
concrete universal, would mean, the economy in the service of the satisfaction of needs. 
But the concrete universal for Marx is not only normative categories of needs, 
but, according to Soviet philosopher Ewald Ilyenkov, concrete universals are also critical 
categories of alienation since capitalism, historical societies produce concrete universals. 
If ordinary logic (Aristotle) sees universals as genres of particulars, dialectical logic 
(Hegel) regards universals being embodies in special particulars, and particulars 
becoming universals in history and development. Thus, the category of value in Marx is 
an example of concrete universal because in its specificity embodies the total logic of 
capital, and it is not a transhistorical conception of value.
301
  
If the party-form embodies one type of concrete universal, it is both a mirror and a 
counter-power to the concrete universal of the value-form. The revolutionary party is not 
a miracle, another Church, a community of the faithful to an exceptional event irrupting 
into the world of capitalist being. The Party and the partisans reproduce this ‘alienated’ 
universe emerging from the form of value to attempt to transcend it. The party emerges 
from specific conditions of struggle, but in those local conditions, the partisan struggle 
express the universal struggle and domination inherent in the law of value. Partisanship 
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like value transverses different politics and different capitals; they are not diffuse without 
concreteness or subjected to one locality without universality. As Lukács states,  
 
“Lenin stubbornly insists on rejecting every utopian view of the human material with 
which the revolution must be made and with which victory must be won: it consists 
necessarily of men who have been brought up in and ruined by capitalist society… The 
Communist Party after all has never claimed to be able to reform the inner nature of its 
member by means of a miracle… The inner life of the party is one unceasing struggle 
against this, its capitalist inheritance. The only decisive weapon it possesses is its ability 
to draw together all the party members and to involve them in activity on behalf of the 
party with the whole of their personality.”302 
The concrete universal also establishes that every form of local struggle has its 
own particular conditions, yet nevertheless they all share the same constituting principle 
of class power. Thus, the structure of the capital relation is universal, but only abstractly, 
and it receives its content and determination locally in the form of anti-colonial, anti-
patriarchal, or anti-capitalist struggles, depending on the level of concrete political and 
economic forces and relations. For the analogical or the speculative imagination, political 
struggles are different and nevertheless they participate of a same nature by analogy, in 
different qualitative proportions. In order for an immanent critique of Capital, proper to a 
speculative perspective, to be operative, one has to assume first the universal nature of 
Capital, but this nature is made concrete in multiple capitals, multiple regimes of 
accumulation and crisis, and forms of rebellion. The dispersal of Capital, which 
constitutes its spread and magnificence, must not be confused with many different 
capitals, as it is the same not to confuse all different concrete capitals with the One 
Capital. If everything revolved under the one law of value, Marx would have had no need 
to write the third volume of Capital. 
Democratic centralism: the speculative unity of the party-form  
For classical Marxists as Lukács and Gramsci, the organizational concept of 
democratic centralism embodies the Hegelian-Marxist logic of identity-in-difference. For 
Gramsci,  
“'Democratic centralism offers an elastic formula, which can be embodied in many 
diverse forms; it comes alive in so far as it is interpreted and continually adapted to 
necessity. It consists in the critical pursuit of what is identical in seeming diversity of 
form and on the other hand of what is distinct and even opposed in apparent uniformity, 
in order to organize and interconnect closely that which is similar, but in such a way that 
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the organizing and the interconnecting appear to be a practical and "inductive" necessity, 
experimental, and not the result of a rationalistic, deductive, abstract process — i.e. one 
typical of pure intellectuals (or pure asses).”303 
 
Parties must consist of both leadership and an active base. The “real movement” of the 
organization comes from its democratic element, but the centralist elements plans for the 
organization. When “democratic centralism” is possible, there is an active energy at the 
grassroots, strong “thrusts from below” energizing and directing the organization. This is 
critical, Gramsci argues, because when it is lacking, when people fail to govern the 
movement, it devolves into “bureaucratic or oligarchic centralism,” into an ossified 
oligarchy in which party leaders rule with impunity. 
 As a concept, democratic centralism is not without merit, especially with the 
authoritarian use of the principle throughout the history of Communist parties because of 
political necessity (as in war communism) or the open repression of Stalinism. Moreover, 
there have been efforts in many sectors of the left to rehabilitate the concept of 
democratic centralism by rescuing it from its authoritarian historical content and 
emphasizing the also historically undefined concept of democracy in the formula. 
Democratic centralism in this sense can be related at present to concepts with more 
political ‘prestige’ such as self-management, participatory democracy, or collective self-
determination. I think it is possible to defend the concept of democratic centralism 
against its historical uses by Stalinists, by creating a new understanding of such central 
concept in political thought, and to re-position democratic centralism against, on the one 
hand, the increasing popularity of concepts and ideas of anarchist, ‘differential’ thinking 
that recants organization and any kind of central decision-making, or, on the other, of 
liberal ideas of ‘representative democracy’ without participation. The speculative 
principle can revise the concept of democratic centralism, by equally emphasizing 
democratic difference in the face of organizational unity. The rise of anti-globalist 
movements in the North has revitalized the Left after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
but their lack of organization and concrete achievements has also objectively 
demonstrated the limitations of such political expressionism and the need for parties 
revolving around democratic centralism. 
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In democratic centralism, unity in the organization and difference of opinion are 
inseparable traits of partisan life. Contrary to the party possessing absolute truth, the 
difference of opinion (the democratic moment) aims precisely at the lack of truth, at the 
open-ended character of historical truth. The organizational moment centralizes the 
decision until the next discussion takes place on a different or similar imperative. Thus, 
for democratic centralism, the party is both destroyed if unity is maintained by sacrificing 
ideological principles (recall the split in the Russian Social-Democratic Party on this 
matter), and if struggle, difference, and factionalism is preferred destroying the party’s 
unity, recanting of the party’s decision when the moment of implementing action comes. 
Hence Lenin, “The principle of democratic centralism and autonomy for local Party 
organizations implies universal and full freedom to criticize, so long as this does not 
disturb the unity of a definite action; it rules out all criticism which disrupts or makes 
difficult the unity of an action decided on by the Party.”304 
To accept democratic centralism according to its concept is opposite to accepting 
the historical reality of historical socialism’s rigid centralization of the Party into an 
intelligentsia or oligarchy. I think that in politics, the most pragmatic and philosophical 
attitude is to possess a speculative attitude and accept the constant unity and struggle 
between the moments of discussion and the moments of organization. Yet this struggle 
within the party or within politics cannot be closured with a definitive victory at the 
danger of party dictatorship or unorganized masses. Neither can the debate be solved in a 
purely intellectual fashion of ideas preceding reality since what is at stake is an objective 
problem of centrifugal and centripetal forces according to the situation. Centralization 
can increase or diminish according to national and international politics with the consent 
of the masses.  In democratic centralism, “there must be”, Gramsci writes, “a continual 
adaptation of the organization to the real movement [of the membership], a matching of 
thrusts from below with orders from above, a continuous insertion of elements thrown up 
from the depths of the rank and file into the solid framework of the leadership apparatus 
which ensures continuity and the regular accumulation of experience.”305 The real 
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movement in democratic centralism is not only the outcome of constant bilateral relations 
between the organization’s leadership and its grassroots base; the real movement also 
means a permanent adaptation to the concrete situation, due to both its high structural 
flexibility of communication and also to its rigid structure once decisions are made. 
The Gramscian “elasticity” of democratic centralism also means the ability to 
balance the political impulse of the bases and leadership with its contrary: the bases 
balance leadership and vice versa. This constant balancing, shifts to and fro the masses 
and the direction, educates both the masses and the leadership, avoiding the problems of 
personalist parties with their corresponding short institutional life, allowing for leadership 
renewal from the masses. In opposition, the bureaucratic centralism of both Stalinist and 
liberal parties have lost that organic dimension of the revolutionary parties and replaced it 
with an oligarchic and elitist nature where the charismatic leader holds the power. Also 
the social movements which lack a clear connection with organization also have lost that 
dimension, being relegated as they are to the level of civil society and marginalized from 
universal policy decision-making. In liberal and Stalinist parties, the relation between the 
party and the masses/constituents is absent; bureaucratic-oligarchic centralism transforms 
them in autonomous entities, only concerned with their own institutional survival. This 
has been possible for the regression in political literacy brought about by consumer 
society, and by the careerism of politicians (the apex of Schlesinger’s “ambition” theory 
of politics) who do not represent anybody but themselves and their parties. I repeat 
bureaucratic centralism is not only the fiefdom of Stalinism. Western liberal parties are 
also based on a static and mechanistic vision of society as self-interest, good as right and 
procedure, and capitalism as a natural and objective fait accompli. 
It remains to be asked, what is the nature of the State for democratic centralism? 
If political parties as mini-political communities practice whether oligarchic or 
democratic centralism, this could also affect the nature and government of the State. 
Madison stands here opposed to Lenin despite what Hardt and Negri say on the 
similarities of both. In Madison, the integrity of the State is assured by breaking up the 
masses. So far the nature of the State has evolved little from monarchic centralism to 
liberal pluralism. Still the State is centralized around classical imperative such as 
property and order. Here again Gramsci provides very useful insights. The State by itself 
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is not the immediate problem in a capitalist society, if it is a workers democratic state, 
and if the local and national States possess an organic relation in the lines of democratic 
centralism, then the State can be a very positive instrument.  The merit I think of Marxist 
instrumentalism is to see a State as a tool of its dissolution, as the masses is the universal 
class in quantitative and qualitative terms. The masses are universal precisely because 
they seek its own negation and ending as masses. For Gramsci, liberalism and anarchism 
disavow the State because both ideologies lack an organic and social conception of 
human communities. These masses are singular or atomized individualities concerned 
only with their locality or self-interested individuality, lacking a universal notion of 
politics. In his polemic against anarchism, Gramsci soon links anarchist critique to 
liberalism,  
“The entire liberal tradition is anti-State. The literature of liberalism is one long polemic 
against the State. The political history of capitalism is characterized by a furious and 
unending struggle between the citizen and the State. The Parliament is the organ of this 
struggle (of private interests), and precisely because of this, Parliament tends to absorb all 
of the functions of the State – in other words, to do away of the State, to deprive it of any 
effective power… Competition is the fiercest enemy of the State [but in liberalism] the 
national State is an organ of competition. It will disappear when competition will be 
eliminated and a new economic practice established…”306 
 
Thus, in democratic centralism, democracy and democratism constitute the 
moment of discursive difference, and centralism represents the organizational unity, a 
mixture of consensus and dissent often forgotten in contemporary political theory, which 
sees democracy only as the permanent irruption of those who have no part, as in social 
movements, or democracy as an aggregation of legitimate speakers (Habermasian 
consensus). Democratic centralism unites and ruptures both. Boris Groys suggests that 
the democratic moment in communism occurs precisely in its discursive dimension, “The 
communist revolution is the transcription of society from the medium of money to the 
medium of language. It is a linguistic turn at the level of social praxis.” For Groys, the 
Soviet Union with all its problems was the historical-political embodiment of 
communism. It was an (ironic) “kingdom” of philosophy, in which language, not money, 
had real-practical meaning. Thus, freedom of speech and dissidence were concretely 
important, enough to be sent to a Gulag. On the other hand, Western societies are mute. 
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Money becomes logos. Freedom of speech is everywhere but without any political 
importance. It produces, in Wolfgang Streeck’s formula, “a process of de-
democratization of capitalism through the de-economization of democracy”, a splitting of 
the two, sanctioned by the US Supreme Court of money finally becoming logos.  
Furthermore, Western societies are divided in such a way that the traditional idea of 
democratic consensus has become more and more impossible. Our societies have become 
managerial democracies because our institutions and capitalism are incapable of 
producing any democratic politics. Hence the economy, with all its a priori assumptions 
on greed, makes our decisions. This is where consensus lies: in the power and willingness 
to consume, in the consensus of desire, of market and consumers, instead of a political 
consensus/dissent between citizens.  For democratic centralism and communism in 
general, money does not play a role, and does not govern its societies.
307
 The exchange of 
ideas with which Merleau-Ponty characterized the life of the party becomes a practice 
where no final consensus is reached, of a language beyond consensus, and when the 
decision to act as a unity is only temporary. This is precisely the linguistic dimension of 
the democratic difference that Stalinism ignored, and for which the moment of 
democracy was never defined and subjected and manipulated to short-term necessities 
and interests (including of course the Nazi colonial invasion). The democratic moment of 
democratic centralism shares with the speculative perspective that the notion of political 
Truth is of a constant ‘failure’, a permanent slippage into new forms of workers’ 
consciousness in their historical situation. Hegel’s speculative logic hopes to provide a 
new understanding of what politics should be from politics’ own conditions. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In this document, I attempted to provide a defense of political partisanship from a 
philosophical perspective by arguing that classical and contemporary philosophy have 
been unable to understand such phenomenon due to its moral and metaphysical 
prejudices, that the Hegelian speculative tradition has been almost alone in defending 
something like a partisan conception of truth, and that Marx and the socialist and 
communist tradition that followed preserved this speculative conception of truth by 
tracing it to the social universe and applying it to the practical tasks of party building and 
organization. In tracing and reinterpreting that history, I hoped I provided a marker on 
how to connect abstract philosophical questions with practical matters of politics. I 
believe following Lenin that there is no revolution without revolutionary theory, no 
politics without philosophy, and conversely, that there is no political philosophy if it does 
not provide guidelines for political practice and exercise,  
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